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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The challenges facing those responsible for energy policy in 
Ireland are considerable, spanning a wide range of different areas 
and a number of difficult economic and organisational problems. 
This paper considers some of the key energy policy issues facing 
Ireland over the next decade suggesting how best they might be 
resolved by policy initiatives. We draw on a range of recent research 
in The Economic and Social Research Institute and elsewhere that 
has informed our understanding of how some of these knotty 
problems in the area of energy policy might best be addressed. 
Looking to the future, the rapidly rising demand for energy due 
to the growth in the world economy is eroding the potential spare 
world oil and gas capacity. With limited prospects of new finds of 
fossil fuels over the coming decades it seems quite likely that real oil 
and gas prices will rise substantially in the longer term. In addition, 
the need to tackle the problem of global warming will also lead to 
increasing real prices for fossil fuels. Preparing for a world of much 
higher energy prices will require significant policy changes. This is 
the context in which energy policy is being formulated in Ireland. 
Ireland does not have a natural advantage in the supply of 
energy, except in the area of renewable resources where, with the 
exception of onshore wind, the technologies are not today 
competitive. As a result, it would not be expected that very energy- 
intensive businesses would locate here. In order to ensure that 
increasingly expensive energy resources are allocated among users in 
an optimal manner it is essential that in all cases business and 
households should pay the full economic cost of energy: there 
should be no explicit or hidden subsidies, even if Irish costs are 
higher than among some competitor countries. However, every 
effort needs to be made to ensure that the energy required is 
delivered at minimum possible cost to both business and household 
customers. 
OBJECTIVES OF ENERGY POLICY 
The overall objective of the state in regulating the energy sector is 
to ensure the lowest possible cost of energy in the long term subject 
to supply being secure and subject to meeting the environmental 
constraints. In this paper we have adopted a simplified approach by 
assuming that energy policymakers will take as given certain 
environmental and security of supply standards and that, 
conditional on these standards, they will then aim to meet the 
nation’s energy requirements at minimum cost. This avoids the 
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problem of having to consider possible trade-offs or conflicts 
between these multiple objectives. 
The need for state intervention in the energy sector arises for 
three reasons: 
1. The presence of economies of scale in parts of the industry, 
which make competition difficult.  
2. Energy is a vital ingredient of modern life and the state has 
an important role in ensuring a secure energy supply, 
including a secure supply of electricity. 
3. The negative environmental externalities that arise from 
energy production and consumption (of which the most 
pressing is global warming) require state intervention to 
move the economy to a more sustainable path.  
ENERGY NEEDS OF A GROWING ECONOMY 
Ireland has seen exceptional economic growth over the last 15 
years. However, the growth in energy demand has been much 
slower. For the future the rate of growth of the Irish economy is 
likely to slow (Bergin et al., 2003), though still remaining more rapid 
that that of the EU generally. The growth in the demand for energy 
is likely to slow further. The two exceptions to this trend are the 
demand for energy from the transport sector and the demand for 
electricity.  
Demand for energy use from transport is likely to continue to 
grow for the foreseeable future. While this will require a further 
increase in the supply of energy, even more important, it will pose 
significant congestion problems. The solution lies in moving Ireland 
towards a more sustainable model of development involving less 
congestion. This would, in turn, deliver significant benefits in terms 
of reduced energy use and emissions. 
While the growth in demand for electricity is slower than that of 
GNP, it is still significant. This means that for Ireland to have a 
secure electricity supply, investment in electricity generation and 
electricity transmission infrastructure will be required for at least 
another decade. Significant additional investment will also be 
needed in transmission infrastructure in order to reap the benefits 
of an integrated all-island electricity market. 
This need for new investment makes Ireland rather different 
from the rest of the EU where capacity is generally adequate. The 
cost of the new investment will have to be paid by consumers in 
Ireland over the next decade whereas in many other EU countries 
the cost of the necessary infrastructure has already been 
substantially paid off. Thus, policy measures to minimise the cost of 
financing infrastructural investment will be more important for 
consumers in Ireland than in much of the rest of the EU. 
SECURITY OF SUPPLY 
Ensuring a secure energy supply for the foreseeable future is of 
crucial importance for the health and economic welfare of the 
country. In the case of oil supplies there is limited action the 
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government can take to ensure physical security. While very 
unlikely, physical interruption to supply would have grave 
consequences. In the very unlikely event of it happening it would 
affect all of the EU and an integrated response at EU level would 
offer the best chance of minimising disruption. 
Over the coming decade Ireland is likely to become increasingly 
dependent on gas to supply its energy needs. In particular, by 2010 
the bulk of electricity generation will depend on gas. This means 
that any physical interruption of gas supply could have very serious 
consequences. If such an interruption were to be sustained for more 
than a few days it could see the island of Ireland lose the bulk of its 
electricity supply with very serious consequences for the health and 
welfare of its citizens.  
While the chances of a break in an undersea pipeline are very 
small, if such an event were to occur it would take some 
considerable time to repair. It is for this reason that the second gas 
pipeline to Scotland was of major importance to the energy security 
of this island. The provision of the second pipeline greatly reduces 
the probability of what was already a very unlikely event. However, 
the vast bulk of the island’s gas supply still goes through a single 
onshore pipeline in Scotland. As a result, it is important that the 
supply of gas from the Corrib gas field is brought onshore as soon 
as possible to enhance the physical security of Irish energy supply. 
In addition, consideration should be given to strengthening the 
onshore gas transmission system in Scotland on which nearly all of 
Irish gas supplies currently depend. 
Ireland, along with other developed economies, faces a much 
greater risk to its economy from sudden shocks to energy prices 
than it does from a possible interruption in physical supply. For 
example, even if there were major disruption in the Middle East, oil 
supplies would still be available – at a price. However, major price 
shocks could have serious economic consequences and the 
regulatory authorities need to consider how best to insure against 
such future shocks. A number of instruments can be used to 
provide such insurance: fuel diversity and financial instruments 
both have roles. The National Treasury Management Agency 
(NTMA) should consider whether the desirability of hedging 
against such risks should affect policy on the portfolio of the 
national pension fund. The regulatory authorities should ensure that 
consumers are aware of potential risks and that, where feasible, 
suitable instruments for hedging risk are available. 
As the price of gas and oil are linked and are both likely to rise 
in real terms it is desirable to have some diversity in the source of 
electricity supplies. For example, undue reliance on gas could be 
limited through a levy on gas used in electricity generation with the 
proceeds of the levy returned to consumers. The need for some 
diversification would suggest awarding some premium to renewable 
energy over and above the market price. This paper provides a 
model for considering the trade off between risk and price in 
deciding on the appropriate fuel mix for electricity generation. Fuel 
diversity should be managed by using market instruments rather 
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than by regulation. Research and Development in alternative energy 
sources will be important in securing the long-term security of 
energy supply for the island. 
With the full integration of the island gas market consideration 
should be given to developing gas storage facilities either in the old 
Kinsale gas field or else in salt caverns near Belfast. At present it 
does not seem wise for the Irish authorities to specifically 
encourage facilities for the supply of Liquified Natural Gas. It 
should be left to market forces to determine if and when such a 
development should take place. 
INTERCONNECTION AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
MARKETS 
An all-island electricity market is likely to confer significant benefits 
on consumers, reducing the long-term cost of a reliable electricity 
supply below what it might otherwise be. To allow an integrated 
and efficient all-island electricity market to develop it is essential 
that there is adequate investment in electricity transmission to 
physically link the existing separate systems. It seems likely that a 
second interconnector between Ireland and Britain could produce 
significant benefits for electricity consumers on the island. 
AN ALL-ISLAND ELECTRICITY MARKET 
The structure proposed for the all-island electricity market by the 
two regulators seems likely to provide the best opportunity for 
securing a competitive supply of electricity for consumers on the 
island of Ireland over the next decade. The electricity pool into 
which all generators will sell their electricity, when combined with a 
suitable regime of capacity payments to electricity generators, 
should encourage supply at a minimum price. It should also 
increase the transparency of the regime making for cheaper and 
more effective regulation.  
The cost of capital is a key ingredient in determining the final 
price of electricity for consumers. The capacity payments regime 
proposed by the regulators will play an important role in minimising 
risk for investors and reducing the cost of capital. Investors will 
know that they will get the bulk of their capital and non-fuel 
operating costs in the form of capacity payments if stations are 
available to generate and if they operate efficiently. This regime 
would provide the right signals for new investment, ensuring the 
provision of adequate electricity generation capacity at least cost. 
Nothing in this regime would prevent the electricity market of the 
island of Ireland being eventually integrated into a British Isles or a 
northwest European market by the end of the next decade. Under 
the new regime the regulators should insist on closure of 
uneconomic plant that is surplus to capacity requirements. For this 
market to operate it is important that the all-island market go ahead 
as planned in mid-2007.  
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MARKET STRUCTURE 
The move to the new all-island market will make the electricity 
sector much more transparent. In the market (pool) each firm will 
offer to supply electricity at a pre-specified price. All firms will 
know that they will receive most of their capital and non-fuel 
operating costs from capacity payments As a result, in the auction 
to supply electricity to the pool each firm will bid in only their fuel 
costs. This will greatly facilitate the information flow to the 
regulator. The regulator will know the price bid by each station and 
will be able to check that price against the price of the fuel delivered 
to that station. This will facilitate the regulatory authority in its task 
of ensuring a level playing field for all market participants.  
The research described in this paper indicates that the move to 
the all-island market will somewhat reduce the ESB’s dominant 
position. In considering the economics of enhanced 
interconnection to Britain the value of such interconnection in 
enhancing competition on the island should also be taken into 
account. The growth in demand for electricity, with further new 
independent generation coming on-stream over the coming decade, 
will also reduce the ESB’s market share. However, even after these 
changes the ESB will still be in a dominant position. 
The operation of the new market structure is likely to encourage 
new investment in generation in segments of the market where the 
existing ESB plant is not very economical. This should see 
significant closure of ESB plant over the rest of the decade to be 
replaced by new plant, generally built by different operators. 
Together with enhanced interconnection to Britain, this should see 
the ESB’s dominant position in the generation sector on this island 
substantially eroded by early in the next decade. 
Finally, the ESB should sell between 500 MW and 1000 MW of 
plant over the period to 2010. If this happens, with the closure of 
uneconomic plant, the ESB could be allowed to replace some of the 
plant that will close. By early in the next decade this would achieve 
the necessary reduction in the ESB’s dominant position. 
It is important that the operator of the transmission system for 
the all-island market should be established on a basis independent 
of all other players. When this happens consideration should be 
given to transferring ownership of the transmission system in the 
Republic to ESB National Grid. Whoever owns the transmission 
system it will be important that that company would contract with 
other companies, including ESB, to maintain and develop the 
system, ensuring competitive pressure on costs. Where possible, 
ESB distribution and supply should also move to buying in services 
on a competitive basis. This is the model that was adopted by Bord 
Gáis Éireann in the late 1980s and it would make the cost structure 
of operators transparent, facilitating regulation. 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
In an ideal world one economic instrument would be used to 
achieve one objective. Using multiple economic instruments to 
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target a single environmental objective is likely to be inefficient and 
to raise the cost of meeting the objective. However, because of 
information deficiencies or other constraints it may be necessary to 
use additional instruments. It is important that the potential costs of 
using multiple instruments to target a single basic environmental 
objective are considered before deciding on the use of additional 
policy instruments.  
The single most pressing environmental issue facing energy 
policymakers is the problem of global warming. Ireland is 
committed to taking action to reduce emissions as part of the EU. 
The EU emissions trading scheme, if suitably reformed should 
provide an appropriate instrument for implementing Kyoto. 
However, as currently implemented by the EU it has very serious 
defects. A reform of the emissions trading scheme should require 
the bulk of permits to be auctioned from 2008 onwards. Failure to 
do so will distort the electricity market, it will reduce the 
environmental effectiveness of the measure and it will substantially 
raise the cost of meeting the environmental objective. Finally, as 
currently implemented the emissions trading regime discriminates 
against renewable energy. 
The current arrangements with Bord na Móna should be revised 
to allow for the gradual replacement of peat by wood biomass as 
the fuel in the three new “peat-fired” power stations. If this is not 
possible the best alternative from the environmental point of view 
would be to close these new stations immediately. 
A properly designed emissions trading regime should generally 
provide the appropriate incentive to develop renewable electricity. 
Under such a regime special treatment of renewables would only be 
appropriate in so far as it was required to incentivise research and 
development. However, the current emissions trading regime 
discriminates against renewables and it may be necessary to offset 
this defect through a continuing special support regime. Any such 
regime must properly reflect the true costs and benefits to society 
of the different types of renewable energy. 
For sectors not covered by emissions trading it will be important 
to introduce a carbon tax. Without such a tax there is a danger that 
Ireland will either fail to reduce its emissions by the required 
amount or else it will do so at undue cost, placing most of the 
burden on the electricity generation sector. 
Tackling the rapid growth in emissions in transport will require 
special measures including the application by the EU of mandatory 
fuel efficiency standards for new motor vehicles. A rationalisation 
of the tax rates on vehicles and fuel and introduction of charging 
for use of road space could simultaneously reduce congestion, 
which has a high cost, and also reduce emissions. In the long run 
policy will need to focus more on developing sustainable cities and 
more energy efficient dwellings. 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND FUEL POVERTY 
The last decade has seen significant improvement in the aggregate 
energy efficiency of the Irish economy. There has been a modest 
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but steady decline in the energy intensity of GNP. Policies to 
promote energy efficiency have been directed mostly at the 
industrial, commercial and institutional sectors and at promoting 
renewable energy. Energy conservation in transport and by 
households has been relatively neglected. 
Of the main policies for overcoming barriers to energy 
efficiency   provision of information, regulations and economic 
instruments –  economic instruments have been least used. 
Inefficient subsidies have been granted and emissions trading has 
begun for energy intensive industrial sectors. However, without 
targeted policies for improvements in energy efficiency, the result 
will be patchy and fall short of its potential. Regulation has been the 
policy most widely employed, but late adoption of energy efficiency 
standards in buildings, difficulties in ensuring compliance, lack of 
engagement in energy efficiency by customers and users, and 
disparities in abatement costs, mean that potential benefits are 
foregone. 
Application of economic instruments, such as a carbon tax, is 
needed. However, in view of recent energy price rises a sensitive 
approach is needed. Economic instruments would reinforce the 
benefits and reduce the shortcomings of regulations and would 
encourage the take-up of energy efficiency advice. Increased 
information is needed on examples of energy conservation that can 
be directly replicated, and on how to access expertise and overcome 
the final hurdle to implementation. The economic benefits of 
Sustainable Energy Ireland’s energy saving schemes needs more 
quantification. 
Fuel poverty is the inability to heat one’s home adequately. It is a 
significant contributor to overall poverty requiring special measures 
to enable households to break out of the spiral of inefficient houses, 
equipment and fuels. Ireland’s winter mortality compared to that in 
the rest of the year is high and it is associated with fuel poverty and 
poor insulation. Fuel poverty is an important energy and economic 
issue because of the inefficiency involved. Tackling the thermal 
performance of dwellings occupied by low-income households 
would greatly reduce or remove the problem of fuel poverty as a 
barrier to the introduction of carbon taxes. 
A major upgrade of policy on fuel poverty is needed  and should 
be focused primarily on improving buildings and equipment, 
combined with education and other supports to efficient behaviour 
and with properly prepared policy evaluation. Fuel poverty should 
not be seen as a reason for avoiding carbon taxes, but rather carbon 
taxes should be viewed as a reason and an opportunity for extra 
funding for policies to tackle fuel poverty. The current very 
substantial energy price rise necessitates action in any event. 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Stone-Age energy has been an essential ingredient for 
sustaining life. Energy for heat and cooking was first provided by the 
sun and the burning of biomass – timber. As commemorated in the 
Christmas carol Good King Wenceslas, through the Middle Ages access 
to timber for fuel was essential for the rich and poor. However, over 
the last two centuries the increasing complexity of modern life and 
the growing sophistication of the economy has seen a dramatic 
increase in energy use, in particular to drive the massive growth in 
transportation technology. This growth in energy use has been made 
possible by the discovery and exploitation on a very wide scale of 
fossil fuels: first coal, then oil and more recently natural gas. Modern 
life is now crucially dependent on the ready availability of a secure 
supply of energy in a convenient form – electricity, gas, peat, oil, 
nuclear and renewable energy.  
1.1 
Background
The complexity of the engineering and economic issues makes 
energy a particularly difficult area to manage. The purpose of this 
paper is to consider some of the range of different issues that 
confront policymakers in the governance of energy policy and to try 
and simplify some, but not all, of these complex issues. This paper 
brings together the results of a range of research undertaken in 
recent years in The Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), 
the results of which contribute to an improved understanding of the 
appropriate policy response to some of the many energy policy 
challenges facing Irish society. This paper concentrates, in particular, 
on the issues for energy policy arising in the electricity and gas 
markets, while giving very limited attention to the important issues 
facing the transport sector. 
Looking to the future, the rapidly rising demand for energy due 
to the growth in the world economy is eroding the potential spare 
world oil and gas capacity. With limited prospects of new finds of 
fossil fuels over the coming decades it seems quite likely that real oil 
and gas prices will rise dramatically in the longer term. In addition, 
the need to tackle the problem of global warming will also lead to 
increasing real prices for consumers of fossil fuels. Preparing for a 
world of much higher energy prices will require significant policy 
changes. This is the context in which energy policy is being 
formulated in Ireland. 
Ireland does not have a natural advantage in the supply of energy, 
except in the area of renewable resources where, with the exception 
of wind, the technologies are generally not at present competitive. A 
consequence of this is that energy prices in Ireland are unlikely to be 
especially low by the standards of the developed world and that as a 
1 
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result energy intensive businesses would not develop new plant in 
Ireland. In all cases Irish business should pay the full economic cost 
of energy: there should be no explicit or hidden subsidies, even if 
Irish costs are higher than among some competitor countries. 
However, every effort needs to be made to ensure that the energy 
required is delivered at minimum possible cost to both business and 
household customers. 
Competitiveness is a key pillar of energy policy along with 
environment and security of supply. We have seen in the 1980s how 
problems in the energy markets can have a significant negative 
impact on Ireland’s competitiveness. At the time, the very high cost 
of electricity in Ireland in the 1980s adversely affected the 
competitiveness of the economy, especially of the manufacturing 
sector. This was addressed in the context of the Culliton report. 
Since the early 1990s there has been a steady improvement in 
Ireland’s position on electricity prices. However, this situation has 
recently been reversed in the face of major new investment needs 
and rapidly rising world energy prices. 
Just because energy is essential to modern life and to sustaining 
today’s life style does not mean that it should receive special 
treatment by governments. For example, food is also essential to 
survival, but the production and distribution of food is largely left to 
market forces in modern economies.1 However, energy is rather 
different from food in the economies of scale and capital intensity of 
production. There are also geopolitical concerns about the 
availability of both oil and gas. For the most flexible form of energy, 
electricity, there is a further complication that it cannot be stored; 
supply and demand must always be equal. 
In most developed countries the government, as regulator, has 
long played an important role in the development and management 
of key parts of the energy sector. The role of the state has typically 
been much greater in this sector than in many other sectors, such as 
retailing and financial services. Historically, the state’s key role in the 
energy sector is not just a reflection of an out of date ideological 
stance; rather, over much of the last century, its role developed as a 
considered response to the need to ensure a cheap and reliable 
source of energy to underpin economic growth.  
In the case of the production of oil the scale of investment and 
the global nature of the business saw the emergence of a small 
number of key multinational companies. Some of these companies 
were owned by governments: BP by the UK government, AGIP, by 
the Italian government etc. In recent years governments have 
 
1 In the aftermath of the shocking dislocation of the Second World War an 
important driving force behind the EEC Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was 
the desire to secure Europe’s food supply for the future. However, after half a 
century of peaceful development, this is no longer an important issue as reliance is 
placed on trade to ensure adequate food supplies for the continent. Another 
analogy is that when governments intervene extensively in key markets, it takes a 
long time for them to effectively extricate themselves – it took 50 years in the case 
of the CAP. 
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generally divested the bulk of their shareholding in these firms and 
the marketplace is truly global. However, governments still have 
major concerns and significant involvement in the sector. These 
geopolitical concerns relate to the small number of countries 
responsible for the bulk of oil and gas supply.  
This paper considers what the role of the Irish government 
should be in managing the energy sector. It examines a number of 
important policy areas and it examines the research evidence on how 
the future secure supply of energy for Ireland can be ensured at 
minimum long-run cost to the consumer. The complexity of the 
issues facing the Irish government (and other governments) has been 
enhanced by the need to take account of the very negative 
environmental impact of the burning of fossil fuels. Together with 
concerns about security of supply this adds further dimensions to 
the problem facing policymakers. 
Generally, in this paper the approach taken is to accept as a given 
the environmental objectives defined under the Kyoto protocol and 
also certain security standards. The job of energy policy is then 
viewed as changing agent’s behaviour and trying to minimise the 
long-run cost of supplying energy in the required form to the Irish 
economy. Even within this seemingly simple objective the 
interaction of security of supply with cost means that the appropriate 
stance of energy policy will not be simple or obvious. At the very 
least there are choices to be made between cost and security of 
supply. The separate identification of environmental standards to be 
met and the cost of environmental damage done can allow the state’s 
environmental objectives to be quantified and, to some extent, 
integrated into the calculus. However, the complexity of the 
engineering and economic issues makes energy a particularly difficult 
area for policymakers. The purpose of this paper is to identify the 
range of different issues that confront policymakers in the energy 
field and to try and simplify some, but not all, of the complexity. 
 
 The state still has a very important role in the energy sector, both 
as regulator to guard customer interests and as a producer (as owner 
of the Electricity Supply Board (ESB), Bord na Móna and Bord Gais 
Éireann (BGE)). In most countries, the government assumes the 
responsibility as the provider of last resort with a statutory obligation 
to take the required emergency action in the case of a sustained 
energy blackout. In less extreme circumstances, the need for the 
state to regulate the sector arises from three important features of 
energy production and distribution. First, many parts of the sector 
are characterised by increasing returns to scale. Given the size of the 
Irish electricity system, a high minimum efficient level of output will 
make it difficult or impossible to rely on the development of 
competitive markets. This is true at the level of the individual 
generator – with the exception of Combined Heat and Power 
(CHP), it is hugely more efficient today to generate electricity in a 
few large generation plants than for each consumer to generate his 
or her own electricity using very small generators. While this 
1.2 
Role of State 
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situation may change in the coming decades with technical 
developments in the sector, it will remain true for some considerable 
time to come. It also arises from the related need to transmit 
electricity from where it is produced and distribute it to consumers.  
The perceived importance of scale economies resulted in major 
state involvement throughout Europe with the development of the 
electricity sector. In Ireland the initial development of the ESB in the 
late 1920s was a response to the huge capital requirements needed to 
fund the initial investment in the Ardnacrusha hydroelectric scheme. 
At the time the Department of Finance had major concerns about 
the scale of the project and the funding pressures that it put on the 
state. However, no other Irish company was in a position to fund 
such a large investment scheme nor were there international 
companies willing to undertake it on a merchant basis. Thus one of 
the key factors driving state involvement was the sheer size of the 
investment needed.  
The electricity and gas markets share two related characteristics. 
The supply of both forms of energy involves very large capital 
investment within Ireland. In addition, the capital investment is likely 
to last a long time: typically at least 20 years for electricity generation 
stations; up to 40 years or more for electricity and gas transmission 
infrastructure. These capital assets cannot be moved once 
constructed so that mistakes in planning capacity can be very costly. 
Second, in the case of security of supply, there are very important 
externalities such that the cost of disruption may be less for the 
players in the market than for society as a whole. There are also 
serious geopolitical concerns that are the proper remit of 
government. Third, a more recent concern relates to the negative 
environmental externalities that arise from energy production and 
consumption. These require state intervention to ensure an optimal 
outcome in terms of the sustainability of energy use.  
The role of the state as producer is, to some extent, a legacy 
arising from the development, under very different circumstances, of 
the electricity and gas sectors. These sectors are highly capital 
intensive, which makes the management of financial risk a high 
priority. In the case of network infrastructure there are good 
arguments for continuing state involvement. However, experience 
elsewhere has shown that, where competitive markets can be 
developed, this can benefit consumers through encouraging greater 
efficiency in production.  
The initial position of the state is one of substantial direct 
involvement in the sector and the restructuring necessary to allow 
the state to exit from this role cannot be implemented overnight. 
The combination of the capital intensity of the sector, the need for 
new investment, and the small size of the market makes the Irish 
electricity market different from the electricity market elsewhere in 
the EU. It means that ready-made solutions to Ireland’s problems 
are not available and it is necessary to develop a new “model” of the 
market to deliver electricity and gas to Irish consumers at minimum 
long-term cost. 
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Ireland has a long history of promoting the interests of producers 
instead of the interests of consumers. This emphasis must be 
understood in the context of the country’s twentieth century history 
– a dependence on agriculture and a shortage of suitable 
employment. In their report Regulatory Reform of the Irish Economy, the 
OECD (2001) noted the extent of the “producer focus” in Ireland, 
and the resulting reduced emphasis on the benefits of competition. 
The OECD report suggested that if the competitiveness of the Irish 
economy were to be sustained in the future, action would have to be 
taken to redress the balance in favour of competition and the 
consumer. It is from this background that we approach the 
principles that should inform Irish energy policy. Ultimately, the 
objective of policymakers should be to minimise the cost of energy 
without subsidisation to Irish consumers in the long run, while 
fulfilling environmental responsibilities and ensuring that the supply 
of energy in its different forms is secure. 
In trying to promote a competitive market the state naturally has 
to focus on the conditions necessary to allow many firms to flourish. 
Without the active competition of many firms, where many is 
generally five or more, real competition is unlikely and the 
consumers’ interest in low prices will not be easily delivered. 
However, there is a danger for policymakers that the focus on 
creating conditions for many firms to flourish will distract from the 
ultimate objective – low prices for consumers. In trying to make the 
market attractive through providing profitable opportunities for 
investors the advantage of competition for consumers, lower prices, 
could be negated. 
The point of regulation is to ensure that in the long run Irish 
consumers get the best possible value for their expenditure on 
energy through keeping prices as low as possible.2 While Ireland’s 
peripheral location3 may make the cost of primary energy, especially 
the price of gas, higher than for our EU neighbours, the objective of 
policy should be to make Ireland more efficient than much of the 
rest of the EU. This would mean that, in spite of our peripheral 
location, Irish consumers could enjoy the lowest possible prices. 
The corollary of the focus on the needs of consumers is that 
employment creation or employment maintenance should not play a 
significant role in future energy policy decisions. It also means that 
the needs of individual companies, public or private, should not 
drive future policy or thwart efficiency gains from competition. They 
are there to serve the economy by providing secure energy supplies 
at a minimum long-run cost. Whether they are privately or publicly 
owned, the profitability of companies operating in the sector should 
be no more than is necessary to ensure that our energy needs are 
 
2 As mentioned earlier, consumers should face the full economic cost of the energy 
they are using. Otherwise they will overuse energy, reducing national income. 
Because most of the externalities associated with energy use are negative it is more 
important than in other sectors to ensure that prices facing consumers (both 
business and households) are not subsidised by the state. 
3 Peripheral with respect to the source of future gas supplies. 
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met. Where competitive markets are possible this will be delivered 
without further state intervention. However, what makes the energy 
sector unusual in the modern Irish economy is that the necessary 
scale of operations makes competition difficult, and in some cases 
impossible to deliver.4 It is for the above reasons that state 
intervention is essential in regulating the market. 
In the past energy policy has from time to time been affected by 
public policy concerns to promote economic growth and 
employment. However, it is now generally accepted that it is more 
appropriate to use other policy levers to promote such goals. Using 
energy policy as a means of promoting employment growth is likely 
to prove very expensive. Even in the 1980s, when employment 
growth was a major policy concern, intervention through the energy 
sector was generally an inappropriate and expensive mechanism for 
pursuing such a goal.  
In a regional policy context it is also very ineffective to use 
explicit or implicit energy subsidies to promote development. It will 
be much more effective to spend available funds on directly 
promoting regional development through other mechanisms. 
However, obstacles in the planning system can still act as a 
significant barrier to development through slowing or preventing the 
deployment of necessary energy transmission infrastructure where 
there is a clear economic case for such investment. In recent years 
this has been the case for investment in electricity transmission in 
the West and North-West of Ireland where shortage in capacity is 
constraining development.5  
 
 Three significant events in the 1970s led to a focused interest in 
Irish energy policy which culminated in the 1978 White Paper Irish 
Energy Policy and also the publication of a separate but identically 
titled report by the National Economic and Social Council in 1983. 
Of these events, the first  –  the massive increase in oil prices in 1973 
– brought to an end an era of cheap energy supplies and was further 
compounded by a second oil crisis in 1979. Second, the discovery of 
commercial quantities of gas off Kinsale underlined the need for 
policies on the development, allocation and pricing of indigenous 
energy sources. Third, there was extensive discussion of the 
desirability or necessity of nuclear-fuelled electricity generating 
capacity. The country’s obligations as a member of the European 
1.3 
The Evolution 
of Irish Energy 
Policy
 
4 The International Energy Agency (IEA) considers that a conventional fossil fuel 
generating plant has to be at least 400 MW to achieve minimum efficient scale. 
However, this is for baseload production (on most of the time) and the opposite 
argument can also be made that the flexibility of smaller units to follow actual 
demand (with its peaks and troughs throughout the day) may have been 
undervalued in the past. It is best left to an efficient market with investment 
certainty to design the most efficient generation portfolio.  
5 However, in the case of gas it will not be economic to provide transmission 
infrastructure to all parts of the country. In the case of sparsely populated regions 
the funds which might be spent on investment in providing gas transmission could 
achieve a much greater impact on regional development if spent in other ways. 
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Community and the International Energy Agency also served to 
focus attention on energy matters.6 While some public discussion 
followed the 1978 White Paper, there was no official response to the 
discussion, partly because the nuclear issue receded following a 
tapering off in electricity demand.7
Over the last decade there have been major changes in the 
institutional framework of the energy market. The EU, in pushing 
for increased competition, has been a major force driving change. 
Even without the EU, change was inevitable, reflecting the evolving 
needs of the economy. The prospect of a changing market structure 
has already resulted in major improvements in existing state energy 
utilities. The establishment of the Commission for Electricity 
Regulation, now the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER), 
reflects this need for a continuing public involvement in managing 
the sector, whatever the ownership of the companies actually 
providing services. However, the current market structure is far from 
perfect and it is not clear what is the best direction for future 
development. There is a danger that the current market structure, 
unless modified, could deliver a high price and unreliable services to 
Irish consumers. 
 
 This paper brings together the results from a wide range of energy 
policy research undertaken by the ESRI in recent years. As reflected 
in the title of this paper, Aspects of Irish Energy Policy, it does not 
attempt to cover all the important issues facing energy policymakers 
in Ireland. Instead it focuses on the areas of policy where recent 
research can make a significant contribution to public understanding. 
In particular, we provide very limited analysis of the energy-related 
issues that arise in the case of transport. 
1.4 
Outline of the 
Paper
This paper first outlines some of the key factors currently driving 
change in the market. These include, the pressures arising from the 
rapid growth of the economy, resulting in significant infrastructure 
shortages. Second, this paper considers how the market structure 
needs to change to deliver efficient and cheap energy to consumers 
over the coming decade. The third factor that will drive change over 
the coming decade is the need to prepare the economy to comply 
with the requirements of international environmental commitments, 
including the Kyoto protocol on tackling the problem of global 
warming. Finally, part of the solution to the pressures which are 
 
6 The IEA was established in 1974 as an autonomous body within the framework 
of the OECD to undertake energy monitoring and co-operation.  
7 Prior to 1977 responsibility for energy matters rested with the Department of 
Transport and Power. In 1977 responsibility was transferred to the Minister for 
Industry and Commerce which then became the Department of Industry, 
Commerce and Energy. By 1980 the increased involvement of the state in energy 
matters gave rise to the creation of a separate Department of Energy with 
responsibility for energy, mines, minerals and petroleum. In July 1981, a further 
change resulted in the creation of the Department of Industry and Energy as the 
responsibility of one Minister.  
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growing on the energy market will involve enhanced investment in 
energy efficiency. 
In addition to the economic and engineering considerations, 
there may be other considerations that do not fit within the 
economic calculus of “least cost” solutions. Two important 
considerations that make the policy choices more difficult politically 
are the interests of providing jobs, mentioned above, and the related 
concern about the industrial relations impact of what may be the 
“obvious” economic answers. These issues are dealt with later in this 
paper. 
This paper concentrates on energy policy related to electricity and 
gas. It only considers policy on other fuels where the other fuels may 
be used in electricity generation.8 This simplification does not mean 
that important issues do not exist in the field of oil supply and 
marketing, but rather that the answers can be determined 
independently of decisions on electricity and gas. In the case of 
electricity and gas, the markets for the two fuels are highly 
interrelated and cannot be considered separately. 
Chapter 2 of this paper discusses the energy needs of a rapidly 
growing economy. The fact that the demand for energy in general 
and electricity in particular will rise quite rapidly over the coming 
decade makes Ireland unusual in the context of the wider EU. The 
need for significant new investment means that policies, which may 
work elsewhere in the EU, may not be appropriate in Ireland. The 
important issues underlying the need to ensure a secure energy 
supply are dealt with in Chapter 3. It considers the problems posed 
by uncertainty about the future availability of oil, gas and electricity 
and also by uncertainty about their future price. It also considers the 
choices to be made between the cost and security of supply. 
Chapter 4 considers how future developments in electricity 
interconnection may transform the isolated Republic of Ireland 
electricity system initially into an all-island system and possibly 
eventually into part of a British Isles or a North-West European 
system. The development of an all-island electricity market from 
2007 onwards will require a new market structure for electricity. The 
implications of different market structures are teased out in Chapter 
5. The chapter concludes that the structure being proposed by the 
two regulators, the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) and 
the Northern Ireland Authority for Energy Regulation (NIAER), is 
broadly appropriate. 
With the liberalisation of the electricity market future investment 
will be driven by the incentives provided by the all-island market. 
However, the incumbent Electricity Supply Board (ESB) is clearly a 
dominant player in that market. Chapter 6 examines how the issue of 
dominance can best be dealt with in an all-island context. Energy 
policymakers are faced with a range of important environmental 
 
8 This is not to say that other major areas such as heat and oil for transport are less 
important, only that they should be subjects of further in-depth research in their 
own right.  
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issues that will, of necessity, impact on the energy sector over the 
coming decade. The implications of environmental constraints and 
the appropriate economic mechanisms for managing them are 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 looks at the important issue of energy efficiency and 
the obstacles to realising potential gains in both the household and 
the business sectors. The appropriate policy response is also 
discussed. The chapter also briefly considers the issue of “fuel 
poverty”. Finally, in Chapter 9, the conclusions of the paper are 
drawn together and summarised. 
A glossary of abbreviations used in the paper is provided as 
Appendix 1. 
 
 
2. ENERGY NEEDS OF 
A GROWING ECONOMY 
Compared to other European economies, the Irish energy market 
is relatively small and the electricity and gas systems are isolated 
geographically. However, trade in energy fuels means that, subject to 
transport costs, if market forces operate effectively they ensure that 
prices in Ireland are competitive with those elsewhere in Northern 
Europe. The isolated nature of the Irish energy supply system has in 
the past restricted the possibility of competition for fuels and it has 
potentially imposed additional costs. The next section examines the 
current cost of energy for Irish users for a range of fuels and 
compares these costs with those of neighbouring countries. In 
discussing the future role of Irish energy policy it is useful to assess 
the evolution of energy demand and supply and Section 2.3 
considers the major changes that have occurred in the demand for 
energy in Ireland over recent years. An understanding of the drivers 
of energy demand in the past is important in preparing outline 
forecasts for energy demand over the coming decade. The forecasts 
are described in Section 2.4. 
2.1 
Introduction
 
 In the 1980s Irish electricity prices moved out of line with those in 
neighbouring economies. Over the 1990s this position was 
substantially redressed. However, today Irish electricity prices have 
again moved above those of other relevant EU economies. By 
contrast, the price of gas available to the nation was very low in the 
1980s relative to the EU price due to a favourable deal over Kinsale 
gas. As that indigenous gas has run out Irish gas prices have come to 
follow those in Britain, whence supplies are currently sourced. As 
prices on the British market have risen dramatically over the last 
eighteen months (due to supply constraints),9 prices have accordingly 
risen in Ireland. 
2.2 
Relative Energy 
Prices
Table 2.1 shows a comparison of the tax exclusive prices of 
electricity, oil, coal and gas to users for a range of countries in 2004. 
The prices are shown in euros to facilitate comparisons. With the 
exception of oil for electricity generation, these data suggest that 
10 
 
9 Some of these constraints may be relieved with the advent of increased 
interconnection for gas between Britain and the continental EU market over the 
coming two years. 
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transport costs are imposing a premium over and above Ireland’s 
European neighbours.  
Table 2.1: Relative Energy Prices (Tax Exclusive), 2004 (Euro) 
 Ireland 
Per kWh 
UK France Denmark Netherlands 
Electricity – Households 0.1225 0.1055 0.0855 0.0940 0.1015 
Electricity – Industry 0.0770 0.0476 0.0356 0.0704 c 
 Per 107 kilocalories (TOE) 
Gas – Households 404.26 324.20 373.88 376.75 348.79 
Gas – Electricity Generation 148.91a 116.79a .. c .. 
Coal – Electricity Generation 54.13 41.51a 53.60 .. .. 
Oil – Households 397.19 244.76 321.22 367.88 347.53 
Oil – Electricity Generation 150.49 157.22 155.75 .. 191.40 
Notes: a = data for 2003; c= confidential. 
Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Prices and Taxes. 1st Quarter 2005. 
 
 A recent report by Sustainable Energy Ireland (SEI, 2005) has 
analysed trends in energy use in Ireland since 1990. Table 2.2 shows 
the small scale of Ireland’s total energy requirement compared with 
that of its EU neighbours. Ireland’s total requirement of energy is 
shown at just over 15 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) or 3.91 
toe per capita. This represents just 1 per cent of the total energy 
requirement of the EU(15) in 2002. Energy use per capita is slightly 
higher than that for the UK and Denmark but is lower than that of 
the majority of the larger EU members.  
2.3 
Past Trends in 
Energy Use
Table 2.2: Scale of Irish Energy Requirement, 2002 
 Total Primary Energy 
Requirement 
TPER Per Capita 
Ireland 15.3 3.91 
UK 257.81 3.83 
France 265.88 4.34 
Germany 346.35 4.20 
Italy 172.72 2.98 
Austria 30.44 3.78 
Denmark 19.75 3.67 
Finland 35.62 6.85 
Belgium 56.89 5.51 
Sweden 51.03 5.72 
Netherlands 77.92 4.83 
Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries (various years). 
 
The demand for energy in Ireland is a derived demand, driven by 
economic growth. However, factors such as changing energy prices 
and technological progress can have a moderating influence on 
demand by causing a substitution away from energy products, or by 
introducing more efficient use of fuels. In addition, with rising 
incomes, patterns of consumption can change, with food and 
heating accounting for a diminishing share of additional 
consumption, while other goods and services increase their share. In 
addition, the structure of the production sector also changes 
gradually over time reflecting changes in Ireland’s comparative 
advantage. Over the last decade there have been some significant 
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closures of energy intensive manufacturing firms, reflecting the 
relatively high cost of energy in Ireland compared to some of our 
EU partners. 
Figure 2.1: Irish Energy Demand and GNP 
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The demand for primary energy broadly kept pace with the 
growth in real GNP until the 1980s, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Energy demand actually fell in the mid-1980s as the economy 
struggled. In recent years the growth in GNP has dramatically 
outpaced the growth in demand for primary energy. The change in 
energy intensity can be decomposed into two factors: structural 
change in fuel use and changes in technical energy efficiency.10 Gas 
has significantly increased its market penetration in recent years 
(Figure 2.2) while energy efficiency accounts for a significant 
proportion of the improvements in energy intensity (Conniffe, 
1993). Most potential for additional future gains in the economic 
return from energy use rests with this latter effect. 
In Figure 2.2 we show the breakdown of total primary energy 
requirement (TPER) by fuel in 1980 and 2003 showing the changes 
in the fuel mix over the last 20 years. It is obvious that oil is the 
dominant fuel in the Irish market, and has been so for the last 20 
years. Its share was around 64 per cent in 2003, identical to its share 
in 1980. Since 1980 the share of final energy accounted for by 
electricity and gas has risen rapidly, so that in 2003 electricity 
accounted for 17 per cent of final energy demand and gas accounted 
for 11 per cent. The share of consumption met from coal and peat 
has fallen dramatically since 1980, as both firms and households 
have shifted their consumption to cleaner, more efficient fuels. 
Although electricity has increased its share, natural gas was the main 
beneficiary of this shift in consumption patterns, increasing its share 
from just 2 per cent in 1980 to 11 per cent in 2003. 
 
10 By technical efficiency we mean the efficiency with which the calorific value of 
fuel is converted into useful energy, such as heat. 
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Figure 2.2: Total Demand for Energy by Fuel 
 
 
 
During the first half of the 1990s, final consumption11 of 
electricity grew by almost 25 per cent, an identical growth rate to that 
of GNP over the period. However, between 1995 and 2000, final 
consumption of electricity grew by around 35 per cent while GNP 
grew by almost 50 per cent in real terms over the same period. This 
reflects the fact that the rate of growth of demand for electricity (and 
other energy) is declining relative to the growth in income (GNP). 
Table 2.3 shows the growth in final energy consumption by sector 
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11 Total final consumption of energy (TFC) is the sum of the consumption of each 
fuel (including electricity) by sector, excluding energy lost in transformation 
(electricity production, oil-refining etc.). 
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for the 1980s and for the most recent period 1990-2004. It shows 
how the growth in demand from the transport sector is very much 
more rapid than that from all other sectors. While the commercial 
sector also has quite a high growth rate (reflecting the changing 
structure of the economy), it is much smaller in absolute size than 
the demand from transport use. As a result, when looking forward at 
the drivers in the growth in energy demand and related emissions of 
pollutants the transport sector should receive special attention. 
However, this issue is not dealt with in detail in this paper. 
Table 2.3: Growth in Final Consumption of Energy by Sector, Per 
Cent  
 1980-1990 1990-2004 
Industry -1.3 0.9 
Transport 1.6 5.9 
Residential 1.2 2.0 
Commercial / Public 5.3 4.1 
Agriculture na 1.6 
Total 1.5 3.4 
Source: SEI, 2005, Energy in Ireland 1990-2003. 
Table 2.4: Characteristics of the Irish Electricity System, 2003 
 Republic of 
Ireland 
Northern 
Ireland 
All Island 
Generating Capacity MW 5,324 1,97812 7,302 
Peak Demand MW 4,389 1,539 5,928 
Peak as % of Capacity 82.4 77.8 81.2 
Electricity Generated MWh 25,044,000 8,599,000 33,643,000 
 
Table 2.4 shows the generating capacity available on the island of 
Ireland in 2003. As can be seen from this table, the electricity system 
in the Republic of Ireland is substantially larger than the Northern 
system. In 2003 peak winter demand was over 82 per cent of 
capacity in the Republic. This represented quite a tight margin, given 
the low availability of older generating capacity and the possibility of 
unexpected events affecting station availability. In Northern Ireland 
the margin over peak demand was significantly greater. 
Table 2.5: Oil Consumed in the Irish Economy as Percentage of GNP 
    1980 1990 2003 
Share of Oil in the Value of GNP 8.0 3.2 1.8 
Share of Gas in the Value of GNP 0.4 0.6 0.3 
Source: GNP from CSO, National Income and Expenditure. Imports of oil and gas in 
value from CSO, Trade Statistics. Domestic production of gas valued at price 
paid by electricity generators, which may be understated due to 
undercounting of gas imports in the trade statistics. 
 
 
 
12 Includes 400 MW in capacity for the electricity interconnector to Scotland. 
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Table 2.5 shows how the share of GNP spent on oil and gas has 
changed over the last quarter of a century. It shows that the Irish 
economy in 2003 was very much less vulnerable to the direct effects 
of shocks in oil prices than it was in 1980. The combination of 
economic growth in less energy intensive areas and the fall in the real 
price of oil in the mid-1980s means that it would take a much larger 
oil price shock than occurred in the 1970s to have a similar direct 
impact on the Irish economy. However, due to the globalisation of 
the Irish economy today the economy is obviously more vulnerable 
today to the indirect effects of such a shock operating through its 
effects on the world economy. 
Gas consumption, which represented 0.6 per cent of GNP in 
1990 accounted for only 0.3 per cent by 2003.13 However, the rapid 
growth in consumption of gas in the electricity sector combined with 
a dramatic rise in gas prices means that gas today accounts for a 
significantly higher share of GNP than two years ago. 
 
 The ESRI Medium-Term Review: 2003-2010 (Bergin et al., 2003) 
published forecasts for the demand for energy over the coming 15 
years. The forecast demand for primary energy under different 
scenarios is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The solid line represents the 
Benchmark forecast. However, because of the uncertainty that 
surrounds the macroeconomic forecasts, a number of alternative 
scenarios for the growth in potential output were also considered. 
Here we consider the implications of the scenarios referred to as 
“High Growth” and “Low Growth” for energy demand.14 In the low 
growth scenario primary energy demand would be almost 1 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE) less than the benchmark forecast by 
2020. In the case of the high growth scenario the Benchmark would 
underestimate the primary energy demand by over 1 million TOE 
per annum by 2020. 
2.4 
Forecast 
Demand
As a result of forecasting errors at the end of the 1970s15 a large 
amount of new electricity generating capacity was built, in particular 
the Moneypoint coal-fired power station.16 This new capacity came 
on stream at a time when the economy was performing poorly and 
the result was considerable excess capacity lasting throughout the 
1980s and the 1990s. The need to finance this excess resulted in very 
high electricity prices in the 1980s, followed by declining real prices 
in the 1990s as the existing capacity was gradually paid for and as 
new capacity was not required. The transmission infrastructure was 
 
13 There is some uncertainty about these figures because of questions about the 
reliability of the trade statistics. 
14 These involve average annual growth rates of around one percentage point above 
and below the benchmark forecast. Over the last 15 years our medium-term 
forecasts have underestimated future growth by something over one percentage 
point a year – hence the margin of error encompassed in the scenarios.  
15 The forecasting errors at the end of the 1970s arose from reliance on official 
government forecasts which always had a low probability of proving correct. 
16 Coal was the fuel of choice to reduce the dependence of the economy on oil. 
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also adequate to the country’s needs in the 1980s. In the case of gas, 
major investment was undertaken to extend natural gas supplies to 
the major urban areas.  
Figure 2.3: Forecast Energy Demand 
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By 2000, the previous excess of electricity generating capacity had 
been eroded and it was clear that new capacity was required. Given 
the forecast for electricity demand shown in Bergin et al., 2003, there 
will have to be up to 2,000 MW of new generation capacity put in 
place over the coming 15 years. (Each new gas-fired station adds 
around 400MW, at a capital cost per plant of around €250 million to 
€300 million.) Already a number of new generating stations have 
been built or are in the process of development. This need for more 
generation arises from the recent period of rapid growth and the 
continuing capacity for the economy to outperform its neighbours, 
at least up to the end of the current decade. Putting in place a market 
structure that will deliver this investment at minimum cost to 
consumers is discussed later in Chapter 6. 
The need for new electricity generation also makes Ireland rather 
different from the rest of the EU. Because of the slower economic 
growth in most other EU economies electricity demand is rising 
much more slowly than in Ireland. The result is that there is no need 
to incentivise major new investment. The rest of the EU is in a 
situation rather similar to Ireland in the early 1990s; it can coast 
along on the basis of past investment, with the price of electricity 
falling somewhat below its long-run cost of production. The Irish 
electricity price henceforth will have to signal the full long-run cost 
of production in order to remunerate recent and potential capital 
investment.  
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The electricity transmission infrastructure is also inadequate to 
the needs of a rapidly growing economy. Unless the planned major 
further investment (Transmission System Operator Ireland, 2002) is 
delivered on time it could have a wider impact on growth.17 In a 
paper on problems with the EU electricity market Newbery, 2002 
says: 
 
The best short-run method of supporting electricity 
liberalisation is to rapidly increase transmission capacity. 
Newbery (2002), p. 926. 
 
In the longer term the integration of the two electricity markets 
on this island, and possibly the eventual integration of the Irish 
system with that in Britain, may be very important in promoting 
competition. For this to happen transmission capacity will have to be 
expanded in advance of demand. If transmission capacity is only just 
adequate for demand, or cannot handle demand, then it will allow 
generators in each jurisdiction to charge monopoly prices. It was for 
this reason it was important that gas transmission infrastructure was 
expanded ahead of demand and the same applies to electricity. 
Obviously it is possible to over invest in transmission infrastructure, 
but the EU experience to date has been one of underinvestment. 
This issue is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
 
• Energy prices are currently higher in Ireland than in 
neighbouring EU countries. In the case of gas this can be partly 
accounted for by problems in the UK gas market (and the fact 
that Ireland is currently importing gas). In the case of electricity 
the need to undertake major new investment is currently 
putting significant upward pressure on prices.  
2.5 
Summary
• The Irish energy system is the second smallest (after 
Luxembourg) in the EU(15). Our average energy requirement 
per capita is lower than the EU average requirement. 
• Demand for energy from the transport sector is growing more 
rapidly than is demand from all other sectors of the economy. 
• The demand for energy, and for electricity in particular, will 
continue to rise quite strongly well into the next decade, while 
the non-transport demand for energy in other forms will show 
only moderate growth 
• There is a need for major investment in new electricity 
generation capacity over the coming decade. 
 
17 The major obstacle to implementation is in the physical planning procedures. 
There are no engineering or financial obstacles to implementation. 
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• There is also a need for major investment in electricity 
transmission, especially to help create an integrated island 
electricity market. 
3. SECURITY OF 
SUPPLY18
Energy plays a vital role in our society, underpinning all areas of 
economic activity. The economic impact of supply disruptions can 
be high, affecting all sectors of the economy and it is difficult to 
insure against such risks commercially. In formulating energy policy 
governments must recognise this potential market failure with an 
energy policy to ensure that affordable energy is readily available 
with minimal risk of supply disruption.19 This chapter identifies a 
range of security of supply risks that could potentially affect the Irish 
economy. There are two different aspects to security of supply of 
energy. The first involves physical security, highlighted in the war 
years by the problems in importing oil – it was unavailable at any 
price. The second aspect is whether, even if available, the price of 
that availability is dramatically higher than the economy can readily 
absorb.  
 3.1 
Introduction
As electricity and oil for transport, the hospital sector and other 
key services are essential to modern life, it is vitally important that a 
reliable supply is always available. As Ireland becomes more and 
more dependent on gas to generate electricity the issue of the 
physical security of the gas supply has grown in importance. The 
provision of the second gas pipeline to the UK has greatly reduced 
the previous small risk of a medium-term complete disruption to 
supply through breakage of the then single under-sea pipeline. This 
is no longer a significant concern, though the fact that all the island’s 
supplies go through a single short piece of pipeline in Scotland 
leaves some residual concerns. 
Even more important than the price of energy is the reliability 
with which it is provided to the business and the household sectors. 
Foreign direct investment has been reassured by the reliability of the 
system over the last decade, but the growing pressures on supply in 
19 
 
18 This chapter draws on the analysis in DKM, ESRI and Electrotec, 2004. 
19 Several plans and safeguards are in place including the ‘Black Start plan’ and the 
ESBNG ‘Generation Adequacy Report’ which informs market participants, 
regulatory agencies and policy makers of the likely generation capacity required to 
achieve an adequate electricity supply in the medium term. They use an 
internationally accepted methodology for establishing the likely generation required 
to achieve an adequate electricity supply to balance the risk of supply shortage (Loss 
of Load Expectation (LOLE) against an accepted security standard of eight hours 
LOLE per annum.  
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the sector must give some cause for concern. It is very important 
that they are addressed to ensure that the past record of reliability is 
maintained over the course of the coming decade. Apart from the 
possibility of interruption of the single most important fuel, a failure 
by the market to deliver the necessary increase in electricity 
generation capacity could see Ireland facing electricity shortages later 
in the decade. While not nearly as serious as a loss of supply for a 
number of months, the potentially disruptive effects of such an 
outcome mean that a major objective of policy should be to ensure 
adequate provision for new generation (and necessary transmission). 
This issue is dealt with later in Chapter 5. 
The second security issue concerns excessive dependence on a 
single fuel where the risk arises from the possibility of shocks to the 
price of that fuel. If, as seems likely, Ireland becomes more 
dependent on gas than most other EU countries, then a shock to gas 
prices would adversely affect Ireland’s competitiveness. For a large 
price shock the adverse economic effects could be quite significant.20
As EU gas supplies (especially UK supplies) run out over the 
coming decade, gas users will become more and more dependent on 
a handful of sources of gas – Russia (Gazprom), Norway, Iran and 
Algeria. With so few suppliers this leaves open the possibility that 
they could use monopoly power to extract high prices from 
consumers who had committed themselves to gas through major 
investment in infrastructure. 
These separate risks concerning the security of supply can 
potentially affect all types of energy: there is a risk of physical 
interruption in the supply and networks of gas and electricity, as well 
as of oil, and most forms of energy are subject from time to time to 
quite extreme price movements. These two types of risk are 
considered separately – quantity risks and price risks. The probability 
of the two types of shock affecting, for example, gas, are very 
different and they have very different economic implications.  
The types of risks facing the Irish energy market are considered 
in more detail in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses the benefits of 
fuel diversification as a means of managing risks. Section 3.4 
quantifies the cost-diversity trade-off using a probabilistic approach 
to managing risk based on modern portfolio theory. Section 3.5 
outlines some policy instruments and options for achieving the 
optimal level of fuel diversity in the short, medium and long terms. 
Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 See J. Fitz Gerald, 2003, “The Macro-Economic Implications of Gas 
Dependence”, ESRI Working Paper 149. 
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QUANTITY RISKS 3.2 
The Key Risks The causes of “quantity” insecurity in the energy sector include: 
• the operational reliability of energy systems; 
• risks related to the scarcity and uneven distribution of 
primary fuels (leading to a concentration of market power). 
In the first very unlikely case, physical interruption of the gas 
pipelines supplying Ireland could leave the economy without gas 
supplies. Another example, which could give rise to a physical 
inability to supply a key form of energy – electricity – would be a 
breakdown in a particular type of electricity generator due to a lack 
of technology diversification. The second type of interruption covers 
cases such as political instability in the Middle East or in the sources 
of gas supply, which could also see a physical interruption in 
supplies. 
Firms (and households) investing in the Irish economy should 
consider the risk of physical interruption of fuel supply. For 
instance, any physical interruption in supply would leave a gas-fired 
electricity generating plant stranded, losing significant profits while 
fuel was unavailable. In a competitive market firms will factor in 
some of this quantity risk into their investment decisions in so far as 
they are liable for the costs of an interruption. However, the 
potential losses of individual firms are only limited to their medium-
run fixed costs for the time that fuel is unavailable and so long as 
these risks are not insurable commercially.  
However, for the economy as a whole a physical interruption in 
supply of fuel and electricity would be extremely serious where 
substitute energy supplies cannot be found in a reasonable time 
scale. Electricity is an essential ingredient in modern life and this is 
reflected in its very inelastic demand.21 A very extensive interruption 
of output across the economy would be inevitable from a prolonged 
interruption of electricity supplies. While probably less important 
than the social impact, if an unanticipated interruption was sustained 
for much longer, the loss of industrial output could seriously affect 
domestic and export markets leading to a long-run loss of national 
income. 
According to Tishler (1993), there are four sources that 
contribute to the cost of an electricity outage: foregone profits 
(output), possible reduction in productivity due to the outage, 
damage to materials, and payments to labour during the outage. 
Lijsen and Vollaard, 2004, estimate that the cost in the Netherlands 
of an unexpected outage leading to a loss of load of one MWh 
would be €3,000, over forty times the cost of generating such 
electricity. Costs are likely to increase exponentially with the duration 
and scale of the outage – the damage done by a loss of electricity will 
be small for a limited outage but could be massive for a total failure. 
For example, a loss of 20 per cent of electricity capacity due to a gas 
 
21 See J. Fitz Gerald, J. Hore and I. Kearney, 2002, “A Model for Forecasting 
Energy Demand and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Ireland”, ESRI Working Paper 
No. 146. 
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outage could be spread through rationing. A regular rotating 
curtailment of supply could be controlled to leave crucial sectors, 
such as hospitals, with continuous supply. However, if the loss of 
capacity were to rise above 20 per cent the costs and related 
disruption would be increasingly difficult to avoid through rotating 
cuts. Thus a loss of 80 per cent of electricity capacity due to gas 
outage would be more than a third worse than the loss of 60 per 
cent.22 While it is clear that such a severe disruption would have a 
very low probability of occurring, the costs, if it did occur, would be 
very grave. If this potential risk is to be adequately dealt with, the 
regulatory authorities cannot leave it to market forces alone, but 
must take independent action to mitigate the probability of such an 
interruption. 
Historically, geopolitical issues related to the concentration of oil 
reserves have represented a particularly important concern for 
governments. Compared with the oil market, the natural gas market 
is much more constrained by transport infrastructure leading to 
more region-specific market characteristics.23 While currently the 
sources of gas on the EU market are quite diverse, with supplies 
running out from existing suppliers (e.g. the UK, the Netherlands 
and Ireland), by 2010 the then fully integrated EU market will be 
dominated by Algeria, Russia (Gazprom) and Norway. This will be 
an even more concentrated market than the current OPEC cartel. 
The switch in sources carries with it further implications for the 
ability of supply to adjust quickly to changing short-term levels of 
demand (such as the winter demand fluctuations arising from 
sudden temperature changes), referred to as the swing capability of 
the system. The main transnational pipelines that will deliver 
imported gas are anticipated to have a much lower swing capability 
than domestic production in these islands. In the European markets, 
lack of flexibility in contracts and delivery is countered by some gas 
storage availability in the UK and elsewhere (Oxera, 2004).  
While the development of gas storage in Ireland would seem 
desirable, much would depend on its cost. The geology of the 
Republic of Ireland is much less favourable than that of Britain or of 
many other EU countries. However, there are large salt caverns near 
Kilroot outside Belfast, which could provide suitable storage for 
significant quantities of gas. With the completion of the North-
South gas pipeline in 2007, these caverns could be developed to 
provide significant gas storage for the island. Such storage could be 
valuable in smoothing daily and weekly fluctuations in demand and 
 
22 It is not feasible to quantify these economic costs in a precise manner as they 
would depend on the extent of the loss of electricity capacity, the length of time 
power was lost and quantification would require much more economic data than 
are currently available. See Lijsen and Vollaard, 2004, for a quantification of some 
of the costs of supply disruption. 
23 Although the emergence of Liquified Natural Gas as an increasingly important 
means of transport is progressively joining regional gas markets together, pipeline 
transport remains the predominant natural gas means, limiting the geographic range 
of international gas trade.  
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also in providing a buffer against short-term disruption to supply. 
The possibilities of developing such storage should be examined as 
part of the development of the all-island energy market.  
A relatively low price elasticity of demand for gas in the medium 
term confers considerable market power on the small number of 
major suppliers.24 This leaves open the possibility that gas prices 
could be dramatically raised for a sustained period through a 
voluntary restriction of supply. It is this risk of a future price shock 
lasting months or years that needs to be considered by Irish energy 
policymakers. 
In many cases shocks that are perceived as being quantitative in 
nature (e.g. a shortage of oil) can readily be turned into price shocks. 
Price shocks allow for some market response modifying the costs of 
an interruption. For example, in the late 1970s action by the Irish 
government in the face of oil price shocks did the reverse – by 
restricting the price of oil, a price shock was turned into a quantity 
shock where supplies were not available to meet demand at the 
going (restricted) price. The resulting disruption magnified the 
already significant cost to the economy. 
Looking out into the next decade, the rapid growth in the world 
economy, especially in China and India, is likely to put major upward 
pressure on demand for oil. At the same time discoveries are not 
taking place at a sufficient rate to keep pace with demand. As a 
result, it is quite likely that real oil prices will rise rapidly over the 
next two decades. However, it is most unlikely that the imbalance 
between demand and supply would lead to any prolonged physical 
shortage. Rather the market will operate to ensure that oil is 
available, albeit at an ever-increasing price. 
PRICE RISKS 
Historically oil and gas prices have been correlated, though with a 
lag, so that the risk of price shocks in oil or gas are clearly 
interdependent. As a result, moving dependence from gas to oil or 
vice versa cannot significantly reduce an economy’s exposure to a 
price shock affecting either fuel. At present gas technologies are the 
most competitive fossil-fuel form of electricity generation in Ireland 
and in the immediate future all new thermal generation plant is likely 
to be gas-fired. The alternatives to increasing gas dependence are 
coal, nuclear and wind, which have higher capital costs and face 
other problems (including higher environmental costs, especially for 
coal and nuclear). Under these circumstances, positive policy 
intervention to change the fuel shares used in electricity generation 
will have significant costs. The fact that gas dependence continues to 
increase in Europe should be seen as evidence that fuel diversity in 
the power generation industry comes at a price. Electricity 
generation historically has tended to go through periods lasting 
 
24 Where the supply pipelines pass through a limited number of countries, such as 
the Ukraine, it could also confer significant market power on these transit countries. 
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decades when, driven by technological developments, one fuel 
appears far more attractive than the rest. 
However, if Ireland were more affected than other markets by 
the price shock, then there would be a loss of competitiveness 
relative to our EU partners. Such a loss would compound the loss of 
output and income, with an increased incentive for sensitive 
production to move to other locations that were less affected by the 
shock. In the case of businesses, the loss of competitiveness relative 
to similar electricity-using businesses abroad could be significantly 
greater, given the much greater gas dependence of the electricity 
sector in Ireland compared to the rest of the EU. This could be 
further compounded if they were heavy users of oil and gas, as well 
as of electricity. Thus, the income loss as a result of a price shock 
would be aggravated by an enhanced incentive to relocate electricity 
intensive output elsewhere.25  
There is a range of different strategies that could be adopted to 
reduce dependence on gas, or on any one other fuel. Unlike the case 
of a physical interruption, there would be limited incentive for 
individual firms with generating plant to take the risk of a major 
shock to gas prices into account in their investment decisions. 
Because all producers in Ireland (and elsewhere) would be faced with 
the same increase, in the long run they could pass it on fully to 
consumers. While there would be some small reduction in demand 
due to the higher prices, this would be limited and profitability 
would not suffer dramatically. It is only if the price rise were 
sustained for many years that investment in new plant using 
alternative fuels would take place, stranding existing gas plant. In the 
end the suppliers of gas, if acting rationally, would ensure that prices 
did not remain high for so long that their market was permanently 
damaged by existing consumers investing in new oil, coal or 
renewables capacity.  
In a very gas-dependent economy a sudden rise in gas prices 
would have the potential to cause significant economic disruption. 
On the basis of the past behaviour of prices it has a much higher 
chance of occurring at some stage in the future than a sustained 
quantity interruption. Such a price shock would potentially damage 
the competitiveness of the economy. From the point of view of the 
individual firm there will be some incentive to hedge the short-term 
exposure to price shocks. However, as the exposure of the firm to 
price shocks may be much less than the exposure of the economy, 
too little use may be made of means of insuring against price shocks. 
This means that security of supply is a regulatory issue. It would be 
worthwhile paying a limited price to insure against such a risk. Some 
degree of judgement has to be used by regulatory authorities to 
determine how much it is worth paying for fuel diversity to avoid the 
very low probability of severe interruption of fuel and electricity 
 
25 Individual businesses would not have to physically relocate elsewhere. Much 
more likely would be a situation where output in the firm declines or ceases in 
Ireland and the market is met from production by more successful firms elsewhere. 
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supplies, and to avoid the real possibility of large increases in the 
prices of particular fuels. 
Probably the simplest insurance policy that the Irish economy 
could take against a price shock would be to invest in shares in gas 
fields in Norway or possibly Russia (or preferably in companies 
owning a portfolio of gas fields that supply the European area). An 
appropriate hedge against oil price shocks could be to invest in the 
shares of oil companies that own substantial reserves of oil. This 
would provide a financial hedge against such price shocks.26 
However, this instrument would provide no insurance against 
physical interruption in supply on these islands. It might also be 
difficult to get a broad enough portfolio of such investments to 
provide an appropriate hedge. Nonetheless, the issue of insuring the 
whole economy against oil and gas price shocks should be taken into 
account when framing the investment strategy for the national 
pension reserve fund (NPRF). 
 
 The previous section showed that due consideration should be 
given to a fuel diversity policy for at least two reasons. First for 
geopolitical considerations – the control of a substantial share of 
fossil fuel resources lies with a small number of suppliers. Second, 
where there is a concentration on one or two key fuel types, the 
exposure to price volatility could be dangerously exacerbated. Third, 
there is quite a strong prospect that oil (and gas prices) will rise 
rapidly over coming decades. 
3.3 
Fuel Diversity27
OVER RELIANCE ON HYDROCARBONS 
The issue of overdependence on oil loomed very large in the late 
1970s in the wake of the oil price shocks of that decade (NESC, 
1983). The result was an enhanced emphasis on non-oil fuels for 
generating electricity. This gave a new lease of life to coal 
technology. In the Irish case this was a very important factor in the 
building of the Moneypoint power station in the 1980s. Elsewhere it 
also gave a major new impetus to the development of nuclear energy 
for electricity generation.28 However, the absence of a cost-effective 
alternative source of energy for transport, together with the fall in 
 
26 If the insurance policy paid up (i.e. oil prices and shares in oil companies rose 
dramatically) it would probably be appropriate to pay the benefits to consumers in a 
way that did not reduce the price of energy below its true cost. 
27 Sterling (1999) provides an extensive discussion on the value of diversity as well 
as an overview of the different approaches available in the literature to measure 
diversity. 
28 The NESC Study “Irish Energy Policy” (1983) reviewed contemporaneous studies 
which found that the economics of coal (higher fuel costs) versus nuclear (higher 
capital costs) showed no clear economic advantage for one over the other. 
However, the need for backup generation for a notional nuclear plant rendered it 
unviable in the Irish context and reinforced the view that the correct decision had 
been made regarding the commissioning of a baseload coal plant at Moneypoint.  
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the real price of oil in the mid-1980s, has resulted in a continued 
increase in world dependence on oil for usable energy.  
Potential over-reliance on gas has been seen as a key concern in 
recent years, particularly in large areas of Europe where dependence 
on non-indigenous natural gas has grown rapidly. However, modern 
economies are permanently interdependent, both in terms of climate 
change issues and the sourcing of energy raw materials. Here we 
consider the example of how a possible gas price shock would 
impact on the economy. (Many of the issues that arise would also 
apply in the case of an oil price shock.) If gas prices were to rise 
suddenly to twice or three times their current level; and if the higher 
price were sustained for a number of years this would have a quite 
noticeable effect on the Irish economy. With gas usage costing 0.3 
percentage points of GNP before the recent price rise (Table 3.1), 
the immediate cost to the economy of such a price shock would be 
an additional 0.8 percentage points of GNP, taking the cost of gas to 
a total of 1.2 percentage points of GNP. This net cost to the Irish 
economy of 0.8 per cent of GNP would be paid to foreign suppliers 
(or owners) of gas, reducing national income. Such a negative shock 
would have knock on effects for consumption and employment as 
the economy adjusted to the inflationary shock. However, provided 
that Irish exposure was the same as the exposure of the country’s 
EU competitors there would be no relative loss of competitiveness.  
The possible impact of excess dependence on gas on the 
economy will depend on the extent of gas dependence in Ireland, 
and also on Ireland’s dependence relative to its trading partners. As 
long as Moneypoint, a significant coal-burning plant, remains open 
on full power, the economy will be less exposed to a reliance on gas 
than would otherwise have been the case. This exposure comes 
mainly from price fluctuations arising from lack of supply liquidity. 
The strategy for dealing with the potential for this kind of shock has 
in the past involved investment in generation using different fuels.  
Table 3.1: Gas in the Irish and EU Economies 
  Ireland Ireland EU 
  2001 2010 2001e 
Gas Consumption – Economy Mtoe 3,140 5,573 328,364 
Price € a Toe 102 131 102 
Total Cost of Gas Bought – Economy € Million 320 731 33,504 
GNP € Million 96,448 178,572 8,816,000 
Gas as % of GNP  0.33 0.41 0.38 
Electricity, Gas share29 % 35 58 18 
e: estimate. 
 
 
 
29 The data for Ireland for 2001 are from the Department of Public Enterprise 
Energy Balance Sheets. For 2010 they come from ESRI projections. For the EU 
they are for 2000 and are taken from IEA, 2002, World Energy Outlook. 
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In the case of the danger of physical interruption there are a 
range of measures, which need to be taken before considering fuel 
diversity. These include the provision of backup infrastructure. 
Systematic provision for temporary dual firing of combined cycle gas 
turbine (CCGT) plants can also, at a cost, provide additional 
security. This latter requirement should allow the electricity-
generating sector to ride out a temporary interruption of gas supply, 
such as might occur due to problems with onshore gas transmission 
infrastructure.  
In Ireland’s case, enhanced international interconnection by gas 
pipelines has been the key strategy for providing physical security to 
an otherwise isolated system. The building of the second gas pipeline 
was important in providing enhanced security against any very 
unlikely breakage in the single gas pipeline to Britain. There may still 
be a need to strengthen the onshore infrastructure in Scotland, as 
while the link to Scotland involves two separate pipes, the onshore 
link in Scotland is a single pipe. The most important measure that 
would further enhance physical security of gas supply, which will 
have zero cost to consumers, is to bring the offshore Corrib gas field 
on-stream. This would probably see Ireland remaining over 50 per 
cent self-sufficient in gas supplies well into the next decade. Any 
further gas finds off the West coast would turn Ireland into a net 
exporter. While not very likely, this would further enhance security 
and it would also have implications for gas prices on the island.30  
When combined with the two pipelines to Britain, the impending 
pipeline to Northern Ireland, and the potential for gas storage off 
the South coast or in Northern Ireland, the domestic supply of gas 
should provide a reasonable level of certainty that gas supplies will 
not suddenly be cut off. BGE believe that onshore system failures 
could in most cases be repaired inside 24 hours. However, with 
interconnection to Britain, and through Britain to the rest of Europe, 
the Irish gas market will continue to be exposed to any shocks to gas 
prices on the wider EU market.  
Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) supplies are available 
internationally from a wide range of suppliers and could potentially 
provide a more diversified source of gas. However, there are 
considerable economies of scale in the provision of LNG terminals. 
These scale economies arise not least from the dangers in handling 
such a flammable fuel. It would appear that because of these 
economies of scale there is no commercial interest in constructing 
LNG facilities on the island of Ireland to enhance physical security. 
Even if such facilities were provided in Ireland the price of gas 
would still be set by the much larger British and continental 
European gas markets. Thus if there were any commercial advantage 
to building such a LNG terminal the benefits would accrue to the 
developer, not to consumers. In any event, to the extent that LNG 
 
30 At present, price is set as the UK price plus transport. If Ireland were ever to 
become an exporter, price in the domestic market would be set at the UK price less 
transport. 
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facilities are provided in Britain they will also benefit Ireland because 
of the interconnected nature of the two markets. If they reduce the 
variance in gas prices in Britain they will have a similar impact here. 
Also if they reduced the impact of a physical shortage in Britain, 
which would severely impact on prices, this effect on prices would 
be automatically transmitted to the Irish market. Thus there seems 
little advantage to the Irish government in promoting such an 
investment. 
EU policies aimed at emission reduction are making fuel diversity 
more difficult to attain. The introduction of emissions trading is 
expected to raise the price of emitting carbon dioxide from burning 
fossil fuels. This will particularly penalise coal and peat, with gas 
being the “cleanest” fossil fuel. Already this policy stance is further 
encouraging concentration on gas as the fossil fuel of choice for 
electricity generation. The Large Combustion Plant Directive, which 
particularly affects coal plant, is further discouraging investment in 
coal (or peat) in the future. Some countries, including France and the 
United Kingdom, are reconsidering the construction of nuclear 
plant, but the lead times are substantial and planning controversies 
inevitable. However, such a policy seems unlikely to be acceptable in 
Ireland in the foreseeable future on environmental grounds. In any 
event, Fitz Gerald (2004), suggests that because of the large size of 
nuclear plant and the small size of the Irish electricity system, a 
nuclear plant would require so much back-up conventional plant as 
to substantially raise its overall costs, reducing any potential 
attraction for investors. 
 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  3.4 
Fuel Price 
Uncertainty and 
the Optimal 
Generation 
Portfolio
According to Markowitz (1952), investors in financial markets have 
always had to deal with exposure to risk. Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT) has been developed to help manage this uncertainty based on 
the concept of an “efficient portfolio” which has the smallest 
attainable risk for a given level of expected return. In an uncertain 
world this approach provides a very useful format for considering 
the trade off between minimising the expected price of electricity 
and minimising the risk inherent in any particular choice of fuel mix. 
It reflects the fact that forecasts are always uncertain and what may 
be forecast to be the best option assuming a particular price scenario 
may well turn out to be much more expensive than expected in the 
long run. This approach assumes that, as well as knowing something 
about the likely future growth in the prices of energy, policymakers 
have information on the volatility in energy prices and how the 
volatility in the price of individual fuels is correlated. In the case of 
energy prices there is good reason to believe that gas and oil prices 
will continue to be quite highly correlated in the future, as in the 
past. 
The theory focuses on identifying either the return-maximising or 
the risk-minimising bundle of assets. The methodology uses a mean-
variance analysis, based on empirical prices, and compares the 
average returns of different bundles of assets (portfolios of 
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generation plant) with the associated level of risk. In any economy 
there are two types of risks that an investor faces, systematic and 
unsystematic. The former has a similar affect on each player, and is 
associated with the market environment generally and is, therefore, 
non-diversifiable. An example of such a risk would be the increasing 
global dependence on gas. Although some countries will be more 
exposed than others to gas price increases, each country will suffer a 
comparable effect in the price of gas from a gas price shock. 
Unsystematic risk refers to the specific risks that each firm faces. It 
is up to the individual firm to try to hedge against these risks as best 
it can. This exposure to price fluctuations is avoidable through 
portfolio diversification and can be best solved through the use of 
Modern Portfolio Theory. Adding generation capacity to the 
portfolio whose fuel prices are uncorrelated with the current mix, 
acts as a hedging mechanism against future price uncertainty. To the 
extent that these additional types of generation capacity have higher 
costs (lower returns) than the ones that they replace, the risk 
reduction comes at a cost in terms of expected future price (return). 
In relation to the example given, this could mean using fuels other 
than gas in electricity generation to reduce risk, even though gas is 
expected to be the cheapest fossil fuel for electricity generation. 
This methodology takes account of expected cost and expected 
risk, calculated as the weighted average of all possible outcomes. 
MPT puts an economic value on price stability. An example of the 
trade-off between risk and price is the choice by many homebuyers 
to adopt fixed rate instead of variable rate mortgages. The extra 
interest that is incurred by the guarantee of fixed repayments, is the 
price of certainty for each customer. Adapting this methodology to 
the choice of the optimal electricity generation portfolio is 
potentially useful in identifying the price to be paid for greater price 
certainty. For example, it permits the comparison on economic 
grounds of the cost of a wind turbine – characterised by a high 
capital expenditure, very low operational costs and no fuel cost – 
with the CER Best New Entrant (BNE) plant, a gas-fired CCGT 
that incurs relatively lower costs of capital per MW of capacity, but 
higher operation and maintenance costs and a substantial and 
uncertain fuel cost element. A well-diversified portfolio of generating 
assets will include a mix of technologies whose underlying fuel prices 
are uncorrelated with each other. This is the best means of hedging 
future uncertainty and similarly ensures that any increase in cost is 
due to market risk and is unavoidable. However, such hedging 
behaviour comes at some cost in terms of higher expected prices. 
 
A generating technology with costs that are statistically 
negatively correlated to the rest of the portfolio can help 
mitigate portfolio cost swings… Current evaluation of 
energy mixes understates the cost of fossil fuels and 
value of renewables (Awerbuch, 2004).  
 
Most fossil fuel prices, with the exception of peat prices, are to 
some degree positively correlated, and the volatility that these prices 
exhibit often has a negative impact on economic activity. 
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Consequently, increasing the amount of fixed cost generation, such 
as wind, in the portfolio, whose price is uncorrelated with any other 
fuel, will add price stability for the future. Greater certainty regarding 
costs emerges as a reduction in risk in the portfolio analysis, albeit at 
the cost of an increase in the expected price. 
Figure 3.1: Illustrative Portfolio 
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In Figure 3.1, we show a stylised example of three different 
portfolios of fossil fuel and renewable generation: all fossil fuel, and 
two different mixes of fossil fuel and renewables. Beginning with the 
fossil fuel and renewables (initial risk) mix we can see that in this 
stylised example it has an expected cost of around 40 and volatility 
of 0.5. It is significantly lower in volatility (lower risk) than the all 
fossil fuel portfolio, though having a significantly higher price. 
However, the alternative mixed portfolio could produce electricity at 
a lower cost (20) than the fossil fuel only option, while being equally 
risky as the fossil fuel only portfolio. In other words, for the same 
risk profile it may be possible to choose an alternative mix of 
generation that reduces the expected future cost of generation.  
The lessons to be drawn from this approach suggest that an 
optimal portfolio of generation technologies should give an 
additional premium to technologies where the fuel price is fixed 
(renewable) or has a negative (peat) or low positive correlation (coal) 
with the price of gas and oil. If there is concern to reduce the risk of 
the portfolio there should be more wind, coal and peat than would 
be implied by a simple analysis based on a single forecast for future 
energy where prices are assumed to be certain. Obviously the 
weights in the desired portfolio will also be affected by the forecast 
movement in prices. For example, if the price of peat is expected to 
rise rapidly because of its high carbon content, this could offset its 
advantage in having a fairly stable basic price when carbon emissions 
are excluded. 
PORTFOLIO MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
Here we use a model of portfolio choice to examine the trade-off for 
different portfolios of generation capacity between risk and price. 
The inputs required to calculate a cost minimising portfolio of 
electricity generation rely heavily on past prices and current costs of 
each of the different technologies, with a view to identifying the 
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cheapest generation option in the long run. The technologies 
represented in the model are: Coal, Oil, Gas-CCGT, Gas-OCGT, 
Peat and Wind. The historic price data comes from the ESRI 
databank and covers the years from 1968 to 2003 inclusive. Fuel 
costs for 2003 were proxied by the average from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) price publication for the first three quarters. 
The Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs are estimates based 
on limited information from the CER’s Best New Entrant paper, 
ESB’s Annual Report 1992 (updated) and a paper by the Royal 
Academy of Engineers, 2004. Most of the disparity in long-run 
marginal costs emerges in the capital data used (DKM, ESRI, 2004).  
The capital cost for coal was assumed to be the €260 million 
necessary to upgrade Moneypoint to include the installation of flue 
gas desulphurisation.31 For both oil and peat, we assume zero capital 
cost (as the capital is a sunk cost). This is based on the assumption 
that no new oil or peat stations will be built, with the exception of 
the two recently completed peat stations. Oil is inefficient due to the 
availability of cheaper and cleaner fuels to work at base load,32 so it is 
assumed that the existing stations will be sufficient to fulfil peak 
demand. With the introduction of Emissions Trading, peat will 
become uncompetitive due to its high carbon content. For Gas-
CCGT, Best New Entrant figures from the CER were used. Gas-
OCGT figures were taken from the Royal Academy of Engineers 
report. The capital cost for wind also came from The Royal 
Academy of Engineers figures. These estimates allowed for the 
variability in wind by building in the cost of backup plant, which 
proves to be quite significant.33 The capital costs are assumed to be 
fixed at our estimate for 2003. The data were standardised to a 
measure of the cost per MWh, using the CER assumptions on new 
entrants.  
For coal, gas plant and wind long-run marginal cost was used. In 
the case of coal the capital cost of the desulphurisation plant was 
included whereas for the other plant the full capital cost of the new 
plant was used. For all technologies the historical fuel prices were 
deflated by the GNP deflator to produce an estimate of the real fuel 
cost over time. An estimate of the real operation and maintenance 
costs was also used. Together these allowed estimates to be made of 
the marginal cost of each technology using current efficiencies but 
historic fuel costs. The resulting variance-covariance matrix, 
 
31 This reflects the fact that Moneypoint is a “sunk cost”. Obviously for a new coal 
plant all the costs of such a plant, not just the renovation and flue-gas 
desulphurisation costs, would have to be included. 
32 Baseload electricity generators run most of the time. Baseload plant is normally 
the only plant running at times of minimum demand known as the off-peak (Stoft, 
2002, p.42). 
33 The cost of this “backup” supply is a matter of considerable controversy. 
ESBNG, 2004a come up with a very high estimate of the cost of wind. However, in 
their model the electricity system is assumed to be optimised in the long run in a 
way that would make the cost of wind very high. With high wind penetration the 
electricity system would develop in a very different manner such as to minimise the 
marginal cost of wind.  
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reflecting the variability in the marginal costs over time, was then 
calculated.  
Emissions trading has started from the beginning of 2005 and so 
the costs of emissions permits, at today’s levels of efficiency, were 
calculated for five prices per tonne of carbon; €0, €10, €20, €30, €40. 
For simplicity, the price of carbon is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with fuel prices.34 However, these five sets of data could be 
amalgamated into one set if assumptions were made about the 
expected price of carbon and the standard deviation in that price, 
but this is outside the scope of this paper. The model is run totally 
unconstrained with respect to fuel shares and no attention is paid to 
time of day or seasonal considerations. These assumptions do not 
properly encompass the characteristics of the market or technologies 
in question, but the results produce a useful illustration of the 
possible trade-offs between price and risk. 
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix 
 Coal Oil Gas-CCGT Gas-OCGT Peat Wind 
Coal 1.00 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.07 
Oil 0.43 1.00 0.74 0.75 0.45 -0.24 
Gas-CCGT 0.42 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.41 -0.06 
Gas-OCGT 0.41 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.41 -0.14 
Peat 0.39 0.45 0.41 0.41 1.00 0.01 
Wind 0.07 -0.24 -0.06 -0.14 0.01 1.00 
 
The correlation matrix summarises historical price fluctuations 
and also allows for the efficiencies of the various technologies. The 
most noticeable correlation occurs between oil and gas, 0.74 for 
CCGT and 0.75 for OCGT. It is this relationship that leads to the 
previously stated conclusion that no more oil stations should be 
built. Gas is a cleaner fuel and gas stations are more efficient than 
oil. Because the prices of oil and gas are highly correlated, oil does 
not represent a good hedge against gas price shocks. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the price of wind has no connection with the 
price of peat and is negatively correlated with coal, oil and gas. More 
importantly, it is the only technology that has negative correlation 
with gas. Portfolio theory puts great value on any option that 
perfectly hedges against price shocks. The high certainty about 
future wind prices should lead to a higher weighting on wind than 
would be the case if minimising the expected price of electricity was 
the only criterion. Peat and coal have smaller correlations with each 
other, and oil and gas. This moderate relationship is also of value 
because it offers a significant possibility of hedging against gas price 
shocks.  
 
 
34 Because of its lower carbon content, gas is favoured by high prices for carbon. It 
would appear that this is already happening. This would suggest some positive 
correlation between gas prices and carbon prices in the future. 
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 MODEL RESULTS  
This model uses the fuel and carbon prices discussed above. It also 
assumes that, with the exception of the price of carbon dioxide, past 
price behaviour over the 35 years 1968 to 2003 is a good guide to 
future price volatility. In Figure 3.2, the x-axis represents the 
standard deviation, which can be thought of as a measurement of 
risk. The larger is the standard deviation, the bigger is the risk. The 
y-axis denotes the time-weighted average (TWA) of the long-run 
marginal costs of generation by the various technologies (€ a 
MWh).35 Each line symbolises a different estimated price for carbon 
permits and measures the level of risk for a given TWA price.  
Figure 3.2: Price Risk Trade Off for Different Portfolios and Costs of Carbon 
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It can be seen from the diagram that the decision becomes a 
matter of a trade-off between risk and price. A low risk of a price 
shock would require a high average cost, due to insufficient fuel 
diversity, with concentration on technologies which are very capital 
intensive (relative to input costs), e.g. wind. A low cost for 
generation means that the risk of price shocks occurring increases. 
Also, it is important to note that as the price of carbon increases, the 
slope of the trade-off line decreases. This is because carbon at €40 
adds more stability to the price of each fuel than carbon at €10. If 
the model allowed for the uncertainty regarding the price of carbon, 
this issue would not arise. 
 
 
35 The Time-weighted average (TWA) is the marginal cost of production averaged 
over every hour in the year. The system marginal cost varies significantly over the 
course of the day, as well as on a seasonal basis. 
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Table 3.3: Portfolio Weights for Minimum Risk (€68 a MWh) 
Carbon price €0 €10 €20 €30 €40 
      
Coal 0.0032 0.0085 0.0137 0.0126 0 
Oil 0.0145 0.0104 0.0051 0 0 
Gas–CCGT 0.0066 0.0164 0.0318 0.0488 0.0723 
Gas–OCGT 0 0 0 0 0 
Peat 0.0148 0.0131 0.0047 0 0 
Wind +Back-up 0.9609 0.9517 0.9447 0.9386 0.9277 
 
The graph indicates that the lowest level of risk is attached to an 
average price of €68 a MWh in all cases. Table 3.3 shows the 
unconstrained optimum weights for each of the technologies for the 
point where the associated level of risk is at its lowest. In each case 
wind would have a very high weight because most of the cost is 
capital. This cost is known at the time of installation so that there is 
little uncertainty about the future cost of electricity from a wind 
generator once it is installed. Obviously, such high penetrations 
would not be feasible in reality but it does show how a desire to 
reduce risk will involve greater use of wind power than would be the 
case if cost-minimisation were the only consideration.  
As shown in Figure 3.2, low risk translates into a very high price, 
€68 a MWh. This is arrived at by including an extremely high 
percentage of wind in the mix of technologies used for electricity 
generation. This is unrealistic but it demonstrates the attractiveness 
of fixed cost technologies in the discussion of security of supply. 
The output table also highlights the problem of assuming a fixed 
price for carbon. As the price of carbon goes up, so does the 
advantage of gas-fired CCGTs. This arises because gas and oil are 
correlated but, since oil is a more carbon intensive fuel, the price of 
oil-fired generation increases more rapidly than that of gas. 
Therefore the pull towards gas-fired CCGTs intensifies.  
Table 3.4: Cost, Risk and Weights 
Carbon P. €0 €10 €20 €30 €40 
Min. Cost €37 €43 €49 €55 €60 
Std. Dev 8.7731 9.2904 9.3808 8.9069 7.7328 
      
Coal 0.4606 0.5189 0.4971 0.3252 0.011 
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas-CCGT 0.106 0.224 0.3672 0.4892 0.5934 
Gas-OCGT 0 0 0 0 0 
Peat 0.3091 0.1634 0 0 0 
Wind + Back-up 0.1243 0.0937 0.1357 0.1856 0.3956 
 
If the lowest possible cost in each case were taken, then the 
corresponding risk would be at its highest and the unconstrained 
weights would appear as shown in Table 3.4. These results indicate 
that if the risk and the price of carbon were not a concern coal and 
peat would have a high weighting in an optimal portfolio of 
electricity generation. However, peat becomes uncompetitive as the 
price of carbon dioxide goes above €10 a tonne. Coal begins to 
become uncompetitive over €30 a tonne of carbon dioxide. It is only 
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at €40 a tonne that a large share of wind would begin to become 
attractive.36
The results from this model suggest that even if coal were not the 
lowest price fuel, which occurs when the price of carbon goes above 
€20 per tonne, the inclusion of coal in the generation mix would 
reduce price uncertainty at a relatively small cost up to a carbon cost 
of €30. The inclusion of both wind and peat also would reduce 
uncertainty but the cost would be high for wind below a carbon 
price of €40 and high for peat at a carbon cost of €10 per tonne. 
However, there is considerable uncertainty about what will be the 
future price of carbon dioxide emissions over the likely lifetime of 
new electricity generating plant. This uncertainty would argue for 
keeping coal-fired generation at its current level and also including 
some peat and wind generation in the mix of technologies. Such a 
portfolio would not represent a minimum cost choice of plant, but it 
would reduce the risks to consumers from fuel price shocks at a 
relatively limited cost. 
Market forces could theoretically continue to deliver a diversified 
portfolio of electricity generation plant in the future, as they have 
done in the past. However, given the drive to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions it seems probable that market forces, left to their own, 
would result in a very big increase in the dependence on gas for 
electricity generation. A second instrument to counter this 
dependence and the attendant risk of price shocks could be needed 
by the regulatory authorities. Such an instrument should aim to 
provide market incentives to encourage a more diversified portfolio. 
While such mechanisms may be needed in the future to ensure a 
sufficiently diversified portfolio of fuels used in electricity 
generation, the analysis in this paper suggests that it should not be 
necessary in the immediate future. It seems likely that the announced 
investment in Moneypoint needed to keep it open will be recovered 
over the remaining life time of the plant up to a carbon dioxide price 
of at least €20 a tonne, a level at which Moneypoint would still 
provide base-load. Even at a price of €30 a tonne it would probably 
still run as mid-load plant and make a sufficient margin over its costs 
to justify the investment. It is only at a cost of carbon dioxide of €40 
a tonne that it would no longer be economic. As a result, such a 
large coal-burning station plays an important role as a hedge against 
price shocks, while simultaneously providing additional insulation 
against a quantity shock (physical interruption).  
While it is for policymakers to use this model to choose the 
portfolio of generating technologies having the desired mix of price 
and risk these results would suggest that a diverse portfolio would be 
better than one which concentrated on a single technology, such as 
gas. Coal (Moneypoint) is likely to have a value for another decade 
through reducing risk, even as its price rises through higher costs of 
 
36 The costing of wind assumes a constant cost over all levels of wind penetration. 
In practise for low penetration of wind where backup supply is not required the 
costs would be much lower. At exceptionally high levels of penetration the costs 
would also be likely to be much higher. 
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carbon dioxide. The optimal deployment of wind will be somewhat 
greater than would be suggested by its headline cost; more wind on 
the system reduces risk at a limited cost. Oil based technologies look 
to have limited prospects. Finally, peat plant should either be closed 
or, as suggested elsewhere in this report, gradually converted to burn 
biomass.  
 
 If the market price for gas and electricity fully reflected the risks 
involved in economy-wide dependence there would be no need for 
the regulatory authorities (The Commission on Energy Regulation 
(CER), The Department of Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources and Eirgrid) to take specific policy measures to deal with 
the issue of security of supply. However, it is clear that market prices 
do not fully reflect the risks from extreme dependence on gas and 
that, left to itself, the market could deliver an unsatisfactory result 
from the point of view of national welfare. 
3.5 
Policy 
Instruments and 
Options for Fuel 
Diversity 
Fuel diversity, and the supply security enhancement which it is 
supposed to bring, confers benefit to which consumers would attach 
value if the market mechanisms existed to allow them to make such 
a choice. However, diversity may come at some additional cost. The 
task of an economically efficient policy is to deliver security up to 
the point where end-users with full information, are willing to cover 
the costs, and not beyond. 
An unregulated energy market,37 left to its own devices, could be 
expected to only partly respond to the public’s demand for supply 
security. It may not be able to respond adequately for a range of 
reasons and the public’s actual demand (willingness to pay) for 
supply security may not be efficiently revealed in a real-world market 
structure due to the public good quality of security of supply. It is 
important to realise that markets have partially responded to real 
demands for ‘qualitative’ features such as supply security or fuel 
diversity in the past e.g. companies buy standby generators and 
hedge fuel price risk. The issue is whether the ‘socially optimal’ 
amount of supply security as well as the optimal private level of fuel 
diversity will emerge without explicit intervention in this regard. 
Further, electricity markets are typically subject to market-dominant 
players and (hence) intrusive regulation associated with that, as well 
as structural features that inhibit efficient pricing.  
There is undoubtedly a security of supply case for intervention 
into the capacity planning side of the energy market to correct an 
obvious market failure. This issue is dealt with in Chapter 5. The 
uncertainty about future market prices and the future price of 
emissions will militate against new investment, especially investment 
aimed at replacing inefficient plant. It could be some considerable 
time before new plant would come on-stream to replace existing 
plant. With an uncertain market, failure to invest in time would see 
the consumer rather than the producer carrying the cost of the 
 
37 Assuming that such a market could actually exist. 
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inefficient production. Business and household (private) sectors will 
respond to the price signals in the marketplace. In a less than perfect 
market, their responses may not be socially optimal, and the 
responses of supply-side players may be constrained. However, state 
action to provide supply security over and above market provision 
needs to be justified in terms of cost; the oil crises of the 1970s 
resulted in expensive policy actions in many countries, including 
Ireland, aimed at reducing exposure to oil price shocks and supply 
disruptions, which in the event, did not materialise.  
In the longer run, as the electricity market faces greater 
liberalisation, it is likely that some incentives will be needed to 
ensure that there is sufficient diversity in fuel (including renewables) 
used in electricity generation. If such incentives were felt to be 
necessary these could take the form of a special levy on gas used in 
electricity generation (or any other fuel that would be over 
represented) with the resulting revenue being used to provide a 
subsidy per MWh for all electricity consumers. If the levy were set at 
an appropriate level this would incentivise new investors to use the 
next cheapest technology to gas for the next generation of electricity 
generation. This would leave it to the market to choose the most 
efficient means of finding a diversified portfolio of generation. 
The alternative of using regulation to impose a solution could 
give rise to substantial windfall gains for existing players, at the cost 
of a higher overall price of electricity for consumers. For example, if 
the regulator were to require that the next electricity generator to be 
built should use oil (which is more expensive than gas), then the 
price of electricity (the system marginal cost) would rise to allow that 
generator to recoup all its costs. The result of such a rise would be 
that all existing generators that were allowed to use lower cost gas 
would make bigger profits.  
In the case of the levy, if chosen at an appropriate rate, the 
profits of the gas and oil generators would be similar and the 
revenue from the levy could be used to ensure that the rise in the 
consumer price of electricity was held to a minimum. However, in 
the example chosen, no mechanism could avoid the additional costs 
for consumers arising from the use of oil rather than gas in the new 
generating station, but at least the additional cost would be confined 
to the electricity generated in that station. 
 
 
PHYSICAL SECURITY 3.6 
Conclusions Physical security of energy supply is very important but, in so far as 
the Irish government can do so, appropriate measures have already 
been taken to secure oil and gas supplies. In the case of oil supply, 
the main risks are geopolitical and totally outside the government’s 
control. In the case of a major international upheaval EU policy 
would be particularly important in ensuring appropriate burden 
sharing within the EU. The provision for storage of a significant 
strategic oil reserve that is already in place could help ease the 
adjustment costs in the event of a major international shock, but it 
38 ASPECTS OF IRISH ENERGY POLICY 
will never be able to deal with a prolonged international dislocation 
of supplies. 
Physical security is not just dependent on the availability of fuel 
but also on having a reliable transmission system to transport the 
fuel to where it is required. Ongoing investment in domestic 
infrastructure (including interconnection to the North and Britain) 
will serve to enhance security of electricity supply. Having adequate 
capacity to allow efficient scheduling of infrastructural maintenance 
will lower the risk of outages and non-availability. In the case of gas, 
the building of the second gas interconnector was important to 
secure Ireland’s supply against the very low probability risk of a 
breakage in a single undersea pipeline. Such a breakage could have 
taken a significant amount of time to fix and, as a result, it could 
have proved very costly. However, this still leaves the island of 
Ireland dependent on a single onshore compressor station and 
pipeline in Scotland and consideration should be given to whether 
these facilities should also be doubled.  
The development of the Corrib gas field will provide another 
very important independent source of supply, further enhancing the 
physical security of the system. As such it is important strategically 
that the pipeline and resulting infrastructure is completed reasonably 
rapidly. Its completion could obviate the need for further investment 
in transmission infrastructure onshore in Scotland.  
In addition, the possibility of using the old Kinsale gas field or 
salt caverns in Belfast for gas storage should be explored. Such 
storage could not insulate Ireland against a prolonged interruption to 
gas supplies or a long-term major price increase. However, it could 
enhance short-term security as well as helping to avoid seasonal and 
peak our spikes in prices. Even if there are adequate supplies of gas 
and oil there is always the danger that there could be inadequate 
electricity generation capacity to meet peak demand. This issue is 
dealt with in detail in Chapter 5, which considers the appropriate 
market structure needed to ensure that there is adequate investment 
to meet expected future demand over the coming decade. 
DEALING WITH PRICE VOLATILITY 
The issue of security of energy supply is much wider than merely 
ensuring that energy is available. There is an important role for the 
regulatory authorities in ensuring that the supply of energy is 
available at reasonable cost. Moreover, there is a wider concern that 
the cost of energy in Ireland should not vary dramatically and 
unpredictably relative to the cost in competing countries.  
The outlook for both oil and gas markets suggests that there is a 
real possibility of very substantial increases in real prices over the 
next 20 years. The continuing growth in the world economy is 
putting ever-increasing pressure on the markets for fossil fuels. To a 
significant extent responsibility for insuring against energy price 
shocks lies with consumers. In the short to medium term it is open 
to larger consumers to hedge their risks, either through choosing a 
diversity of different fuels, or through entering into financial 
contracts to hedge their risks. Theoretically individuals, companies 
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and even the state have the possibility of hedging the risk of major 
increases in gas and oil prices through buying shares in oil and gas 
fields. However, such insurance policies are not an easy option for 
many consumers, especially for households. In addition, as outlined 
above, there is reason to believe that the costs to society from energy 
price shocks may be greater than for the individual. The rate of time 
discount for individuals may be different from that for society as a 
whole and, in any event, financial instruments are not easily available 
to hedge energy price risk far into the future. Security of supply has 
features of a public good (non-rivalrous, non-excludable) and the 
regulator must be charged with monitoring the cost-risk balance that 
electricity consumers face and may not be in a proper position to 
assess.  
In the case of electricity generation a key question is the extent to 
which the regulatory authorities should incentivise a diversity of 
fuels and technologies. The analysis in this chapter provides a 
framework for considering this issue. For the current situation where 
the cost of carbon emissions is between €20 and €30 per tonne, the 
Irish electricity system is quite diversified. However, with the 
prospect of higher carbon prices over the coming decade there will 
be a tendency for new investment to result in increasing dependence 
on gas-fired technology. While the encouragement of wind will 
provide some hedge against future price volatility, undue 
dependence on that technology could prove expensive.  
The risk of undue concentration on gas for electricity generation 
must be considered in the context of developments in the energy 
markets of our competitors. While a serious shock to energy prices 
would have adverse consequences for the economy, its impact would 
be magnified if Ireland were much more seriously affected than its 
competitors. Such a differential shock could affect competitiveness 
and could have a more detrimental impact on medium-term growth 
than if the shock were shared by all Ireland’s EU neighbours. Thus 
the issue of security of supply must be seen in a wider context, 
taking account of developments elsewhere in the EU. 
While the provision of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) processing 
capacity could help reduce exposure to gas price shocks, because 
Ireland is part of a British Isles (and increasingly a European) market 
for gas, that investment can take place in Britain or even on the 
continent. The benefits of such investment (if any) will accrue firstly 
to the investors and then to all consumers in the market where the 
market is very broadly defined. Because such investment is likely to 
be expensive to implement and because of the economies of scale 
involved it would not be appropriate for the Irish government to 
devote resources to promoting such investment in Ireland. If the 
market provides such infrastructure in Ireland on a commercial 
basis, and provided that sufficient environmental safeguards are put 
in place, then there could be some minor advantages in terms of 
enhanced competition and some enhancement in the already fairly 
high level of security against interruptions in physical supply. 
The analysis in this chapter suggests that where it is necessary, 
the regulatory authorities should use a market instrument to 
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incentivise greater diversity in fuel (and related generating 
technologies) into the future. This would allow the market to decide 
on the least cost method of meeting the regulator’s objectives. To 
some extent such a mechanism may work counter to the incentives 
provided by emissions trading. If it does so, this will reflect the 
competing priorities of policymakers facing multiple objectives. 
Providing there is just one instrument for each objective (emissions 
trading/carbon tax for promoting a reduction in carbon emissions 
and a fuel diversity levy for security of supply), the market should 
deliver the least cost solution to the regulator’s specified objectives. 
However, if there is not clarity on the objectives or if the objectives 
are inappropriate then no configuration of policy will produce the 
“right” answer. 
In the very long run the real price of fossil fuels, especially gas 
and oil, will rise worldwide. On its own this will encourage 
investment in alternative sources of energy supply. However, the 
private market may be slower to undertake research than is desirable 
from a public policy point of view. As a result, as discussed in 
Appendix 2 there is a case for promoting research in alternative 
energy sources. However, such alternatives should only go into 
production on a significant scale when they are approaching 
commercial viability. Providing that the incentives for such 
investment in alternative energy infrastructure are appropriately 
designed, this should ensure that the Irish energy system evolves 
towards long-term sustainability without disruptive shocks to supply 
or to prices. 
 
 
• Individual firms and households do not have an adequate 
incentive to invest in security of supply despite the potential for 
significant economic disruption arising from a sudden surge in 
fuel prices. This market failure makes security of supply a 
regulatory issue.  
3.7 
Summary
• It is important that the supply of gas from the Corrib gas field is 
brought onshore to enhance the physical security of Irish energy 
supply. 
• Also for physical security reasons, consideration should be given 
to strengthening the onshore gas transmission system in Scotland 
on which Irish gas supplies depend. 
• Consideration should be given to the economics of developing 
gas storage in either the old Kinsale field or in salt caverns near 
Belfast. 
• As the price of gas and oil are linked and are both likely to rise in 
real terms it is desirable to have some diversity in the source of 
electricity supplies. 
• The regulatory authorities need to consider how best to insure 
against future price shocks. A number of instruments can be used 
to provide such insurance: fuel diversity and financial instruments 
both have roles. 
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• The regulatory authorities should ensure that consumers are 
aware of potential risks and that, where feasible, suitable 
instruments for hedging risk are available. 
• It does not seem wise for the Irish authorities to specifically 
encourage a major increase in supply of Liquified Natural Gas. 
This should be left to market forces. 
• The portfolio modelling approach can help identify the price risk 
trade-off facing the regulatory authorities in the electricity sector: 
what is the appropriate mix of fuels and technologies to use in 
generation?  
• The results in this chapter suggest that a diverse portfolio of 
generating technologies and fuels would be better than one which 
concentrated on a single technology, such as gas. Coal 
(Moneypoint) is likely to have a value for another decade through 
reducing risk, even as its price rises through higher costs of 
carbon dioxide. The optimal deployment of wind will be 
somewhat greater than would be suggested by its headline cost; 
more wind on the system reduces risk at a limited cost. Oil based 
technologies look to have limited prospects. Finally, peat plant 
should either be closed or gradually converted to burn biomass. 
• Fuel diversity should be managed by using market instruments 
rather than by regulation. For example, undue reliance on gas 
could be limited through a levy on gas used in electricity 
generation with the proceeds of the levy returned to consumers. 
• Research and Development in alternative energy sources will be 
important in securing the long-term security of energy supply for 
the island. 
4. INTERCONNECTION 
AND THE GEOGRAPHY 
OF MARKETS 
Unlike many other goods, electricity and gas cannot be carried 
from one market to another by the normal means of transport. In 
the case of electricity transmission wires are needed and in the case 
of gas38 pipelines are needed to get them to market. Thus the 
geographical delimitation of the market for gas and electricity 
depends on the transmission system in place. Even if there are some 
wires connecting two different electricity markets, unless their 
capacity to carry electricity is adequate relative to the market size, the 
two markets may continue to operate separately (albeit synchronised 
and technically interdependent). A single electricity market is 
characterised by a transmission system that does not place serious 
constraints on the movement of power within the geographical 
limits of the system. Similarly, a single gas market relies on there 
being adequate pipeline capacity. 
4.1 
Introduction
In the case of Ireland an interconnector between the electricity 
systems in the North and the South was constructed in the early 
1970s. However, terrorist action rapidly put it out of action and kept 
it from being used until the latter half of the 1990s. The capacity of 
the interconnector is limited and the capacity of the transmission 
system linking the interconnector to the rest of the system in the 
Republic is also very congested. The interconnector between 
Northern Ireland and Scotland also does not have the capacity to 
make the Northern Ireland system part of the British system. 
The fact that the electricity networks on either side of the border 
are separate systems is most obviously manifested in the very 
different prices of the two systems. If there were infinite 
interconnection capacity between the two systems North and South 
the wholesale price of electricity of the two systems would end up 
identical, unless other artificial barriers were put into place. Similarly, 
with enough interconnection between Britain and Ireland, Ireland 
would become part of the British system. Given the relative size of 
the two systems such integration would see Ireland becoming a price 
taker on that joint market.  
42 
 
38 Except in the case of Liquified Natural Gas – LNG. 
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In the case of gas, the construction of the pipeline between 
Ireland and Scotland in 1994 effectively made Ireland part of the 
British gas market. From the time the pipeline opened, in a 
liberalised market the Irish wholesale gas price had to be equal to the 
British price plus the cost of transmission. This reflected the fact 
that the capacity of the pipeline was large relative to the domestic 
demand. Until 1998 the British gas system was effectively isolated 
from that of the rest of the EU and gas prices were lower in Britain, 
and hence in Ireland, than in the rest of Europe. This benefited Irish 
consumers, just as it did British consumers. However, with the 
opening of the Zeebrugge-Bacton gas pipeline in 1998 the British 
price rose to European levels. The construction of the 
interconnector benefited shareholders in gas fields in Ireland and 
Britain at the expense of consumers. This shows that, while 
enhanced interconnection is likely to be globally welfare enhancing, 
it may not enhance the welfare of all players in the market. Where 
two gas or electricity systems are isolated from one another 
problems in one system cannot affect the other neighbouring 
system. However, once they are linked together a problem on one 
system can propagate through the other system. This highlights the 
importance of getting the market structure and regulatory 
arrangements right where two or more markets are being integrated. 
It would not be necessary to have infinite interconnection 
between two networks to make them one system. It is an empirical 
question just how much capacity would be needed to produce a 
single market. In the case of electricity, in addition to the need to 
have adequate carrying capacity on the interconnection, at the very 
least there would have to be two interconnectors to ensure that the 
integration of the systems was secure – that it could survive an 
accidental breakdown in one interconnector. In the case of gas a 
single interconnector may be acceptable because of the much lower 
vulnerability of such a pipeline to interruption than in the case of 
electricity wires. 
This highlights the importance of transmission infrastructure in 
producing an integrated market on this island. Without adequate 
capacity linking the two networks they will remain separate systems 
and will have to plan their development on the basis of their isolated 
status. To produce an all-island market it will be essential to build a 
second significant interconnector between the two systems and also 
to strengthen the transmission system in the Louth area of the 
Republic. 
A further dimension to the choices facing policymakers on 
whether and when to put in place additional interconnection 
between the North and the South (and between Ireland and Britain) 
is that delay in decision making can be costly. The up-to-date 
position on the provision of the North-South interconnector is that 
ESB National Grid and Northern Ireland Electricity are working 
together on putting one in place. However, there are a number of 
obstacles facing them and, as a result, the timing of its completion 
remains unclear.  
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It is still not clear when the East-West interconnector to Britain 
will go ahead, much less be completed. This means that investors are 
uncertain about the size of the market they will face in five years 
time and how that market will be organised. This uncertainty raises 
the cost of capital for investors and raises the long-term costs facing 
consumers. This indicates the importance of bringing the project to 
completion, a point made in the report on the East-West 
interconnector for the CER by DKM et al. (2003). What is needed is 
a decision, either to build the enhanced interconnector capacity to 
Britain now, or else a decision not to build it until the next decade. 
Indecision is likely to be costly. 39  
This chapter first outlines the options on interconnection for 
both electricity and gas. It then considers the evidence on the costs 
and benefits of enhanced interconnection. The appropriate strategy 
for financing and pricing the interconnection infrastructure is then 
considered and the final Section brings together the conclusions 
reached in the chapter. 
 
 If the two Irish electricity systems are to reap the benefit of 
integration it will be necessary to put in place an additional 
interconnector. While the present interconnector could theoretically 
carry much more power than at present, it is severely constrained by 
the capacity of the transmission system in the Republic of Ireland. 
The result is that no more than 330 MW of power can flow from 
North to South and around 100 MW from South to North. Thus 
enhanced integration would also require significant further 
investment in transmission in the Republic to allow power to flow in 
both directions. The interconnector between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland, which has a maximum capacity of 500 MW, also does not 
make the Northern Ireland system part of the British system.  
4.2 
Interconnection 
Options
A single interconnector on its own would pose a significant risk 
to the security of the system in both parts of the island. A single 
strike by lightning could put a single interconnector out of action. If 
it was carrying a large volume at the time there could be dramatic 
effects on the availability of electricity on the whole island in the 
immediate aftermath of the failure. The presence of a second 
interconnector provides a completely different level of security 
because of the exceptionally low probability of both interconnectors 
failing simultaneously. 
Generally, considerations about security of supply suggest that 
the loading on a single electricity interconnector should not exceed 
the size of the largest stand-by unit (or other interconnector). On the 
Irish system this would amount to around 400 MW. However, with 
the greatly enhanced security with two interconnectors each line 
 
39 As of Summer 2005, a consortium has been appointed by the CER to advise on 
the financial, technical, commercial and procurement aspects of a 500-1,000 MW 
interconnector to Britain on a regulated, merchant or hybrid basis.  
   INTERCONNECTION AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF MARKETS 45 
could carry more than 400 MW without endangering the security of 
electricity supplies in either part of the island.  
Similar arguments apply to linking the Irish and British systems. 
At present there is a single interconnector between Northern Ireland 
and Scotland which carries up to 400 MW. The government have 
announced that an interconnector to Wales will be built with a 
capacity of up to 1,000 MW. However, there are a number of 
reasons for suggesting that, at least initially, a single interconnector 
of 500 MW would be appropriate. 
First, as outlined above the size of the flows permitted to operate 
safely on an interconnector are related to the size of the alternative 
sources of supply in the event of a sudden and unexpected 
breakdown. With the interconnector to Scotland having a maximum 
flow of 500 MW and with many of the unit sizes on the Irish system 
being around 400 MW, it is unlikely that a 1,000 MW interconnector 
would be used up to anywhere near its capacity. 
Second, the transmission infrastructure on both sides of the Irish 
Sea would need strengthening, especially for an interconnector of 
1,000 MW (DKM, et al., 2003). In the case of Wales it is unlikely that 
planning permission would be given for any new over-ground lines 
so that reliance would have to be placed on the limited infrastructure 
already in place (with a capacity for only around 500 MW of power).  
The benefits of an additional interconnector of 500 MW would 
probably outweigh the costs of building it (DKM, et al., 2003).40 
However, the marginal benefits of an additional 500 MW of 
interconnection will be less than for the first 500 MW and it could 
well be the case that such an investment, even if feasible, would not 
be warranted in the immediate future. This issue must await further 
research to establish the possible costs of different levels of 
interconnection and the likely impact on the Irish electricity system 
of different levels of interconnection. 
In purely engineering terms, transmitting electricity over long 
distances is costly due to losses in waste heat from the wires. The 
losses of energy are much less when gas is transmitted than when 
electricity is transmitted. Thus, faced with a simple choice between 
transmitting gas to generate electricity or transmitting the electricity, 
the losses in transmission will be minimised where the gas is 
transmitted and the electricity is generated locally. However, many 
other issues may intervene requiring interconnection of both 
electricity and of gas systems to develop satisfactory markets.  
In the case of gas, the markets are simpler. The transmission 
infrastructure has been put in place, including considerable capacity 
to Britain. The infrastructure between the Republic and Britain 
should be capable of handling all the demand for gas in the 
 
40 However, account would have to be taken of the cost of strengthening the 
onshore transmission infrastructure. 
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foreseeable future. In addition, as the capacity is shared over two 
pipelines there is security against physical breakage.41  
With the opening of the first pipeline between Ireland and Britain 
in 1994 Ireland effectively became part of the British gas market. 
With the decline in the domestic supply of gas, the price in Ireland 
became the price on the UK market plus the cost of transmission 
through the pipeline. With the connection of the British market to 
the Continental market through a pipeline to Belgium in 1998 the 
British price rose to close to the Continental price. 
The Northern Ireland gas market is separately connected to the 
British market. Because both the Northern Ireland and the Republic 
gas markets are connected to the British market, the price of gas 
throughout the island is linked to the British and wider European 
price.42 The two gas systems North and South are to be connected 
directly by a new gas pipeline over the next two years. This is 
unlikely to change the price or security levels of the system in the 
Republic but it will significantly enhance the security of the 
Northern gas system, which is today reliant on only a single pipeline. 
With the likely integration of the two electricity systems on the island 
the security of the integrated electricity system will come to depend 
on the reliability of the gas supplies to power stations North and 
South. 
 
 There are a number of reasons for believing on a priori grounds 
that increased integration of the electricity and gas systems in 
Europe can confer benefits on consumers in the long run. First, 
there are considerable economies of scale in electricity production. 
In addition, trading in electricity can ensure that the benefits of 
efficient generation plant are fully exploited. Second, if properly 
managed, with an integrated system there would be less likelihood 
that problems with a single fuel or technology could cause a major 
black out. The larger the market, the more likely it is that the power 
will be generated by a range of plant using a variety of technologies 
and fuels, providing enhanced security. Third, larger systems are 
more likely to support a range of competitors, each having a 
portfolio of plants. It is only with a substantial number of players 
that the full benefits of competition are likely to be realised. 
Newbery, 2002c suggests that at least five independent players are 
needed to assure a reasonably competitive market and states that an 
4.3 
Costs and 
Benefits
 
41 This is true for the under-sea pipeline. However, the onshore infrastructure in 
Scotland is not fully duplicated and may need upgrading in the future to provide 
adequate security. 
42 Since the pipeline from Britain to Belgium was completed in 1998 British gas 
supply from the North Sea has fallen while demand has risen. As a result, in the 
Winter of 2004/5, because of capacity constraints on the pipeline to Belgium, the 
price of gas in Britain and Ireland on certain days rose well above the European 
price. However, new pipeline developments and investment in LNG facilities in 
Britain should remove this constraint, resulting in the price of gas on these islands 
reverting to its past behaviour – tracking the European gas price. 
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oligopoly with fewer than five players can be worse than a well-
regulated monopoly In small isolated markets, such as the two 
existing Irish markets, economies of scale will make it impossible for 
such a number of independent players to develop and prosper. 
So far no comprehensive study has been published of the costs 
and benefits of enhanced interconnection of the two electricity 
systems on the island. A rough guesstimate of the costs of providing 
an additional interconnector would put it around €150 million. The 
costs would be affected by the route chosen, which in turn could be 
affected by physical planning issues. The cost of strengthening the 
transmission system in the Republic to allow flows of power in both 
directions could be at least €100 million. These guesstimates are 
provided to give an idea of the order of magnitude of the costs. 
There is a wide margin of error around them, with the actual outturn 
being probably somewhere between two-thirds and double these 
estimates. The purpose in providing them is to gauge the significance 
of any quantification of likely benefits. 
McCarthy (2005), using a model of both electricity systems on 
the island, considered what the average cost of generating electricity 
would have been in 2003 if there had been an integrated island 
system. She compared the resulting average price per MWh of 
electricity generated by the all-Ireland system with the model’s 
estimate of what a competitive market would have delivered for the 
Republic of Ireland market on its own. The estimate for the all-
Ireland average price was €32.5 per MWh whereas for the Republic 
on its own it was €34.4, a reduction in price of 5.5 per cent.  
The estimate for the Republic of Ireland on its own assumed no 
interconnection between the two systems in 2003. In fact in that year 
significant flows of power took place from North to South (the 
transmission constraints are much more binding for flows in the 
other direction). As a result, the Republic already enjoyed some of 
the significant benefits that integration of the two systems would 
bring. Thus these estimates of the gains from trade as a result of 
enhanced interconnection are biased upwards. 
The estimate discussed above for the reduction in electricity 
prices as a result of enhanced interconnection would amount to over 
5 per cent.43 Given that the Republic consumed around 25 million 
kWh of electricity in 2004, the saving in costs that would have been 
produced by moving from a totally isolated Republic of Ireland 
system to an integrated all-island system would have amounted to 
just under €50 million a year. The paper does not consider the 
benefits to Northern Ireland from the enhanced interconnection. To 
arrive at a full assessment of the benefits from enhanced trading, the 
effect on electricity prices North and South would have to be taken 
into account. However, even if two-thirds of these benefits are 
 
43 The savings would be much greater if, as is discussed in the next chapter, 
generators bid a price into the market that covered, not only their fuel costs, but 
also their operating costs. However, as argued in that chapter, such high prices 
would not actually occur if the market used other instruments to cover generators’ 
operating costs. 
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already being realised through the existing flows across the 
interconnector, this would still leave significant gains to be reaped 
from enhancing the interconnector capacity. 
The second way that improved interconnection can confer 
benefits on consumers is through enhancing the security of the 
island-wide system. A larger integrated system could operate at the 
specified security standard with a smaller installed generating 
capacity. This saving in generating capacity should translate into a 
saving in electricity bills for all consumers. Without integration of 
the two electricity systems consumers in both parts of the island will 
have to finance unnecessary additional investment in reserve capacity 
to ensure security of supply.  
Fitz Gerald (2004b) has examined the potential savings in the 
generating capacity needed to meet the security standard currently 
underlying system planning in the Republic.44 The paper considered 
a range of options on interconnection, including the current 
situation. The results set out in the paper indicate that electricity 
consumers on the island are receiving a very significant benefit from 
the operation of the, albeit constrained, existing interconnector 
between the North and the South. These benefits, in terms of 
reduced investment in generation capacity, are worth about €251 
million. They arise as a result of the increased security provided by a 
more integrated island electricity system. This is likely to be 
substantially more than the replacement costs of the current 
interconnector. 
The model results also suggest that the construction of a second 
interconnector, combined with reinforcement of the transmission 
system in the Louth region of the Republic, would result in further 
potential savings in capacity worth around €132 million. The 
strengthening of the transmission in the Louth region is likely to 
bring marginally greater benefits, in terms of increased security, than 
will the construction of a second interconnector. These savings of 
€132 million, on their own, would be likely to account for a 
significant part of the cost of a second interconnector and of the 
strengthening of the transmission in the Republic. 
A third channel through which enhanced interconnection could 
bring benefits to consumers is through the potential for a larger 
market to enhance the level of competition. It could also somewhat 
reduce the problems of ESB dominance in the market. McCarthy 
(2005), considers this issue and concludes that there would be 
significant additional gains through this channel. This issue is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.  
The estimates of the potential benefits from enhanced 
interconnection on this island are drawn from different sources. One 
additional factor that has not been taken into account above is the 
possible saving in spinning reserve that an integrated system could 
realise. The estimates given here were derived as by-products of 
other research. Before deciding finally on the integration of the two 
 
44 That is a Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) of 8 hours in the year. 
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electricity systems on the island it would be important to carefully 
study the results of a formal cost-benefit analysis of the project. 
However, our preliminary estimates of the costs and benefits suggest 
that there are likely to be significant potential static benefits from 
creating an all-Ireland electricity system. While the estimates of the 
security benefits shown above are presented in terms of a reduction 
in the capital investment, the estimated savings from enhanced 
trading are presented in terms of the annual reduction in the cost of 
electricity.  
The estimates of the security savings could amount to half the 
capital cost of the enhanced interconnection. Even if only part of the 
estimated trading benefits were still to be reaped by further 
interconnection, they are sufficiently large on their own to suggest 
that further interconnection is warranted. On top of these benefits 
are the potential gains from increased competition.  
The study undertaken on the costs and benefits of an additional 
East-West interconnector to Great Britain (DKM et al., 2003) 
suggested that the benefits would probably outweigh the costs, 
though further detailed research was needed on the costs of a 
specified routing. It was anticipated that the benefits would not 
come from base-load power flowing from Britain to Ireland but 
rather from enhanced security and additional trading benefits. 
While interconnection may well bring substantial economic 
benefits to offset the costs of interconnection (and losses in 
transmission), it will also leave the individual systems vulnerable to 
the possibility of regulatory failure in the wider market. For example, 
if the market structure in the Republic does not produce adequate 
investment, or produces very expensive investment, resulting in 
exceptionally high consumer prices, this could be worse for 
consumers in the North than if the two markets remained separate 
with separate prices. The same applies in the other direction if 
mistakes were made in the North (or in Britain). The potential for 
such regulatory failure must be taken into account in planning the 
development of an all-island market. It argues for agreement on a 
workable single market structure for any all-island market prior to 
integration taking place (see Chapter 5).  
In the case of greatly enhanced interconnection to Britain, it 
seems likely that the very small Irish market would be absorbed into 
whatever market structure already exists there. However, the 
prospect of such an integration into the British market could further 
discourage investment in Ireland, posing problems in guaranteeing 
supply in the period before such integration actually took place. This 
issue will need to be considered in reaching an early decision on 
whether or not to go ahead with this investment. 
While it seems probable that an all-island electricity system will 
reduce the total costs of electricity generation on this island no 
research has been undertaken into how the costs and these benefits 
are likely to be shared on a regional basis. This will need to be 
considered before an all-island market is finally implemented. 
In the short to medium term, for Northern Ireland a 
strengthening of the electricity transmission in the Louth area of the 
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Republic is likely to confer much greater benefits in terms of 
enhancing security of supply than will the construction of a new 
interconnector between the two jurisdictions (Fitz Gerald, 2004). 
For the Republic the priority lies in developing the second 
interconnector. The benefits from an East-West interconnector will 
probably be greatest if there is already an all-island system. This 
would allow the all-island electricity system to optimise 
simultaneously the use of the two interconnectors to Britain. 
 
 Over the last three years both the electricity and the gas 
interconnectors between Northern Ireland and Britain have been 
bought back by a mutual company from their previous private sector 
owners. The mutual company specially established to take over the 
interconnectors is very similar in character to a state enterprise. The 
corporate governance of the new company ensures that it acts purely 
in the interests of Northern Ireland’s energy consumers. The 
advantage of this arrangement was that the new company, having no 
equity stake, requires a lower rate of return on capital than a private 
sector company would accept. In addition, because the two 
interconnectors are essential for the welfare of Northern consumers 
the regulator has guaranteed that any losses on operation will be 
made good by a levy on all consumers. As consumers were already 
carrying all of the risk this does not represent any additional burden 
for consumers. 
4.4 
Financing and 
Pricing of 
Infrastructure
In return for these guarantees, the company has been able to 
borrow funds at a rate of interest very close to the government bond 
rate. The resulting significant savings in capital costs have already 
been passed through to Northern Ireland consumers as a reduction 
in the price that they would otherwise have had to pay. As the 
company has very small operating costs, there is no danger that the 
de facto nationalisation of the interconnectors will lead to inefficient 
operation. 
This experience has important lessons for the Republic of 
Ireland. It highlights the fact that transmission infrastructure is best 
considered as part of the regulatory asset base and financed 
accordingly. In the Republic this means that any additional electricity 
interconnectors to the North or Britain should probably be financed 
by Eirgrid/ESBNG like the rest of the transmission infrastructure. 
As the Northern experience has shown, the Public Private 
Partnership approach might raise the costs for consumers, and it can 
be expensive and difficult to unwind. What makes transmission 
different from generation investment is that the consumers will 
always carry most of the risk of failures in the transmission system 
whereas the cost of bad decisions by investors in generation plant 
will fall on shareholders. If consumers are in any event going to carry 
the risks then they should benefit from the lower cost of capital they 
can achieve through borrowing by the publicly owned 
Eirgrid/ESBNG. 
With the development of an all-island market the cost of 
electricity interconnectors within Ireland should probably be 
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considered as part of the regulatory asset base and paid for by 
consumers in their use of system charges. In the very long run it may 
be appropriate for Interconnectors to Britain to be considered in a 
similar manner if they provide adequate capacity for all normal 
commercial flows. However, if they are all paid for by Irish 
consumers and if, as is likely, some of the benefits of their existence 
will accrue to British consumers, then a different method of 
accounting may be required. At present space on the Scotland- 
Northern Ireland interconnector is auctioned. Where capacity 
constraints on the interconnector remain binding this may continue 
to be the appropriate mechanism. However, where the 
interconnector is not fully utilised throughout the day a rather 
different pricing regime may be appropriate. 
The pricing of the gas transmission infrastructure can have 
important implications for incentives in the domestic market. At 
present, all the cost of the currently largely empty second gas 
pipeline is charged on all imports from Britain through the pipeline. 
This raises the domestic cost of gas through that source. It also 
raises the price that domestic producers can get on the Irish market. 
As long as they produce less than the total requirements of the Irish 
market the Irish price will remain equal to the British price plus the 
transmission cost. The obverse of this charging mechanism is that it 
raises prices for domestic consumers. 
As the second pipeline was required to provide enhanced security 
of supply, all consumers in Ireland potentially benefit, whether or 
not their gas comes from Britain or from domestic sources. Under 
these circumstances the cost of the second pipeline should be 
charged to all consumers. If such a policy was adopted then the cost 
of transmission would be lower and the price obtained by domestic 
producers would also be lower, with consequential benefits for Irish 
consumers. 
The situation would change if domestic supplies exceeded 
domestic demand. In that case domestic producers would get the 
British price less the cost of transmission. The existence of very large 
export capacity in the gas pipelines enhances the attractiveness of 
exploration. Previously, gas finds off the Irish shore would have only 
had the limited domestic market available, without major further 
investment. Now the capacity to export is guaranteed. However, the 
physical planning difficulties in Mayo may prove a serious 
discouragement to further exploration and are a cause for serious 
concern. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, provision of gas infrastructure should 
not be used as a policy instrument for promoting balanced regional 
development. If such investment were not commercially viable the 
implicit subsidy payable to achieve the deployment of gas 
infrastructure would almost certainly be better used to finance other 
forms of infrastructure more conducive to regional development. 
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The development of a single electricity system for the island of 
Ireland through enhanced interconnection seems desirable from an 
economic point of view, with the potential gains likely to offset the 
potential costs. The total cost of producing the island’s electricity 
would be marginally reduced if the system were dispatched on an 
island-wide basis (McCarthy, 2005). It is likely that an all-island 
electricity system would allow significant savings in capital 
investment through enhancing security of supply. It would also 
provide some limited scope for increased competition. However, 
further work needs to be done to quantify these costs and benefits. 
In addition, there will be an issue as to how the costs and benefits 
will be shared between consumers. 
4.5 
Conclusions
To bring about a single island electricity system will require 
substantial investment in transmission to integrate the systems from 
the points of view of engineering and network planning. It will 
require a single market operator and it may also be desirable a move 
to a single system operator taking on board the functions of Eirgrid 
and SONI (System Operator Northern Ireland). It should also 
involve the development of an integrated approach to regulation. 
This latter will involve significant difficulties. There will have to be 
both agreement on a common market structure (easier to achieve) 
and a clear delineation of reporting relationships between the 
regulator and the political systems in both jurisdictions. This latter 
requirement will be important to ensure the accountability of the 
regulator(s) to the taxpayers North and South. 
It also seems very likely that consumers in Ireland could benefit 
from the construction of a second interconnector to Britain. The 
costs and benefits of such a project also need further investigation.  
In terms of sequencing decisions the first decision should be 
about the development of the interconnection of the two electricity 
systems on the island. Such an integrated system will require a new 
market structure to realise the benefits for consumers. This is 
discussed in Chapter 5. While the decision on a second 
interconnector to Britain is less important than the decisions on 
developing an Irish electricity system, it is very desirable that a 
decision is also taken quite rapidly. Delays in decision-making 
translate into uncertainty for investors and costs for consumers. 
 
 
• An all-island electricity market is likely to confer significant 
benefits for consumers, reducing the long-term cost of a 
reliable electricity supply. 
4.6 
Summary
• To allow an integrated and efficient all-island electricity 
market to develop it is essential that there is adequate 
investment in electricity transmission to physically link the 
exiting separate systems. 
• It seems likely that a second interconnector between Ireland 
and Britain could produce significant benefits for electricity 
consumers on the island. 
5. AN ALL-ISLAND 
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
For over 50 years the electricity market in the Republic of Ireland 
was internalised within the ESB. While generators did not “sell” 
electricity on an open market and suppliers did not “buy” it, there 
was effectively an internal market within the company. The output 
of each plant was chosen in such a manner as to minimise the cost 
of production over the day. Investment decisions were made by the 
planners within the company with the intention of minimising the 
long-run cost of production. While this arrangement ensured that 
Ireland had a secure supply of energy over the decades, it did not 
provide appropriate incentives to encourage the monopoly firm and 
those working within it to minimise costs or to minimise the long-
run price for consumers.45
5.1 
 Introduction
Over the last 20 years major changes have taken place worldwide 
in the electricity sector. In many countries the liberalisation of the 
market has allowed new entrants to build generating stations, 
providing a measure of competition. In many cases the way the 
market was liberalised has resulted in a significant reduction in costs. 
For example, Markiewicz, Rose, and Wolfram (2004), estimate that, 
in anticipation of enhanced competition, or because of such 
competition, the US liberalisation has resulted in a reduction in 
labour and materials input costs into power generation of around 5 
per cent in privately owned utilities and by between 15 to 20 per 
cent in publicly owned utilities. However, they found no evidence of 
savings in energy input costs, suggesting that existing utilities were 
not particularly inefficient in how they actually operated their 
generating plant. (Their data did not allow them to consider the cost 
of capital employed.)46  
Even though there have been significant cost savings from 
reform within the ESB and from the liberalisation process, these 
savings have not necessarily resulted in lower prices of electricity for 
consumers. In the case of Northern Ireland the nature of the 
liberalisation process meant that, while the industry has been run 
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45 In fact public policy in the late 1970s actively encouraged the ESB to hire 
additional staff. 
46 Newbery and Pollitt (1997) found that the UK CEGB privatisation process 
equated to at least a 5 per cent reduction in total costs which they argued would 
almost match the full value of the company when discounted at a rate 5 per cent 
over the lifetime of the capital. 
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more efficiently with lower costs since privatisation in the early 
1990s, consumers have had to pay much higher electricity prices 
over the last two decades than has been the case in either the 
Republic of Ireland or in Great Britain (McGurnaghan, 1995).47 In 
the case of the British liberalisation of the late 1980s, the efficiency 
gains accrued first to shareholders and the UK government, with 
relatively little savings for consumers in the early years of 
privatisation (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). 
Thus, while liberalisation may reduce costs, it is not necessarily a 
foregone conclusion that the benefits will accrue to consumers. The 
experience elsewhere indicates that the way the liberalised market is 
designed and regulated can play a very important role in determining 
who gains from the changes. From the point of view of 
policymakers in Ireland it is essential that the bulk of any efficiency 
gains are passed through to consumers. This chapter considers how 
the all-island electricity market can be designed so as to bring 
adequate downward pressure on operating costs, while still ensuring 
that most of these gains are passed on to consumers. 
Table 5.1: Unit Cost Structure for a “Best New Entrant” Gas CCGT 
Generator 
 € MWh 
Cost of Capital 9.38 
Operating Costs 6.13 
Fuel Costs 4.84 
Carbon Costs 1.7 
Total 66.10 
Source: CER, 2005 (CER/05/110, 26 July 2005). 
 
In designing a liberalised electricity market for Ireland it is crucial 
that the risks for new investors are minimised. Where a market is 
perceived to be risky new investors will require a much higher rate 
of return on capital to warrant building new plant. Table 5.1 shows 
the Commission for Energy Regulation’s estimate of the cost 
structure for a new Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) providing 
3,050 GWh of electricity annually running on natural gas (CER, 
2005). This shows that the cost of capital at €9.38 per MWh is 
slightly larger than all the non-energy operating costs – labour and 
materials. The research quoted above, if applicable in an Irish 
context, suggests that the scope for efficiency savings in materials 
and labour could have been close to 15 per cent in an old state 
owned monopoly. However, these figures published by the CER are 
for a new plant operated under best practice so that they already 
include the bulk of such potential savings.  
 
47 The Northern Ireland generators were sold off with long-term contracts which 
meant that consumers would have to pay a very high price for electricity for the 
following 20 years. The British taxpayer got a much higher price than they would 
otherwise have done. All the benefits of the major efficiency gains which the new 
owners achieved then flowed to the new shareholders. Because the price for 
consumers was effectively fixed they could not reap any of the benefits of the 
efficiency gains. 
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The capital costs assume a reasonably certain environment for 
investors where they plan to make their return over 15 years. 
However, if the market were perceived to be much more risky than 
the CER are assuming, resulting in investors looking for a payback 
over, say, 8 years, this would raise the cost of capital by 
approximately 50 per cent.48 Thus the effect of risk on the cost of 
capital can potentially have a much bigger impact on the cost of 
electricity production than any likely efficiency gains or losses in the 
actual operation of a generation station. This means that a very 
important priority in any market design is the requirement that it 
should minimise the cost of capital. 
While there is significant research which suggests that 
liberalisation can result in a reduction in operating costs of firms in 
the electricity sector, there is much less evidence on the importance 
of economies of scale. It is clear that the historical development of 
the sector throughout much of the world was partly driven by the 
considerable economies of scale in the industry. In Ireland and 
Britain the earliest private sector electricity companies were 
eventually taken over by public monopolies. This change was 
significantly driven by the scale economies, rather than by any 
ideological stance.  
In the case of the British liberalisation of the 1980s the initial 
configuration saw three large generating companies and many more 
regional supply companies. However, over the last decade the 
industry has reorganised itself into five big re-integrated electricity 
companies, which each have significant generation capability, as well 
as each having an average of five million customers. When 
compared with the potential all-island Irish market with less than 
three million customers in total, this raises the issue of how realistic 
or efficient (in terms of reaping the economies of scale) it is to 
envisage a similar number of players being sustainable in the long 
term. This issue must be taken into account in designing an 
alternative electricity market for the island of Ireland. 
The economies of scale in electricity generation, while difficult to 
quantify, stem from a range of different factors. The most obvious 
factor giving rise to scale economies in the industry is the physical 
characteristics of the production technology, especially its 
engineering characteristics.49 For example, gas fired CCGTs come in 
units of around 400 MW. For security it is important to spread 
generation over a significant number of units so that the risks of 
unexpected breakdowns are minimised. Fitz Gerald (2004b), 
suggests that the small size of the Northern Ireland market and the 
large size of the generating units relative to the market size may 
require higher security margins there. A much larger market would 
not face these problems as it could reap the benefits of economies 
of scale. 
 
48 This uses the same formula and parameters used in the CER Best New Entrant 
approach. 
49 In the case of electricity transmission and distribution the high capital cost makes 
duplication of transmission a natural monopoly. 
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Possibly even more important than the engineering factors which 
give rise to scale economies is the issue of commercial risk. This 
factor has been significant in driving the reintegration of the British 
power companies (Newbery, 2003). If generating companies operate 
on their own they are exposed to the risk of fuel price shocks, and 
also to very considerable volatility on the market for their electricity. 
To some extent they can hedge the risks by having a portfolio of 
different generating stations and also through financial hedge 
contracts for their fuel. However, such measures require significant 
scale of production and it is not possible to hedge all risks. The use 
of such financial instruments also requires the employment of a 
range of financial and legal experts by all the parties involved.  
Supply companies are also exposed to the possibility of very large 
spikes in the price of the electricity that they buy, while their sale 
price cannot be varied rapidly. The example of California shows how 
regulatory failure and bad planning by supply companies can result 
in their bankruptcy in such an environment.50 While supply 
companies could theoretically hedge much of their risks through 
appropriate financial contracts with generators, such contracts can 
be expensive to draw up. Also it assumes that there are a sufficient 
number of players to make for a liquid market in such financial 
instruments. There is evidence that the British market does not have 
adequate liquidity to facilitate such an approach (Power UK, 2004). 
While it was theoretically possible for the British electricity 
industry to deal with these risks through supply companies entering 
into a wide range of contracts with generating companies, in practise 
they have chosen instead to merge into integrated power companies 
which internalise these risks within the companies. This obviates the 
need for a wide range of financial contracts. This pattern of 
integration is replicated elsewhere in many other liberalised markets. 
Economies of scale also apply to the purchase of fuel. Big 
consumers of gas or coal can command a much more competitive 
market price than small players. Also bigger players can afford to 
source fuel from different suppliers with different types of contracts, 
including contracts that involve fixed prices for fuel deliveries some 
distance into the future. However, this does not mean that players 
must achieve large scale operation on a single market, such as the 
Irish market. It is also possible to reap the benefits of large 
purchasing power where a player has generation plant spread across 
a number of different European markets. 
Another way of looking at this issue of economies of scale is the 
transactions costs that are involved in moving away from a vertically 
integrated firm to a world of many different independent players. In 
some of the examples discussed this must include the cost of all the 
 
50 California introduced competition to its retail and wholesale power markets in 
1998 but experienced a major crisis during 2000 and into 2001. This crisis has 
provoked a major debate about the effects of deregulating markets to allow 
competition but the consensus has emerged that California’s power crisis was a 
failure of market design and of regulation, which neglected adequate capacity 
planning (World Bank, 2001).  
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expertise, financial and legal, to make a fragmented or decentralised 
industry structure operable. Depending on the chosen market 
structure, the transactions costs of making the market work can be 
quite substantial. These transactions costs represent a cost to both 
producers and consumers. If they prove large they can seriously 
impact on the efficiency of the industry and on the welfare of society 
at large. Thus in choosing an appropriate market design for an all-
island market it will be important to ensure that the costs of 
operating that market for all those involved are kept to an absolute 
minimum. Fears about the possible costs of operating the market 
structure proposed by the CER for the Republic in 2004 were 
important in persuading the regulator to abandon those plans. 
In this chapter we first consider the problems of ensuring 
adequate generation capacity in a liberalised market. We then discuss 
four different ways of organising an Irish electricity market 
considering, in turn, their advantages and disadvantages. We then 
outline what we feel is likely to be the most practicable model for 
current Irish circumstances. In the concluding section we consider 
how future developments, including greater interconnection to the 
British electricity system in the next decade, could affect any 
developing Irish market. 
 
 Before deregulation, it was the responsibility of the vertically 
integrated monopoly to insure that enough generation capacity was 
available and usually there was a system of centralised planning. The 
traditional approach to this was to build planning reserves based on 
the forecasted load, the loss of load probability (LOLP) and an 
estimate of the value of lost load (VOLL). Then, the costs of the 
extra capacity required were allocated implicitly among customers. 
In a deregulated, restructured electricity industry there is no central 
planning for new additions to capacity. There are no guarantees 
given for the return on investment in generation but the generation 
companies do not have to give any capacity guarantees that there 
will be a minimum overall level of capacity available. Each new 
investor makes estimates of its own risks in an independent 
assessment, akin to any other industrial investment. Since the 
structure of the electricity generating industry is far from a perfect 
competition model and closer to an oligopolistic one, total private 
supply will frequently be less than the socially optimal level or total 
demand. Hence the so-called supply adequacy problem emerges.  
5.2 
Ensuring 
Adequate 
Generation 
Capacity
Investment in new generation is a risky activity in an uncertain 
environment of deregulated electricity markets. Investors are more 
interested in short-term returns on investment and are justifiably 
reluctant to commit to large long-term investments with a long 
recovery period for their investment which has increasing 
uncertainties as time goes on. Investors have to take into account 
the fact that the investment environment could change at any point 
depending on future electricity demand, spot market prices, 
variations in regulatory policies and financing costs and availability. 
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No two electricity markets are the same when it comes to 
inducing sufficient capacity into the future. It depends greatly on the 
market arrangements and the regulatory situation prevailing (or likely 
to prevail). Capacity deficiency will cause the market to be very 
different compared to a market with excess capacity and may even 
cause the market to breakdown completely as it did in California.  
Examples of energy-only markets (where there is no special 
payment, direct or indirect, for capacity) include California, Norway, 
Alberta and Australia where, the only revenue source for the 
recovery of capacity costs is the difference between the market 
clearing price and generators’ production costs. In a perfectly 
competitive market where prices of electricity vary continuously to 
reflect the supply and demand status at each moment, payment to 
inframarginal generators (above system marginal cost) should cover 
their capacity costs. Peaking plants need opportunities for profit to 
invest – they will produce electricity whenever the difference 
between the electricity price and the fuel cost is favourable.  
Short-term capacity deficiencies occur because of the long 
construction time of new power plants. Without capacity markets or 
payments there is no way of controlling long-term capacity 
availability directly. Without capacity payments peaking plants may 
not recover their investment costs from the market. Experience in 
California and elsewhere has shown that even where a market may 
work in theory, the reality may be very different for three main 
reasons: 
(a) the application of price caps, although necessary in some 
situations, distorts the price signal for investment. As a 
result, some peaking generators may not be able to recover 
their fixed cost; 
(b) the electricity market is akin to an oligopoly rather than 
perfect competition where it is common practice for 
oligopolists to underinvest so as to raise market prices when 
barriers to entry are strong: 
(c) demand may be exceptionally inelastic where large 
consumers are largely disconnected from the true market 
price (due to contracts etc.) and there are only very weak 
channels for real-time price signals to influence demand side 
power response. 
 
 Four possible options or models for structural reform of the 
electricity market are considered here: 5.3  Alternative 
Models • Find yourself a customer. • A single buyer model. 
• Planned parenthood. 
• A pool with capacity payments – the preferred option. 
FIND YOURSELF A CUSTOMER 
The first of these models is the one favoured by the EU in its 
legislation and it was initially believed by some policymakers to be 
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the solution to Ireland’s problems. Under this EU legislation, any 
private sector firm can build a new generation station and find 
customers for their output. From February 2005 all customers are 
free to choose different electricity suppliers.51 It was originally 
expected that lots of new entrants would build generating capacity 
and then compete for the favour of the roughly two million 
customers in the Republic of Ireland. However, this model suffered 
from a number of disadvantages.  
Even with the business sector there is considerable inertia among 
customers. Even if electricity is on offer at lower cost from an 
alternative supplier, customers may be slow to shift allegiance. In the 
case of electricity the ESB “brand” is very strong – they have a 
reliable track record. This makes it difficult and expensive for new 
businesses to build up a customer base.  
In addition, a single generator on its own cannot supply the 
commodity that consumers want – electrical supply that varies in 
line with the very different demand profiles of customers over the 
day. As a result, a single generator company will have to contract 
with other generators to provide these additional services that 
consumers want. Finally, individual generators can face huge costs 
buying in power to meet their contractual obligations to customers 
in the event of a breakdown in their own plant.  
Given the scale economies in generation, new power plants 
involve major additions of capacity. However, as it takes time to 
build a customer base it potentially makes it difficult for new 
entrants to match supply with demand when a new plant opens. As 
an interim measure to deal with this the CER arranged sales of 
“virtual power” to potential new entrants. This meant that they 
could build a customer base in advance of opening. However, this 
remained a rather unsatisfactory mechanism for reducing uncertainty 
for investors mostly because independent power purchasing capacity 
was very difficult to acquire.  
Probably the most serious problem with the current market is 
that new customers are not prepared to sign contracts for power 
supply with new entrants for periods longer than two or three years. 
This means that new entrants cannot guarantee themselves a market 
in advance of investing. As the capital costs in building generating 
stations are very large, this makes investment very risky, increasing 
the cost of capital. The normal way to finance a new power plant is 
to borrow with long-term contracts for sales of electricity providing 
security. This is not possible in the Irish case because of the 
impossibility of obtaining matching long-term contracts for sales. 
The electricity supply sector is concerned with the purchase of 
bulk electricity on wholesale markets and the delivery of this 
electricity to customers. The metering of all consumers is handled 
separately. Supply is a distinct operation from the transmission and 
distribution system, which provides the wires to deliver the 
 
51 Northern Ireland domestic customers will be free to choose their supplier from 
2007 onwards. 
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electricity. This supply business accounts for around 5 per cent of 
the delivered cost of electricity so that it is a low margin business 
and it does not, on its own, provide much scope for efficiency gains 
from competition. 
All of these factors make it very difficult for a new independent 
generator to enter the market through building a generation plant 
and developing a supply business through building its own customer 
base. 
Significant uncertainty is also added because of the behaviour of 
the government as a player in the electricity market. The most 
obvious cause of uncertainty arises from government interference in 
pricing decisions by the dominant player, the ESB. In June 2000, the 
government announced a package of measures to combat inflation, 
including a commitment that electricity prices would not rise later in 
the year.52 This raised the prospect that new entrants would face 
unfair competition in the future due to government’s use of its 
power as shareholder in ESB to restrict price increases. For the 
future new entrants should be protected from such behaviour by 
handing over responsibility for minimum as well as maximum prices 
to the CER.  
A further major concern for new entrants is the fact that the ESB 
controls the bulk of generating capacity. By manipulating availability 
such a dominant player could potentially exert huge market power. 
Under government ownership the ESB has generally not acted to 
use its market power to maximise its profits. Instead it has generally 
acted as a public sector utility with a broad remit to act in the 
“public good”. However, the possibility that the ESB might be 
privatised in its present form raises the prospect of major future 
dangers for new entrants. This is an additional reason for making a 
clear commitment not to privatise the ESB in its present form. This 
issue of dominance and how it can be dealt with is addressed in the 
next chapter. 
For all eligible customers (eligible to buy from any supplier) they 
will pay the current long-run marginal cost for generation, plus 
whatever charges are set for use of transmission and distribution 
systems. If a new entrant could undercut the ESB, the ESB would 
eventually have to react by matching that price for all categories of 
eligible customers; otherwise all eligible customers would move to 
new entrants, possibly resulting in substantial stranded capacity or 
stranded contracts. This would mean that the ESB on its own could 
no longer internalise cross subsidies to peat or wind generation and 
other social obligations. This has been reflected in the bundling of 
many of these costs into a new Public Service Obligation (PSO), 
payable by all consumers. 
The result of these uncertainties is to greatly increase the cost of 
capital for new plant and to reduce the incentive to invest. This is a 
problem common to all electricity systems (Castro-Rodriguez, 
 
52 http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/finance/2000/0628/archive.  
00062800123.html 
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Marin, and Siotis, 2001). This market structure makes it safer and, 
therefore, more profitable for individual players in the generation 
market to under-provide rather than to over-provide capacity. The 
result of pursuing this model without offsetting measures to ensure 
security of supply could be significant shortages of generation 
capacity over the next decade. With a very low price elasticity of 
demand for electricity, this would translate into a major increase in 
prices and much bigger profits for incumbents. Clearly, from the 
point of view of the consumer, this is not a satisfactory prospect. 
SINGLE BUYER 
In a market structured round a single buyer, some of the problems 
with the existing model could be overcome. While this was originally 
a possible option under EU legislation, it was not favoured in 
Ireland and has since been ruled out by the development of the Irish 
market. In a single buyer model that independent buyer 
(independent of generators) would be required to buy electricity at 
the minimum possible price and that single buyer would then sell it 
on to suppliers at the purchase price. (In the Irish case such a buyer 
could have been the transmission system operator, EIRGRID.) The 
buyer would have to set transparent rules for the dispatch of 
generating stations. Existing players and new entrants, who would 
know their own cost structure and those of their competitors, could 
then predict reasonably accurately their likely sales. 
Such a model would get over many of the problems for new 
firms breaking into the market as they would not have to market 
themselves to a disparate consumer base. Instead they would know 
that if their product came in cheapest it would all be sold. This 
would reduce one element of the uncertainty facing new entrants. At 
the point where investment decisions are made it should be possible 
to predict reasonably accurately sales in the first few years of 
production.  
However, as described here, under this model the availability of 
long term contracts for sale would have depended on there being a 
range of significant supply companies. This uncertainty would have 
maximised the pressures on existing participants to reduce their cost 
base, but, due to the uncertainty, it would still have made the cost of 
capital for new investors quite high. 
By preventing direct sales to consumers by generators it would 
also have prevented possible innovations through new products or 
methods. For example, the sale of electricity from renewable sources 
at a premium price might not be possible under this model. Also 
there would be less incentive to offer flexible or interruptible 
contracts to consumers to reflect the variations in cost of production 
by time of day. New products, exploiting profitable opportunities in 
such areas, could have found themselves ruled out. 
Finally, it would have reduced the possibility for competition in 
electricity supply as all suppliers would have paid the same price for 
the electricity that they purchase. However, as discussed above, the 
evidence from elsewhere suggests that the scope for major savings 
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from enhanced competition in supply is much less than the scope 
for savings in generation. 
A variant on the single buyer model would have been to allow 
ESB as the supplier of the franchise market – the bulk of electricity 
consumers – to buy electricity from all producers, including new 
entrants.  
Newbery (2002) argues that the EU approach to electricity 
markets, in dismembering the monopoly supply business, risks two 
unattractive alternatives: 
 
Without a new Directive, distribution companies 
retaining a domestic franchise and subject to yardstick 
regulation of their power contracts could provide 
countervailing power against generating companies. … 
However, opaque markets … may lead to an old 
German-style equilibrium … – safe but rather 
expensive. 
 
With the new Directive, the end of the franchise by 
2005 is likely to encourage generators to integrate 
forward into supply, and risks removing the counter-
parties to longer-term contracts that would facilitate 
entry. …. then it will be profitable for companies to 
reduce the spare capacity margin, with possibly 
Californian consequences (worse if the regulators lack 
the legislative powers to intervene). 
 
The first problem – opaque markets, would have certainly 
required the separation of ESB electricity supply from generation. 
As Newbery says, this could have been safe but could have incurred 
additional costs. The alternative, which is the route initially pursued 
in Ireland of relying on new independent generators entering the 
market and finding customers, risked undersupply for the reasons 
already discussed. 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD 
One of the key problems with the existing market model is that it is 
in danger of producing a serious shortage of investment in 
generating capacity in the medium to long term. While eliminating 
some of the uncertainty facing investors, the Single Buyer model 
would produce some improvements. However, it would still have 
left significant uncertainty for any new investors, militating against 
adequate provision in the medium term.  
While long-term contracts would greatly reduce uncertainty for 
investors they could also greatly reduce competitive forces in the 
market (Newbery, 2002). In the case of Northern Ireland, the long-
term contracts granted at the time of privatisation have meant that 
the price of electricity for consumers in Northern Ireland has been 
among the highest in the EU for the past decade. Clearly this has 
been a disaster for consumers. 
What is required is a model that will significantly reduce 
investment risk, while still ensuring that competitive pressures 
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reduce costs and that the resulting savings are passed on to 
consumers as lower prices. One possibility would be to leave 
responsibility for ensuring that there is adequate capacity in the long 
term to the transmission system operator (Eirgrid) as planner of the 
system.  
Where the current market model is not delivering adequate 
investment the planner (possibly the CER or Eirgrid) would have 
the task of commissioning new plant to be built. However, the 
operation of the plant would be subject to a separate contract 
determined in a tendering process. Private sector companies would 
compete for the right to manage the new plant. This would minimise 
the capital costs for new operators of power stations, while still 
keeping downward pressure on operating costs. The sales of 
electricity would still be undertaken on a competitive basis with 
producers seeking customers. However, the market would probably 
work much better if the supplier of the franchise market was also 
required to buy its supplies of electricity on the market, rather than 
taking it from its own generators. A separation of ESB electricity 
supply from generation would be desirable and this would be met if 
all plant were managed on contract by private sector firms. 
In addition to planning new plant it would be desirable to take 
the ownership of the sites of all existing ESB generation stations 
into the ownership of the planning authority (possibly Eirgrid). The 
NCB report (2002) identifies problems in obtaining planning 
permission for new sites as a major obstacle to new entry. By putting 
the ownership of the sites of generation plants under independent 
management, incumbents would not be allowed to prevent new 
entrants from gaining easy access to suitable sites. Obviously 
payment for the sites would be made in relation to normal market 
prices, but the special advantage of access to planning permission 
for generation would not be built in to the price. 
AN ELECTRICITY POOL AND CAPACITY PAYMENTS 
Now that market opening has been completed, the basic outline of 
the Irish electricity market is in place. There is the potential for 
competition in supply. New entrants can and have built independent 
power plants. To date these major changes have been 
accommodated in an ad hoc fashion. What is needed is a transparent 
market structure that can apply to an all-island market and can 
minimise the uncertainty for investors, and the transactions costs for 
all the players.  
Here we outline a suggested market design that is very similar to 
the design agreed by the two regulators in All Ireland Project (AIP) 
(2005a). While it is a hybrid of the different models already outlined, 
it should deal with many of the problems with these individual 
models identified above. It is not a fully worked out model, rather 
concentrating on the essential features that will ensure that it delivers 
reliable electricity supplies at least cost in the long term. There is, 
necessarily, very considerable complexity in making any such model 
operational and many important details are left to the regulatory 
authorities to develop.  
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As with the draft market structure proposed by the CER for the 
Republic in 2003-2004, the market should be centred on a gross 
pool. That is, all electricity produced in Ireland should be sold 
through the pool. Each generator will bid a volume and price pair53 
into the market for each hour (or even 15 minutes) and the market 
operator will choose sufficient output to meet demand on an hourly 
basis. The choice (or dispatch) of the generating stations operating 
will be made on the basis of the prices bid in by their owners – the 
prices are stacked in ascending order and the market operator moves 
up the stack till the cumulated supply meets demand.  
Each supplier is paid the price bid by the marginal plant 
operating and this is referred to as the system marginal price. 
Depending on the way the players bid in the market, during the 
night-time this price can be very low – say €30 per MWh – but 
during day-time peaks in winter, when supply is very tight, it could 
go very high – up to at least a hundred times the minimum price. 
Suppliers then contract to buy tranches of electricity by the 
period to meet their expected demand. It will be up to the system 
operator to deal with short-term deviations in demand or supply to 
ensure that the market is in balance second by second. The handling 
of these balancing measures and how they are remunerated is 
outside the scope of this paper which concentrates on the broad 
outline of the market. 
Another unknown is how the gross pool market arrangement will 
deal with renewable energy (RE) intermittent generators. In practice, 
there is very little empirical data or experience of RE intermittent 
generators participation in this market type. RE generators have, in 
the main, either opted for policy mechanisms which placed them 
outside the scope of market participation or have been granted non-
dispatchable or must-run status. The issue of the treatment of 
intermittent generation needs to be thought through carefully to 
ensure that the market delivers the correct signals to RE generators. 
In the original CER scheme proposed in 2003 (CER, 2003), it 
was proposed that generators would receive all their remuneration 
from their sales on the pool (or spot market). Thus their prices 
would have to be high enough for them to receive revenue, not just 
to cover their short-run marginal cost (the price of the fuel used), 
but they would also have to generate a sufficient surplus over fuel 
costs over the year to pay their operating and maintenance costs and 
to pay off the cost of the capital employed.  
Each generating company (possibly owning a portfolio of 
generating plant) would have to assess how many hours each plant 
would run in the year for any given pricing strategy. They would 
choose their price for each period such that ex post the numbers of 
hours run in the year multiplied by the hourly system marginal price 
would cover all their costs, including capital costs. They would 
 
53 e.g. 100 MW of electricity from 03.00 to 04.00 on the 1 August 2005 at a price of 
€50 per MWh. 
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normally not bid in a price below short run marginal cost – the price 
of the fuel.54  
In any single time period individual generators could often make 
more money by cutting the price (while still keeping it above short-
run marginal cost) to ensure dispatch ahead of another generator 
that was pricing to cover its operating and capital costs. While such a 
strategy would be successful in enhancing revenue in that time 
period, the competitor would be forced to respond in the same way. 
Such a competitive rush for lower prices could work in the short 
run. However, our simulations with a model of the Irish electricity 
market (McCarthy, 2005) would indicate that, under these 
circumstances, the vast bulk of plant would not even cover its 
operating costs and would have to close. The result would be a 
significant shortage of electricity for peak periods. 
However, knowing that such would be the outcome of a 
competitive race for the bottom in prices, it is much more likely that 
each operator will bid a price knowing that every other operator 
faces the same need to cover capital and operating costs. As a result, 
the alternative equilibrium is one where everyone bids a price that 
takes account of their need to stay in business by covering operating 
and capital costs. 
The implication of such a bidding strategy is dramatically 
different from the case where firms only bid a price to cover their 
short-run marginal cost. For example, for an electricity generating 
plant specially designed to handle peak load the short-run marginal 
cost (cost of fuel used) could be around €90 per MWh. However, if 
the plant only ran for one hour in the year to handle an exceptional 
peak load, each MWh of electricity generated would have to produce 
revenue of between €40,000 and €50,000 per MWh for that one 
hour – 500 times the short-run marginal cost. This price arises 
purely from the need to stay in business and would in no way be 
driven by issues of dominance or market power. Thus a pool where 
players have to get all their income from direct sales of electricity 
can expect to see huge volatility in hourly electricity prices across the 
year.  
Because all electricity sold in the pool in a given hour receives the 
system marginal price, base load plant, which runs all of the time, 
will make a significant part of the surplus needed to cover its non-
fuel operating and capital costs in these few hours of exceptional 
prices. For the bulk of the day they will probably bid in a price close 
to their system marginal cost.  
If regulators were to find such exceptional spikes in electricity 
prices unacceptable and cap them, then a significant number of 
players would end up making a loss and having to close. If investors 
had any concerns about regulatory authorities operating in such a 
manner it would seriously discourage investment in such a market.  
 
54 Under a locational marginal pricing regime there might be circumstances where 
firms would bid in a price below the cost of fuel. 
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Even if there were no such fears this extreme volatility can be 
very difficult for market participants to handle. Of its nature such 
spikes in power prices would be difficult to predict. In some years 
there could be few if any, while in others there could be quite a 
number. The extremes in volatility and their uncertain occurrence 
pose serious problems for all players, buyers and sellers, and it can 
be difficult to hedge all such risks with financial contracts. 
The risks for buyers and sellers in this market, arising from the 
extreme volatility in prices, can theoretically be handled by means of 
bilateral financial contracts. For example, a buyer could agree with a 
generator that if the market price for peak electricity on a 
Wednesday in January is below a specified threshold then the buyer 
will compensate the seller. In the case that it is above the threshold 
specified in the contract the seller would compensate the buyer. This 
would mean that effectively the two parties have a firm contract for 
electricity at a specified price (such a contract is referred to as a 
“contract for differences”). Provided that there are many buyers and 
many sellers and that the cost of writing such financial contracts is 
small relative to their value (the transactions costs are low), then it 
will be possible for the market to organise itself to share risk. Given 
a fully flexible market in financial instruments, by using such 
instruments sellers will effectively make payments to generators to 
cover their costs of being available to produce.  
By allowing generators to cover their costs outside the market by 
means of such financial instruments the generators would no longer 
need to price in the market to cover their operating costs and capital 
costs. Under these circumstances, if all the players know that all the 
other players have covered their operating and capital costs by such 
contracts, then they will all bid in their short-run marginal cost.  
However, experience in the British market suggests that the 
transactions costs involved in organising financial markets by means 
of financial contracts may not be as effective in practice as it is in 
theory. Power Economics (2004), suggests that in practice the 
British market for such contracts has proved illiquid. In the Irish 
case, with one very large supply company and one very large 
portfolio producer, even if they were separate independent 
companies, the availability of financial contracts to allow the market 
operate would depend heavily on the behaviour of these two 
companies. If they did not offer the range of contracts needed to 
allow independent suppliers and generators to hedge their risk the 
market would be seriously distorted. In addition, the very small scale 
of the Irish market will make the size of the contracts much smaller 
than in Britain and much more expensive in terms of transactions 
costs. The fact that the British electricity market has reintegrated 
generation and supply companies, again internalising these 
transactions costs, illustrates their significance. 
The alternative approach to this issue is to have a scheme of 
capacity payments that mirrors the “ideal” set of financial contracts 
outlined above. These capacity payments would be made by the 
market operator to all generators based on a formula outlined below. 
They would be funded as part of the use of system charges levied on 
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all consumers. The payments would be conditional on plant being 
available to generate electricity, not on whether the plant actually 
runs.  
A range of possible approaches to capacity payments schemes is 
set out in AIP (2005b). Here we consider one possible example of 
such a capacity payments scheme. In this example there would be 
serious penalties for plant that is unexpectedly unavailable to 
generate. (All plant must be serviced during the year and is, as a 
result, unavailable on a planned basis for about 10 per cent of the 
year. No penalties would be payable and no payments would be 
made for planned shutdowns.) As discussed in the next chapter the 
penalty for unexpected unavailability is important to discourage any 
attempt by dominant players to game the system.  
By making the payments conditional on availability it would 
provide a significant incentive for plant to ensure high levels of 
availability. ESBNG (2004b), has estimated that the low levels of 
plant availability in 2003 in the Republic imposed a significant cost 
on the system. Fitz Gerald (2004b) estimated that for every 0.8 
percentage points increase in average availability of generation plant 
there is a potential saving in the capital cost of spare generation 
capacity of €50 million. If there were a significant response by 
generators to such incentives for enhanced availability of existing 
plant this could save consumers a significant amount of money in 
the long term. The experience in Northern Ireland on privatisation 
was that the introduction of incentives for availability produced a 
very big response from the newly privatised industry. However, 
because of the inappropriate structure of the contracts, the benefits 
all flowed to the shareholders in the companies owning the 
generation plant and consumers ended up paying exceptionally high 
prices.  
The model of capacity payments considered here is one that is 
calibrated to ensure that adequate generation capacity is available to 
meet the specified standard on security of supply. Currently, the 
Irish system is designed to meet a loss of load expectation (LOLE) 
of 8 hours a year or better. That means that, on average each year, 
demand should only exceed supply for 8 hours, necessitating power 
cuts for some consumers. 
The proposed annual capacity payments should be equal to the 
annual operating and capital costs per MW of capacity of a peak 
generator multiplied by the generation capacity required to meet a 
LOLE of 8 hours at a high average availability of ideally 90 per cent 
in any year. This sum of money would be divided between the 
generators on the basis of actual availability in terms of MW per 
hour over the year, with heavy penalties for unplanned failures.55 If 
the actual capacity were exactly equal to planned capacity then a new 
peak generator would receive exactly the right amount to cover its 
operating and capital costs for the year. If actual capacity were 
 
55 As discussed later, the treatment of wind would need special consideration under 
such a regime. 
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inadequate to meet the security standard then new investors would 
receive more than their costs making a profit. When plant was 
greater than needed new peak plant would make a loss.  
Such a scheme would clearly send the right signals to investors in 
peak generation. NERA (2002), also suggests that on theoretical 
grounds the incentives for mid load and base load generation should 
also be appropriate. In the next section we examine how such a 
model of the Irish electricity market would have performed if it had 
been implemented on an all-island basis in 2003. To do this we use a 
newly developed model of the Irish electricity market, which is 
described in more detail in McCarthy (2005). 
In this paper we model this scheme on the basis that the 
payments are made equally for all hours a plant is available in the 
year. However, it may well be appropriate to profile the payments in 
such a way that it would incentivise availability when the balance 
between demand and supply is likely to be tightest (see AIP, 2005b). 
The advantage of this scheme of capacity payments is that 
because it would be centrally administered the transactions costs 
would be relatively low. There would be no need for all the 
individual players to employ legal and financial personnel to manage 
the alternative – a portfolio of financial contracts needed to allow 
them to operate safely in the Irish market. In addition, if the scheme 
were designed optimally, it should mirror an optimal set of financial 
contracts, though probably having much lower transactions costs 
than the alternative of organisation by financial contracts. In 
addition, because of the transparency of the scheme it could give 
added certainty to new investors, reducing their cost of capital, with 
significant advantage for consumers in the long run. 
Already the island electricity system is connected to the British 
system by one interconnector. It is likely that the existing 
interconnector will be supplemented by a second interconnector 
early in the next decade. The issue will then arise as to how exports 
and imports of power should be treated in a market with capacity 
payments. The British market operates on the basis of bilateral 
contracts between generators and suppliers (with much of this taking 
place within the large integrated power companies). These contracts 
ensure that generators receive their full costs, including operating 
and capital costs. If Irish generators were allowed to sell spare power 
into that market while receiving capacity payments they would be 
compensated twice for their non-fuel costs. As a result, it would 
probably be appropriate for no capacity payments to be paid for 
capacity that sells its output in the current British market (referred to 
as BETA). Similarly, there will be an issue as to whether capacity 
payments should be payable on imports from Britain.  
Because of the complexity of the issues involved we do not 
attempt to resolve the issue here as to how trade in electricity should 
be treated. For example, because capacity payments would be aimed 
at incentivising availability of generation to provide a secure energy 
supply, an issue would arise as to whether the capacity in Britain 
exporting to Ireland was “secure” and could be relied on. Similarly, 
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where spare capacity in Ireland exports to Britain it may still be 
available to the Irish system in case of shortage. 
Finally, the treatment of wind power under such a regime would 
need to be considered. Because the availability of wind on any 
particular day in the year is not known a year in advance wind might 
not be eligible for any capacity payments under this scheme. 
However, this would be an inappropriate extreme outcome – wind 
power certainly provides some capacity credit to the system. The 
treatment of capacity payments for wind would need to be handled 
in a consistent manner with the treatment of charges for reserves on 
the system. Further research would be needed to determine the 
appropriate treatment of wind generation in such a regime. 
 
 A model of the Irish electricity system, North and South has been 
developed and is described in more detail in McCarthy (2005). The 
model includes all electricity generators on the island and it can be 
used to simulate either the two systems on the island as separate 
entities or as a fully integrated network. The model uses half-hourly 
data for actual demand in 2003.  
5.4 
Modelling the 
Proposed 
Market
When it is used to model future years the daily and seasonal 
profile of demand is maintained, with the overall level of demand in 
each half hour being scaled up by the expected rise in aggregate 
demand for electricity for the year (Bergin et al., 2003). Conditional 
on forecast demand for a particular year, a separate model, described 
in Fitz Gerald, 2004b, is used to determine what is the appropriate 
level of generating capacity needed to meet a specified security 
standard. Additional generating stations can then be added to the 
basic model of the system to ensure that there is adequate generating 
capacity. The additional stations are of a representative nature, 
generally based on the specification in the CER’s paper on “Best 
New Entrants”, CER, 2004. 
The model is static in the sense that it does not automatically 
introduce new stations where it would be profitable to do so. 
However, for the newer stations the cost of capital employed is also 
known and it is possible to estimate whether the stations are 
covering their long-run costs and whether it would be profitable for 
new investment to be undertaken in base load, mid load or peak 
load plant.56 The model can be run a series of times in an iterative 
fashion to take account of new entry where it would be profitable, 
and exit of old plant where it no longer covers its operating costs. 
Two approaches to bidding by generators are considered in the 
model. In the first it is assumed that firms only bid in their fuel costs 
– the short-run marginal cost. The model can also be run iteratively 
 
56 Plant that runs almost full-time throughout the day and throughout the year is 
referred to as base load. Plant that runs for a limited number of hours in the year is 
referred to as peak plant. In between plant that runs for of the bulk of the daylight 
hours each day is referred to as mid load plant. Obviously there is a whole spectrum 
of utilisation rates and this three way distinction is used for convenience of 
exposition. 
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to derive the prices each generator would bid in for each half hour 
such that over the year they would each cover their operating costs 
as well as their fuel costs. To simplify the model the half-hourly 
price is capped at €2,000 a MWh. This means that a few peak 
stations that actually run in the year may not cover their costs for the 
year. However, this does not detract significantly from the analysis 
set out below. 
In this section we first consider for 2003 what the effect would 
have been in an all-island market where generators bid in only their 
fuel costs or where they bid in sufficient to cover their operating 
costs. We consider the Time Weighted Average (TWA) price for 
electricity over the year in each case. That is the average over the 
year of the half-hourly output of electricity multiplied by the system 
marginal cost for the relevant half hour. We also consider the cost of 
the fuel used and the operating surplus or deficit of generating 
stations.  
Figure 5.1: All-Island System Marginal Cost Function 
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Figure 5.1 graphically illustrates the difference between the two 
different bidding strategies. The System Marginal Cost Function 
shows how many megawatts can be purchased for a given price. 
Where firms bid a price to cover their operating cost it is referred to 
in Figure 5.1 as the medium-run marginal cost MRMC. The fuel only 
bidding price is referred to as the short-run marginal cost SRMC. 
The diagram illustrates that under both bidding strategies a small 
tranche of power comes at zero marginal cost – basically the output 
of the hydro and wind stations which have no fuel cost. Then 
approximately 1,000 MWhs can be bought for just less than €20 per 
MWh under both bidding strategies. As the market gets closer to full 
capacity, the deviation between the two bidding strategies becomes 
more apparent. This arises because the peaking stations are bidding a 
much greater price per MWh in order to allow them to recoup their 
true variable costs. For the last tranche of output the marginal cost is 
off the scale of the graph where firms have to bid enough to get 
back their operating costs. This just reflects the fact that such plant 
would operate for very few hours in the year and would have to get 
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an exceptional surplus in those hours to earn enough to pay the 
permanently employed staff of the plant and its other operating 
costs. Under this regime in most years there will be some plant that 
never runs if the electricity capacity is adequate to meet the required 
security standard. Such plant would inevitably make a loss as it 
would not produce any electricity. 
Table 5.2 shows the results of running the model for 2003 for 
the All-Island Market under the two different bidding strategies by 
firms. The most striking feature of the results shown in the Table is 
the difference in the Time Weighted Average Price (TWA) between 
the different strategies. On average, the wholesale price of electricity 
would be just under four times higher if firms had to recover all 
costs on the market, compared to the case where they only recover 
their fuel costs. The total cost of fuel is identical under the two 
bidding strategies. This indicates that the change in bidding 
strategies does not change the merit order of the plant – the order in 
which it is chosen to run. This is important as it means that the 
dispatch of plant is equally efficient under the two strategies. 
Table 5.2: Electricity Model Results for All-Island Market 2003 
 All-Island 
Bidding Strategy SRMC MRMC 
Time Weighted Ave. Price, € 32.50 115.1 
Total Revenue, € million 1,093 3,871 
Total Losses of Stations (gross), € million 126 50 
Total Fuel Cost, € million 565 565 
Total Surplus,57 € million 197 2,844 
 
The figures shown in Table 5.2 for Total Losses of Stations 
represent the gross losses (difference between revenue and fuel and 
operating costs) that would have been incurred by stations, without 
subtracting the surpluses that would have been made by some of the 
base-load stations. It is this “loss” figure, which would have to be 
eliminated if the portfolio of power generators were all to stay in 
business. As shown in the last row of Table 5.2, under the regime 
where firms only bid in their fuel costs (SRMC) even though many 
plants would not cover their operating costs, the electricity 
generating system as a whole would have made a net surplus of 
nearly €200 million. While this would not have been enough for all 
stations to remunerate their capital, it does reflect the fact that some 
base-load plant might actually have earned enough to warrant new 
investment. 
Moving to the case where firms bid in a price to cover their 
operating costs, the price would be dramatically higher under that 
regime in order to ensure that every generating plant at least covered 
its fuel and operating costs. As a result, the surplus would be more 
than €2.6 billion greater than under the simple fuel only bidding. 
Clearly, if the problem were to ensure that sufficient plant stays in 
 
57 Surplus = Profit Before Remuneration of Capital = Revenue minus fuel and 
O&M Costs. 
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business by covering its operating costs this strategy of bidding 
would be massive overkill, at huge expense to the consumer. 
The scenario where firms bid in their operating costs as well as 
fuel costs does not represent a stable equilibrium. With profits 
inflated to the extent shown in Table 5.2, there would be major entry 
of new generating stations. This would gradually whittle away the 
excess profits and also lead to some firms exiting the industry. 
However, the magnitude of the changes which would be required, as 
reflected in the massive price differential, is such that the adjustment 
process could take a very long time leaving consumers with an 
exceptionally high price of electricity in the immediate future. 
As discussed in the previous section, the electricity market, if 
faced with the prospect of paying such prices to secure a reliable 
electricity supply, would rapidly move to put in place bilateral 
financial contracts between suppliers and generators to ensure a 
certain supply at a much lower cost. Suppliers, by entering into 
suitable contracts (technically called contracts for differences) would 
effectively pay the owners of the plant making losses in column 1 of 
Table 5.2 enough to keep them in business. The result would be that 
generators would all know that as everyone was getting their 
operating costs they would all revert to bidding in terms of their 
short-run marginal cost (price of fuel). Finally, even if the gross 
losses were actually covered by the financial contracts the system 
might not be sufficiently profitable to encourage new investment. 
Because of the riskiness of the market, as evidenced by the potential 
volatility in prices, investors may be loath to invest unless supply 
companies could offer longer-term financial contracts. However, 
because consumers themselves are not subject to such contracts, 
having the freedom to switch suppliers as and when they choose, 
suppliers would only be able to offer relatively short-term contracts. 
While it would be possible for the market to reorganise itself 
using a range of different financial contracts so as to ensure a 
reliable supply of electricity at a reasonable cost, as argued earlier 
this may involve very considerable transactions costs and may work 
imperfectly in a market as small as the Irish market is likely to be. 
Theoretically, the same result could be achieved by means of an 
appropriate capacity payments regime. As argued earlier, such a 
regime could prove more certain for investors than reliance on 
bilateral contracts, as well as being more transparent.  
If a scheme along the lines outlined in the previous section were 
implemented, the total capacity payments in 2003 would have been 
around €300 million.58 This would raise the Time Weighted Average 
 
58 This assumes a payment of €55,000 a year per MW of capacity – an estimate of 
the capital and operating cost per MW of a new peak plant. With an installed 
capacity on the island of around 6,000 MW and assuming plant was available 90 per 
cent of the time (and ignoring penalties), this would have cost around €300 million 
in 2003. This assumes that the installed capacity was only just adequate in that year 
– it was probably a bit more than was needed in practice. Also actual availability in 
the Republic was way below 90 per cent. As a result, this estimate is on the high 
side. 
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price of electricity by 27 per cent above what it would be with firms 
bidding only their energy costs, though dramatically lower than 
under the alternative bidding strategy. This would probably eliminate 
the bulk of the gross losses and give rise to a total net surplus for 
generation of around €500 million. This would probably have been 
more than enough to compensate for capital costs on existing plant 
and it would have incentivised some new entry. As discussed later, if 
modelled dynamically, the new entry would, in turn, result in some 
exit of less efficient plant.  
What is very clear is that such a scheme of capacity payments, 
resulting in firms bidding in only their energy costs, would have a 
dramatically lower cost for consumers than would be the case where 
all compensation for operating and capital costs has to come from 
the pool. Even with financial contracts, they at best can replicate the 
results of a properly designed capacity payments scheme. At worst, 
because of high transactions costs and illiquidity due to the small 
size of the Irish market, they could add to the cost of electricity for 
consumers. 
McCarthy (2005), suggests that the disparity between the two 
bidding strategies would be even greater if the Republic of Ireland 
market was examined on its own, rather than the all-Island market. 
In 2003, the state of affairs in the two electricity systems on the 
island was very different; the South was in a position of under-
capacity whilst the North had sufficient spare capacity and was 
exporting some electricity across the border. In a state of under-
capacity, a system operator would need to employ nearly all of the 
available generation in the country and would therefore have to 
travel much further down the merit order of generators’ bids. The 
last station on the list would be the most expensive and if it was 
deployed to produce energy all other stations would make profits, 
and some would make very significant gains. If this happened on a 
regular basis, it could have serious cost implications for the 
consumer in the short run.  
Finally, the suggested market structure has important advantages 
in terms of transparency. With major concerns about the dominance 
of one or more players on the Irish electricity market it is important 
that the market structure should maximise the flow of information 
to the regulatory authorities and that the behaviour of the different 
agents on the market should be easily understood by all involved. A 
market that relied on a wide range of bilateral financial contracts 
would be far from transparent. It would still leave open the danger 
that one or two dominant players could control that market through 
withholding or granting consent to suitable contracts. By contrast, a 
scheme of centrally administered capacity payments would be 
transparent. Everyone would see how the benefits of the capacity 
payments scheme were distributed. 
In moving the pool to a basis where all firms were incentivised to 
bid in only their fuel costs it would also be much more easily 
understood and regulated by the appropriate authorities. It is 
relatively easy to check the value of expenditure on fuel in different 
generating stations whereas it would be much harder to check the 
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logic of a bid which was designed to cover operational cost based on 
the forecast annual demand and forecast of the bidding policy of all 
other generators. The latter type of market would make it much 
easier to disguise a bidding strategy designed to exploit a dominant 
position in the market. 
 
 The small size of the Irish electricity market, the relatively large 
size of generating units relative to peak demand and the presence of 
a dominant player in that market means that market structures that 
may work elsewhere may not be appropriate for Ireland. In addition, 
some of the options that might have been available a decade ago, for 
example the single buyer model, are now ruled out by EU or 
domestic legislation (e.g. market opening). 
5.5 
 Conclusions
In this chapter a range of different models for organising the 
Irish electricity market are considered. On balance it is concluded 
that a gross pool, the market structure proposed by the two 
regulators (AIP, 2005a), would be the most appropriate basis for 
organising an all-island market. Under such a market regime all 
electricity would be sold in the pool (and all electricity bought in the 
pool). In addition to the pool there should be a scheme of centrally 
administered capacity payments. The cost of these capacity 
payments would be levied on all consumers. Subject to certain 
restrictions outlined earlier in the chapter, these payments would be 
made to all generators that are available to generate, whether or not 
they are actually called upon to supply electricity. Failure to meet 
promised commitments would incur a heavy penalty payment, 
(which would be used to reduce use of system charges). The formula 
for calculating the total amount of the payments would be based on 
the total capacity needed to guarantee a secure supply multiplied by 
the cost of a peak generator. 
This regime would be both transparent and relatively certain for 
new investors. This aspect of certainty, reducing the cost of capital 
for investment, will be essential in a market that will require 
continuing investment in new generating capacity over the coming 
decade. Failure to provide a reasonably transparent and predictable 
market could substantially raise the cost of capital for investors. 
Inevitably that would be passed on to consumers as higher prices. 
However the electricity market is organised, the bulk of the risk 
inherent in the market will be passed forward to consumers rather 
than carried by shareholders. The market structure must reflect this.  
While strategies to minimise the cost of capital for investment 
will play the primary role in controlling electricity prices for 
consumers, nonetheless measures also need to be put in place to 
minimise operating costs. The market design suggested here will also 
incentivise efficiency in operating costs. Failure to deal with 
overstaffing could leave open an opportunity for a new entrant to 
profitably enter the market, squeezing out inefficient incumbents. 
However, the strategy suggested in Chapter 6 for dealing with the 
issue of dominance in the market should also play an important role 
in encouraging greater efficiency in the sector. 
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A final consideration in designing any new market structure for 
the island of Ireland is whether the island itself is likely to become 
part of the British electricity system in the next decade through 
enhanced interconnection. If Ireland had sufficient interconnection 
to Britain de facto Ireland would become part of the British market. 
As is the case with gas today, the price for electricity would be set on 
the much larger British market and no Irish players on that market, 
including the ESB, could significantly influence that price.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, it now seems likely that a second 
interconnector will be built early in the next decade. Whether or not 
this would be sufficient to make Ireland part of the British system is 
not clear. This needs significant additional research to understand 
where the critical threshold would lie. On the basis of current 
information, with an additional interconnector of 500MW, it would 
appear that Irish prices would still diverge significantly from British 
prices for much of the normal day, leaving market players still 
dependent on the design of the Irish market to determine average 
price and return on capital. 
This issue is important for all potential investors. As their 
investment will be expected to last at least 20 years their 
expectations about the market structure will affect their assessment 
about the likely rate of return on capital. The study done on the 
costs and benefits of an East-West interconnector (DKM et al., 
2003) did suggest that it should go ahead. However, the study also 
stressed the urgency of making a firm decision on the project so as 
to reduce uncertainty for potential investors. 
 
 
• The structure proposed for the all-island electricity market by 
the two regulators seems likely to provide the best 
opportunity for securing a competitive supply of electricity 
for consumers on the island of Ireland over the next decade. 
5.6 
 Summary
• The electricity pool, when combined with a suitable regime 
of capacity payments, should encourage supply at a 
minimum price. It should also increase the transparency of 
the regime. 
• The capacity payments regime will play an important role in 
minimising risk for investors and reducing the cost of capital. 
The cost of capital is a key ingredient in determining the final 
price of electricity for consumers. 
• This regime would provide the right signals for new 
investment ensuring the provision of adequate electricity 
generation capacity at least cost. 
• Nothing in this regime would prevent the electricity market 
of the island of Ireland being eventually integrated into a 
British Isles or a north-west European market by the end of 
the next decade. 
6. MARKET  STRUCTURE 
The electricity and gas sectors in both parts of the island of 
Ireland are characterised by firms that have dominant positions in 
particular segments of the market. To some extent their position 
arises from the nature of certain parts of the business – transmission 
of gas and electricity is a natural monopoly.  
6.1 
Introduction
While recent years have seen some new entry in electricity 
generation and supply, competition remains limited. In the Republic 
of Ireland the ESB owns the bulk of the generating capacity, the 
transmission59 and distribution systems and it is responsible for most 
of the supply. In the North of Ireland the structure is rather 
different, having developed through the break up and privatisation 
of the single monopoly business in 1992/3. There are now three 
companies owning generation capacity (together with a capacity to 
import from Britain) and there is also limited competition in supply. 
However, as part of the privatisation deal the bulk of the output of 
two of the generators in the North is contracted on a long-term 
basis to the power procurement business of Northern Ireland 
Electricity (NIE).  
Chapter 1 discussed how the structures North and South reflect 
their origins deriving from the original state-owned integrated 
monopoly producers. For some time there has been a concern in 
Ireland, and elsewhere in Europe, that increased efficiency and lower 
costs could be realised by a restructuring of the industry. The need 
for a restructuring of the industry in Ireland is also being highlighted 
by the prospective changes needed to produce an all-island 
electricity market. 
Here we consider the extent to which a restructuring of the 
industry in Ireland could produce an environment where competing 
companies would thrive and drive down costs. This chapter also 
considers how other aspects of the industry can be restructured in a 
different way to facilitate the necessary regulation  to deliver some of 
the benefits of competition. 
Section 6.2 considers the background to the current industry 
structure. Section 6.3 then examines the disadvantages of monopoly 
producers and it discusses where efficiency gains could be expected 
from a restructuring. Section 6.4 sets out the empirical evidence on 
how restructuring could be expected to change the competitive 
environment. Section 6.5 suggests an approach to restructuring that 
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59 While the ESB owns the transmission system, it is operated by a separate 
company ESB National Grid – Eirgrid. 
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could realise significant gains for consumers while, where 
appropriate, realising the benefits of scale economies. Conclusions 
are drawn in the final section. 
 
 Under the old monopoly producer model the country was 
provided with a reliable electricity supply. However, that model of 
organising the industry had a number of defects from the point of 
view of the consumer. Most notable among the defects was the 
relatively high cost base of the ESB and the resulting effects on the 
price of electricity. In turn, the high cost of electricity adversely 
affected the competitiveness of the economy with negative 
consequences for employment.60  
6.2 
Background
In addition to higher prices, over the 1970s and the 1980s there 
were periodic interruptions to supply due to industrial action. The 
cost of such interruptions to society is very high.61 The partnership 
approach applied to industrial relations over the last 15 years has 
seen a major improvement in this situation, with few if any industrial 
relations related shortages. However, there remains a concern about 
the potential threat to security of electricity supply from potential 
industrial disputes in the future which might affect the dominant 
generating company. There are also concerns at the price of 
achieving such industrial peace in terms of inflated labour costs. 
In Northern Ireland the industry was privatised in 1992 
(McGurnaghan, 1995). The generation capacity was sold off to four 
different generators,62 with the transmission, distribution and supply 
business remaining a single integrated firm – Northern Ireland 
Electricity. However, in return for substantial payments to the 
government, the firms buying the generation capacity received very 
generous long-term contracts. These long-term contracts, designed 
to enhance the value of the assets being sold, have resulted in very 
high electricity payments for consumers in Northern Ireland ever 
since. It will not be until 2011 that the effects of these legacy 
contracts will finally drop out of the Northern Ireland cost base, 
relieving consumers, and the Northern Ireland economy generally, 
of the heavy burden. 
While the privatisation in Northern Ireland resulted in significant 
improvements in operating efficiency, the gains accrued to the UK 
Treasury (through the high sale price) and especially to the 
shareholders rather than to customers. Thus there was no offset for 
customers for the high premium resulting from the long-term 
contracts entered into as part of the privatisation. 
 
60 See Fitz Gerald and Johnston, 1995, p. 12. 
61 For an estimate of the cost to households and business see Leijsen and Vollaard, 
2004. 
62 Since privatisation two of the plants have closed (Belfast West and Coolkeragh). 
New plant has been installed in Coolkeragh and in Ballylumford since privatisation 
leaving three different locations where there is generating capacity owned by three 
different companies, one of which is the ESB. 
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In the Republic in the early 1990s consideration was given to 
undertaking a similar privatisation exercise to that in Northern 
Ireland. However, as a result of a more cautious approach, the 
Republic was able to learn from the experience in Northern Ireland. 
This experience made it clear that privatisation was not a simple 
panacea for the ills of the electricity system in the Republic. The 
“option value” of delaying a decision was seen to be significant: 
better to delay making a decision rather than to make the wrong and 
irrevocable decision. However, the combined impact of EU 
legislation and the drive to create an all-island market to realise 
potential efficiency gains is raising in a much more acute form the 
issue of the dominant position of the ESB. In addition, the 
experience in Ireland and elsewhere over the last 15 years means that 
the appropriate way forward is somewhat clearer than it was in the 
1990s. 
The forces driving change in the sector are threefold. First, there 
is a broad “liberalisation” agenda, which has grown up in developed 
economies over the last 25 years, that promotes efficiency gains 
through industrial restructuring. Very often this involves 
privatisation, but the two agendas are not identical. Fitting within 
these agendas is a desire to improve the competitiveness of the Irish 
economy through driving down costs. Second, the related EU 
liberalisation agenda, is also driving change. While these forces are 
on a “convergent” path they are not always fully compatible. For 
example, the direct costs of market opening, required by EU law to 
introduce competition in electricity supply, may prove greater than 
the potential benefits to consumers. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 
2, the Irish market for electricity is growing quite rapidly and is likely 
to continue growing out to the end of the decade. This means that 
there is a need for continued new investment in generation capacity 
and also in transmission and distribution. This is a rather different 
situation to that in the rest of the EU and in North America where 
there has been excess capacity for the last decade. The result is that 
the price of electricity in Ireland must be high enough to fully 
remunerate the capital employed. In much of the rest of the EU, 
where the assets have already been significantly depreciated (Helm, 
2004), the price, albeit temporarily, may have fallen below long-run 
marginal cost. 
The nature of the electricity sector is such that there is no simple 
solution that will introduce perfect competition. No single model of 
best practice has been developed elsewhere in the developed world. 
There are some significant markets where for a sustained period 
reformed market structures have realised significant gains for 
consumers. For example, the Nord Pool63 arrangements covering 
the Scandinavian electricity market have worked well for over a 
decade (Olsen, 1995). Similarly the British electricity market of the 
last decade realised relatively low electricity prices for consumers. In 
 
63 On 1 January, 1990 Sweden joined the Norwegian electricity exchange to form 
the first multinational market for trade in electricity. Four years later Finland and 
Denmark became members of Nord Pool.  
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the US, the PJM market in the North-East United States has 
generally been successful. However, no single model has proved to 
be clearly superior to any other model and all of these models have 
suffered from significant problems in recent years.  
The small size of the Republic of Ireland market, or even of an 
all-island market, poses special problems in introducing the 
disciplines of competition. It means that a specifically Irish model 
must be developed, taking account of the lessons learned elsewhere. 
This model must also allow for the possibility that over the course 
of the next decade the all-island market will eventually become part 
of a wider British Isles, or even of a North-West European 
electricity market.  
It is likely that whatever the market structure, the small size of 
the electricity system on the island of Ireland will make an 
environment of competition difficult to achieve. As a result, if the 
market is to work in the interests of consumers it will need to be 
regulated on a fairly continuous basis by the appropriate authorities. 
To make regulation effective it will be desirable to make the market 
system that evolves as transparent as possible. This requirement for 
transparency to facilitate regulation should be a significant 
consideration in market design for the future. The need for 
transparency to increase the flow of information to the regulator(s) 
should inform any restructuring of the industry. 
 
 A market dominated by a single monopoly producer carries 
certain inherent defects compared to a market where there are many 
competing firms. Monopolies will tend to charge higher prices than 
will be possible where competition reigns and is actively pursued. 
The result will be lower levels of output and the ultimate sufferers 
will be consumers – paying more for less. 
6.3 
 The Problems 
with 
Monopolies
The counterpart to higher prices charged by monopoly producers 
will be some combination of four possible outcomes: 
• The shareholders can benefit from the higher prices arising 
from monopoly power through higher profits. 
• The employees of the monopoly firm may benefit through 
some combination of higher wage rates and higher 
employment (staffing ratios). 
• Suppliers of goods and services may benefit through higher 
prices for their inputs or otherwise favourable supply 
conditions. 
• Without the disciplines of competition, the monopoly may 
also be run in an inefficient manner involving waste and 
badly planned investment. 
These are the disadvantages for consumers of monopoly power 
on the part of existing firms and these are the ways that the revenue 
raised by higher prices paid by consumers may flow back to the key 
stakeholders. These disadvantages must be considered against any 
benefits that accrue from the increased scale of operation. In the 
case of natural monopolies, such as electricity transmission, the 
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benefits from having only one transmission system are likely to 
exceed any potential savings from competition between competing 
infrastructures. However, in other sectors of the electricity and gas 
industries, such economies of scale do not exist, or are much less 
obvious than in the case of transmission. 
In the case of private sector monopolies the benefits from higher 
prices go substantially to the shareholder in the form of higher 
profits.64 In the case of state owned monopolies, such as the ESB 
and BGE, if the price charged were the same as for a privately 
owned monopolist and efficiency of production were the same, the 
dividends paid to the government (shareholder) could be used to 
reduce more economically distorting taxes. However, even if used in 
this way there would still likely  be a welfare loss. In the case of the 
ESB it is clear that not all the revenue from higher prices charged 
arising from the use of monopoly power accrue to the taxpayer as 
owner of the monopoly. The major area where the higher prices 
have allowed “inefficiency” in the past has been through over-
staffing, and through facilitating wage rates remaining above market 
levels. The level of profitability in these monopolies has been 
broadly adequate to fund the growing capital needs of these 
enterprises. In BGE there was major progress in dealing with the 
problem of overstaffing in the late 1980s and early 1990s through 
contracting out the provision of key services. While there has been 
substantial progress in the ESB over the past decade in reducing the 
level of overstaffing it is clear that significant further reductions in 
costs are possible.  
Suppliers of the monopolist are more likely to obtain terms that 
would not be possible in a competitive market (e.g. for peat). Over 
the last 30 years some of the revenue arising from the higher prices 
charged for energy (as a result of monopoly power) has been used to 
pay the costs of peat-fired electricity and to extend the gas 
transmission network into regions that would otherwise have been 
considered uneconomic. In the past it has been much more costly to 
produce electricity using peat rather than coal or gas (Nic Giolla 
Choille, 1993). While the new peat-fired generation stations are 
much more efficient at converting peat into electricity than the 
retiring plants, it is clear that in a competitive market, without 
further regulation, such new peat plants would not have been built. 
While there is an undoubted argument that peat-fired generating 
stations provide security through diversifying fuel supplies, it seems 
most unlikely that this is the most appropriate means of meeting the 
security of supply objective in a world where greenhouse gas 
emissions will carry an increasing penalty. Whether or not this use of 
 
64 This need not always be the case. In the case of Dublin Gas in its latter years the 
bulk of the benefits of its monopoly position appear to have gone to its employees 
at the expense of its customers. The 2005 CER Consultation Paper on the 
“Regulation of ESB’s Power Generation Business until the Establishment of the 
Single Electricity Market” [CER 05/111], suggests that the high labour costs that 
are embedded in the ESB Power Generation business are not currently passed on to 
consumers.  
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resources to fund the peat industry is wise, it is clear that current 
public policy would still insist on maintaining these plants in 
operation in a more competitive environment. To this end the 
substantial subsidy to new peat plants is now provided for through 
the Public Service Obligation (PSO) charge paid by all consumers. 
These potential excess costs would automatically be eroded if it 
were possible to introduce competition into the electricity and gas 
sectors. However, the nature of the sector is such that competition is 
not easy to introduce. As discussed earlier, the transmission systems 
are natural monopolies and the small scale of the Irish electricity 
system(s) means that the number of independent generators in the 
system is likely to be limited. Also the experience of the UK, where 
the supply business has seen major consolidation, suggests that the 
scope for competition in supply may be limited in Ireland because of 
economies of scale. The five major supply companies in Britain have 
a minimum of around five million customers each whereas the total 
number of electricity customers on the island of Ireland is less than 
three million. 
The major area where efficiency gains could potentially be 
realised in the energy sector in Ireland through a change in market 
structure is in the area of labour costs.65 Such a reduction would 
benefit consumers in the long run by allowing enhanced energy 
supply at lower prices. Any reform of the market structure for the 
energy utility sector must tackle this problem, while ensuring that 
efficiency gains that are realised are passed on to consumers as lower 
prices, rather than all going to shareholders as higher profits. This is 
the appropriate yardstick against which to judge any market reform. 
Labour costs in the generation of electricity may account for a 
smaller part of the long-run cost of electricity than do capital costs, 
reflecting the capital intensity of the sector (see Chapter 5, Table 
5.1). As a result, anything that increases risk, raising the cost of 
capital for investors, will also increase the costs of electricity. Market 
reform must balance the need to minimise the cost of capital 
through reducing unnecessary risk against the need to incentivise 
increased efficiency in using inputs, especially labour. 
In recent years the ESB has ceased to be the monopoly provider 
of electricity in the Republic. There has been new entry in generation 
and there is limited competition in supply.66 This has transformed 
the Irish market into an oligopoly bringing new issues for players in 
the liberalised market. The ESB remains the dominant player in the 
market and all other players must take account of the ESB’s actions. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, new entrants have found it 
difficult to develop in acquiring customers for electricity at the retail 
level, in the face of inertia and loyalty to the incumbent ESB. For 
 
65 As discussed earlier, more efficient dispatch consequent on movement to an all-
island market could also deliver significant efficiency gains. 
66 Competition between suppliers has been in place for business consumers of 
electricity for some time. It is only since February that firms other than the ESB 
have been allowed to compete to supply the household sector. However, there is no 
sign of new entrants to the market competing against the ESB for such business. 
82 ASPECTS OF IRISH ENERGY POLICY  
new investors in generation there is also the issue of how the ESB 
will react to their entry in the market. Without regulation it would be 
possible for the dominant player to squeeze out new entrants, 
resulting in significant losses for them. The fact that this has not 
happened reflects the importance of the independent regulator in 
ensuring proper conduct and also the legacy of the public service 
ethos of the state-owned ESB. 
For the future, if the market is to progress with new entry, such 
new entrants will have to be reassured that the nature of the 
regulatory regime will prevent any abuse by ESB of its dominant 
position. The best way of guaranteeing this would be if the 
dominant position were to gradually disappear through new entry. 
However, this may not be realistic in the next decade without further 
intervention by the regulatory authorities. 
In designing a structure for the electricity industry to provide 
incentives for producers to minimise the cost of electricity in the 
long run,  there are a number of objectives: 
• While risk is inherent in investment decisions, the structure 
of the industry must avoid creating unnecessary uncertainty 
for investors – minimising the cost of capital. There is a 
trade off between regimes that penalise bad investment 
decisions and ones that reduce risk to investors. However, in 
many cases the full risks arising from bad investment 
decisions are not carried by the investor but are actually 
shared with consumers. For example, if a generation station 
suffers a serious malfunction the owner may lose revenue 
but the consumer will suffer higher prices and possibly a very 
expensive loss of power. 
• The structure of the industry should incentivise producers to 
minimise the cost of the labour input. 
• Reforms to introduce competition must also take account of 
the role of economies of scale in the energy sector. 
In restructuring the electricity sector the solution will involve 
some combination of the following: 
• Restructuring the industry to separate different parts of the 
business into separate companies. The extent to which such 
a restructuring is desirable will depend on the extent of 
economies of scale and scope in the business. 
• A further increase in the contracting out to independent 
companies of the supply of services to the different business 
units of the ESB as is currently the case in BGE. 
• New entry into potentially competitive segments of the 
market as well as the possible divestiture of some assets and 
the exit of plant which is uneconomic in potentially 
competitive segments of the business. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, in the long run, if technical change 
reduces the cost of extensive interconnection with the British 
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electricity system,67 this could see Ireland becoming part of a much 
wider competitive market. However, even with the British electricity 
market there is no certainty that just because it is competitive today 
this will always be the case in the future.68  
BGE, which had major industrial relations problems when it 
took over the household gas supply business in the early 1980s, 
undertook a major reorganisation over the course of the rest of the 
decade. The policy adopted was one of contracting out the supply of 
services maintaining a limited core of employees to service head-
office functions and to maintain safety standards. This has meant 
that the bulk of the work on extending and maintaining the 
distribution and supply infrastructure has been undertaken by 
outside contractors.  
As well as putting pressure on costs, this approach has 
maximised the flow of information to the regulator about the true 
costs of the gas industry. This has meant that it has been easier in 
BGE to regulate the business and to establish the appropriate 
pricing for services provided than is the case for electricity. 
Over the course of the late 1980s and the 1990s BGE used its 
position as a monopoly supplier to build its business by extending 
the coverage of its distribution network. Because of the competitive 
price of gas at that time69 the firm used its monopoly position to 
price gas at a level that would attract consumers from competing 
fuels, while realising sufficient profits to fund the expansion of the 
business. In the business sector the pricing policy was also aimed at 
increasing the customer base through setting different prices for the 
different markets segments.  
However, with the maturity of the business in recent years 
pricing policy has become more transparent. With the run-down in 
the Kinsale gas field, the rapid rise in gas prices in recent years has 
meant that the company has a much more limited margin which is 
subject to regulatory oversight. 
With the availability of adequate transmission for gas between 
Britain and Ireland the Irish gas market has, for competition 
purposes, already become a part of the wider British and EU gas 
markets. There are a number of significant gas suppliers in the 
industry. The ESB is the largest purchaser of gas to supply its own 
business. A number of other large consumers purchase their own 
gas supplies on the British market. BGE is still the supplier of the 
domestic market. 
In Northern Ireland the gas industry has developed much later 
than in the Republic. It did not have the benefit of a supply of cheap 
gas which would allow the monopoly supplier, Phoenix Gas, to 
 
67 There is already an interconnector between Northern Ireland and Scotland but 
the limited size of the interconnector and the weakness of the transmission network 
on the island of Ireland means that it does not make the Irish electricity system part 
of the British system for purposes of competition. 
68 Helm, 2005,  
69 BGE had a favourable long-term contract for the price of gas from the Kinsale 
gas field. 
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incentivise and fund a rapid deployment of gas distribution in the 
Belfast area. 
NATURAL MONOPOLIES 
The transmission of gas and electricity is a natural monopoly. 
Competing networks would be hugely inefficient. These networks 
are central to the energy system and any serious failure will have very 
substantial costs for consumers. This infrastructure is a ‘must-have’ 
for consumers and, as a result, consumers de facto carry a substantial 
part of the risk of failure. Under these conditions the regulatory 
authorities have a crucial role in ensuring the adequacy and reliability 
of the networks.  
In addition, as consumers carry a significant part of the risk of 
failure in transmission they have a role in guaranteeing the future 
performance of the infrastructure. A guarantee by consumers that 
the cost of authorised infrastructure will be repaid can greatly reduce 
the cost of capital. While it also greatly reduces the risks to investors, 
potentially leading to inefficient decisions, the consumer has often 
more to fear from inadequate investment and from a high cost of 
capital.  
The experience in Northern Ireland has been that the 
mutualisation of the gas and electricity interconnectors to Britain 
over the last 2 years has greatly reduced the cost of capital, resulting 
in significant savings for consumers. As consumers had already 
effectively guaranteed that the capital would be repaid, little 
additional risk was taken on by consumers in providing an explicit 
guarantee of repayment. The mechanism chosen was the acquisition 
by a mutual company of the interconnection assets. The acquisition 
of the assets by the mutual was funded by borrowing from the bond 
market. With the benefit of the guarantees from the regulator on 
behalf of consumers, the borrowing was achieved at a very tight 
margin over the then prevailing government bond rate.70 As these 
assets have very low operating costs and they were already built, the 
potential downside for consumers was minimal. This experience 
highlights the importance of minimising the costs of capital in 
funding very capital-intensive assets. 
The privatisation of the existing monopoly players in situ would 
not be the best option for promoting market reform. A swapping of 
a public monopoly for a private monopoly, while realising efficiency 
gains, could see the bulk of these gains accruing to shareholders 
rather than to the consumer. This was the option pursued in 
Northern Ireland, with disastrous consequences for Northern 
consumers in the case of electricity generation (McGurnaghan, 
1995). If the privatisation were also to raise the cost of capital, this 
would more than likely offset any gains in efficiency in a very capital- 
intensive business.  
 
70 The option of an acquisition by a state company was not open to the regulator. 
The use of a mutual company to undertake this task has additional complications in 
terms of corporate governance. 
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The prospect of privatisation has itself had a negative effect on 
the behaviour of a number of existing state monopolies. In the case 
of Aer Rianta, and to a lesser extent in the case of the energy 
utilities, the possibility of privatisation has encouraged the state 
monopolist to increase profitability at the expense of the consumer. 
Employees’ appetites  have also been whetted by the experience with 
the privatisation of Telecom Éireann. It is important that the 
prospect of  privatisation of state monopolies be ruled out so that 
the management of the existing firms know that their objective is to 
minimise the price to consumers in the long run,71 not to maximise 
profitability. 
Instead of privatising the natural monopoly elements of the 
energy sector, what is needed is a reform that will tackle the 
problems of the existing market structure. Where competition is 
possible under new market structures it could be appropriate to end 
state involvement, through selling off relevant parts of existing firms 
or through new entry by private sector operators. However, the 
natural monopoly elements, such as transmission, should remain in 
state ownership, with efficiency gains being incentivised through 
appropriate contracting out of service provision.  
This does not mean that the natural monopoly elements of the 
electricity system should be left untouched. Instead what is required 
is an alternative approach which will still reap the benefits of a low 
cost of capital while at the same time putting strong downward 
pressure on operating costs. An obvious approach to this task would 
be for the ownership of the transmission system to be transferred to 
the independent system operator) and for them to contract with 
other players, including the ESB, for all the services needed to 
maintain and develop the transmission network. As in the case of 
BGE, this would ensure that there was adequate downward pressure 
on costs and it would also help increase the flow of information to 
the regulator. This approach should also be adopted where the 
nature or scale of the operation makes it unrealistic to expect the 
early development of a competitive market through divestiture or 
other forms of restructuring. 
INTRODUCING COMPETITION 
The experience of liberalisation in the UK and economic theory 
both suggest that to achieve a competitive market in electricity 
generation it is necessary to have quite a number of players, each 
with pricing power in the relevant range of the merit order. At a 
minimum, 5 separate generating companies would be needed to 
ensure proper competition (Helm, 2002). Given the significant scale 
economies in the electricity generating business, this is clearly not an 
easy or even a realistic objective for Irish policymakers and the issue 
facing the authorities responsible for implementing the liberalisation 
of the market is how best the market can be regulated to ensure that 
 
71 The long run means that the firms must cover the full cost of necessary 
investment through making adequate profits. 
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consumers experience the benefits which a more competitive market 
might produce.  
In the absence of a suitable competitive environment, very heavy 
regulation will be needed if there is to be any chance of competition. 
It will be important that the developing structure of the industry 
should aid regulation through enhancing transparency and the 
resulting flow of information to the regulatory authorities. What is 
likely to happen is that new entrants will appear gradually (as has 
happened in the case of Viridian at Huntstown), building a CCGT 
(combined cycle gas turbine) plant. The current state of technology 
and the relative price of the different fuels mean that throughout 
much of the EU, especially in the UK, CCGTs provide the best 
value in generating technology. At the very least the new entrants 
provide a benchmark against which the regulator can measure costs 
in the dominant incumbent, the ESB.  
It is likely that the advent of new entrants, or the threat of more 
new entrants, will ensure that the staffing of new plants will be fairly 
similar whoever runs them, well below the staffing of equivalent 
older plants in the current system. This threat of new entry should 
help put pressure for further cost savings in the existing ESB plants. 
While the advent of new firms in the generating industry has lent 
credibility to the calls for efficiency gains, as discussed below, there 
are major problems with the market model currently in place. 
A clear strategy for managing and reducing the ESB’s dominant 
position in electricity generation is required to reassure new 
investors. A clear statement is required that the monopoly elements 
of the ESB will not be privatised at any future date, removing this 
potential risk for new investors, while also introducing substantial 
changes to allow new entrants to compete for business against the 
other elements of the ESB’s business, especially in the case of 
generation.  
 
 This section describes the results of a study of the effects on the 
market for electricity generation of options for restructuring the 
ESB generation business. Full details of the study are given in 
McCarthy (2005). A range of theoretical approaches to restructuring 
the ESB’s generation portfolio was considered. These involved a 
series of options on divestiture where the ESB’s portfolio of 
generation was broken up to form three or more different 
companies. In each case the portfolio assigned to each company was 
chosen on an arbitrary basis and was not intended to be realistic. 
The intention was to model the Irish electricity market to discover 
how radical a change would be needed to achieve a “competitive” 
market where no firm, including the ESB, could significantly alter 
the market price to its advantage through its own independent 
behaviour. 
6.4 
Evidence on 
Gains from 
Restructuring
In the electricity sector, above-cost pricing may not be a 
symptom of the exercise of market power since scarcity pricing is a 
characteristic of any market where the total available supply is 
capped in the short run. Scarcity pricing refers to those times of the 
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day or year where demand is very close to the system’s total capacity 
and so the price of electricity on the spot market will be 
exceptionally high to reflect this scarcity and the closeness to full 
capacity. Excess demand is not a possibility in an electricity market 
as it will cause a ‘black out’, so preventative measures must be taken 
to maintain total available supply equal to demand. The need for 
such “exceptional measures” is signalled by the price as the price 
incentivises additional short-term supply. In a competitive market 
many generators rely on these periods to recover the bulk of their 
fixed costs.  
Although the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and market 
share indices are internationally recognisable standards for 
measuring dominance, as static measures they do not represent the 
real-time aspect of electricity markets very well. Furthermore, they 
only examine the supply side of the market. For instance, there may 
exist some market with a HHI value below 1,000. This figure would 
typically characterise an unconcentrated market where the threat of 
abuse of market power is low. However, even the smallest generator 
can possess some level of power to affect prices. This may be the 
result of harsh weather, breakdowns, transmission failures etc. When 
suppliers are essential for the certain and adequate provision of 
electricity, they possess significant market power regardless of their 
company size relative to the market. This occurs most often when 
the system is close to full capacity. For example, if a supplier knows 
demand will be high and that their electricity will more than likely be 
required, they can effectively name their price. 72
This study uses the Residual Supply Index (RSI) as a measure of 
potential market power.73 It was developed by the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO) as a continuous metric that 
could represent the likelihood of an abuse of market power by a 
generator. The RSI for a company X measures the per cent of 
supply capacity remaining after subtracting company X’s capacity of 
supply (less contract obligations). An individual company’s RSI of 
above 100 per cent implies that the company is not pivotal and vice 
versa. Therefore a low RSI is of more concern to the market than a 
high RSI. Sheffrin et al. (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2004) 
established the existence of a relationship between hourly RSI and 
hourly price-cost mark-up in the California market. Empirically, the 
 
72 Gorecki (2005) defines dominance as significant market power and the ability, on 
a sustained basis to raise prices above the competitive level. A necessary condition 
is that entry (actual or the threat of it) is not sufficient to compete away the ‘super 
high’ rate of return. Firms have to abuse their dominance to fall foul of competition 
law. This is different from the need for regulatory intervention to ensure adequate 
competition in a market to the benefit of consumers. 
73 The RSI is defined as the ratio of residual supply to demand for an individual 
supplier S, RSIS = (Total Available capacity – Available capacity from Supplier S)/ 
Demand. “The RSI measures how pivotal suppliers may be in setting prices based 
on the residual supply left, without their capacity, to serve demand. A supplier is 
deemed “pivotal” if it can withdraw its capacity from the market and induce a 
shortage” (Sheffrin et al, 2004). This tool was initially created to assess the 
Californian electricity crisis of 2000/2001. 
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correlation between the two indicates that on average, an RSI of 
approximately 120 per cent will result in a market price outcome 
close to the competitive benchmark.  
In the analysis of different options on restructuring, the RSI 
index was calculated for all the players in the generation market: an 
index of above 120 for all players was taken to indicate a market 
where no player had serious market power. 
To undertake this analysis a model of the Irish electricity sector 
was developed (McCarthy, 2005). This model, which was also used 
in the analysis in the previous chapter, uses details of all current and 
potential future generators on the Irish system, North and South. 
Given the cost and engineering characteristics of each generator, the 
model estimates the short-run marginal cost of each plant. The input 
to the model contains the half-hour demand figures for the chosen 
year. In the first set of simulations using the model it was assumed 
that all generators bid in their fuel (short-run marginal cost) into the 
market. (Other pricing strategies were also examined but this 
approach was felt to be the most realistic, given the current 
proposed structure for the all-island market.) The model assumes 
that the stations are dispatched (their potential output is used) in the 
order of their bids, up to the point at which the half-hourly demand 
is satisfied. No account is taken in the model of constraints in the 
transmission system or of engineering restrictions on the ability of 
individual stations to change load over short periods. (See Doherty 
(2005), for an example of a model that takes some of these 
engineering considerations into account.) 
The model was used to simulate the effects of different 
configurations for the future ownership of the ESB. In each case the 
RSI index was calculated for all the players. In addition, simulations 
were carried out to establish if any portfolio player in the generation 
market could increase their profitability by reducing supply in a 
significant number of half hours. This increase in profitability could 
potentially occur if the margin between demand and potential supply 
is very small and if the portfolio player has a significant number of 
stations in its portfolio.74
The changing structure of the generation market was considered 
in the context of both a Republic of Ireland market and of an all-
island market. It was also considered on the basis of today’s market 
size and the likely market size in 2010. The potential effects on the 
Irish electricity market of increased interconnection between the 
Irish and the British electricity systems were not considered. 
However, it seems likely that a significant increase in 
interconnection capacity will be put in place over the coming decade 
and this possibility must be taken into account in considering the 
results of this research. 
 
74 Obviously a player with only one generation station can not increase its 
profitability by shutting down production in that one plant. 
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Table 6.1: ESB Portfolio of Generation 200375
 Republic of Ireland All-Island 
Price Setting Ability 91% 67% 
% Generation Capacity 73% 58% 
% MW Generated 64% 45% 
RSI Average 0.39 0.66 
 
The situation of the ESB in the market is illustrated in Table 6.1 
for both the case of a Republic of Ireland market and of an all-island 
market. This shows that if the market structure proposed by the two 
regulators (CER, NIAER, 2005) had been in place in 2003 in the 
Republic, ESB plant would have set the system price in 91 per cent 
of the hours in that year. The ESB would have accounted for around 
73 per cent of the generation capacity. However, because much of 
their plant was suitable only for running as mid-load or peak load, 
the ESB would have generated only around 64 of the power 
consumed in the Republic. Because the ESB would have controlled 
the key surplus of electricity in periods of peak load it would have 
been in a very strong position to influence the price. This is reflected 
in the very low RSI index of 0.39. (A value of 1.2 would be needed if 
the ESB were no longer to control the price in the crucial peak 
periods.) 
Table 6.1 also shows that if there had been an all-island market in 
2003 the ESB’s dominant position would have been significantly 
reduced, with the ESB accounting for a minority of the power 
generated. However, the low value of the RSI index indicates that 
the ESB would still have been in a position to influence the price in 
crucial periods when the capacity margin was tight. 
An experiment was carried out assuming a hypothetical 
divestiture arrangement that involved splitting ESB Generation into 
three companies with roughly equal portfolios of plant.76 This was 
carried out for the year 2003 in the context of an all-island market. 
As shown in Table 6.2, this divestiture arrangement would have 
increased the RSI index to the crucial threshold of 1.2 for all three 
artificial groups. It would have left the largest group with under a 
quarter of the generation capacity on the island. While this would 
have eliminated the ESB’s power to influence the peak price, 
account would have to be taken of the costs of divestiture and of 
any potential costs arising from the reduced scale of operation. 
Table 6.2: Statistics for ESB Generation Split into Three Groups 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
RSI Index 1.2 1.32 1.29 
% Generation Capacity 0.23 0.16 0.19 
 
A further experiment was carried out in the context of how the 
all-island market might look in 2010. Assumptions were made about 
 
75 The ESB portfolio excludes Synergen and Collkeragh. 
76 Further details of the portfolios assumed for each of the artificial groups are 
given in McCarthy (2005). 
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further new generation, assumed all to be provided by independent 
producers, and about electricity demand in 2010. The simulations 
carried out for 2010 assume no further interconnection to Britain by 
that date. 
With the growth in the market and the construction of new 
generation by firms other than the ESB, the ESB’s dominant 
position would in any event be significantly eroded by 2010 (Table 
6.3). However, even though it would have under half of the 
generation capacity on the island by that year, it would still be in a 
position to influence the price in key periods of shortage of capacity, 
as reflected in the value of the RSI index of 0.90. However, if 900 
MW of plant were divested by that date, for example Moneypoint, 
the RSI index would rise to 1.12, quite close to the threshold where 
the ESB would lose its influence on peak pricing.  
Table 6.3: Statistics for ESB, 2010 With and Without Moneypoint 
Indicator ESB with Moneypoint ESB without 
Moneypoint 
% Generation 43 34 
% Generated 33 17 
RSI (average) 0.96 1.12 
 
More recent work using the model suggests that when the all-
island market is simulated with a capacity payments regime, the 
effect is to incentivise significant new entry, possibly in the area of 
mid-load plant. This new entry would displace existing ESB mid-
load plant which is very expensive. Providing that economically 
redundant ESB plant was closed, this could well see ESB’s 
generation portfolio reduced by between 500 MW and 1,000 MW of 
plant by 2010, taking the RSI index close to the threshold of 1.2, 
greatly reducing the company’s ability to influence peak prices. 
However, to the extent that the ESB’s mid-range plant is potentially 
uneconomic because of inefficient operating practises, the ESB 
might respond to these market pressures by reducing its costs to 
retain these plants in business. 
From the point of view of the consumer, at the very least such a 
regime would put pressure on the ESB to increase the efficiency of 
its older mid-range plant. Under the new all-island market regime, 
failure to improve efficiency would see this plant close,77 to be 
replaced by new independent power producers. Even without a 
reduction in the ESB’s dominant position, such a reduction in costs 
would be passed back to consumers through the reduction in the 
time-weighted average (TWA) price of electricity on the all-island 
market.  
In the early years of the next decade, with the an all-island market 
and the construction of an additional 500 MW interconnector to 
Britain and some further rationalisation and new entry, it seems 
likely that the ESB’s existing generation portfolio will lose its 
dominant position, as measured by the RSI index. Unless the ESB 
 
77 It will be important that the regulators insist on the closure of inefficient plant 
through preventing cross-subsidisation within an individual company’s portfolio. 
   MARKET   STRUCTURE 91 
builds new plant, over the next decade a significant part of its 
existing portfolio will close, leaving the ESB with a much smaller 
share of Irish generation. As discussed in Chapter 4, an additional 
500 MW interconnector is unlikely to make the island of Ireland 
fully part of a British Isles electricity market. However, such an 
investment will significantly change the operating environment for 
all the players. Much further research, engineering and economic, 
needs to be undertaken to ascertain how such interconnection will 
change the drivers of energy policy in Ireland. However, because of 
the long lives of the major assets in the electricity sector, 
policymakers need to take account of such developments in 
determining the appropriate response to today’s problems. 
The modelling work, described above, suggests that, with no new 
construction of generation by the ESB, there will be a gradual 
erosion of that company’s dominant position as measured by indices 
such as the RSI index. However, experience with such markets 
suggests that even if no firm has a dominant position in a significant 
number of time periods there remains the possibility that de facto co-
ordination of pricing by firms might evolve so as to increase the 
market price. In the case of the electricity market the pricing “game” 
will be played out repeatedly every time period in the new market 
and each firm will come to understand the characteristics of the 
plant of all the other firms and of their pricing behaviour. Under 
such circumstances, even if the RSI index were just above the critical 
threshold, there would remain the danger of co-ordinated behaviour 
by a number of players to raise prices. Such behaviour would not 
require any overt collusion between the players.  
As a result, it seems likely that there will be a key role for 
regulators in overseeing the market for the foreseeable future. To 
this end it is important that the market is structured in such a 
manner as to make it as transparent as possible and to maximise the 
information which the market reveals to the regulator and to all the 
players. The planned all-island market should facilitate such 
transparency, especially because much of the payment for capacity 
will be effected in a fully transparent manner by capacity payments. 
 
 If a competitive market could be created, ignoring the problem of 
scale economies and transactions costs, then the efficiency losses 
would be eliminated through competition, and profit levels would be 
reduced to “normal” levels. In the case of the break-up of a state 
owned monopolist the result would be likely to be a substantial 
reduction in operating costs, including the cost of labour (Gorecki, 
2005).78 However, if there was significantly increased uncertainty for 
investors this could greatly increase the cost of capital for new plant 
(Castro-Rodriguez, Marin, and Siotis, 2001). 
6.5 
Appropriate 
Restructuring
 
78 X-inefficiency – without the spur of competition this occurs reducing the 
incentive to introduce new technology and constantly seek the most efficient 
production method with the result that costs drift upwards. 
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In the case of electricity in Ireland it is clear that the monopoly 
position of the ESB had led to significantly higher than necessary 
labour costs over decades of operation up to the end of the 1980s. 
However, the prospect of competition and a changing operating 
environment has seen a significant improvement in efficiency over 
the last decade, though still leaving substantial room for further 
improvement. 
In looking at the possible gains from the creation of a 
competitive market the major savings could be expected in lower 
operating costs.79 However, the creation of a competitive market 
through fragmenting the industry, if it could be achieved, would also 
have costs, in particular in raising the cost of capital. In a mature 
industry where new investment is not required this would not be a 
problem. This has been the case for much of the mature European 
electricity market over the past decade. There the potential gains 
from increasing operating efficiency dominate gains from the lower 
cost of capital. For Ireland the situation is very different, with many 
billions of Euro of investment required over the coming two 
decades. 
One aspect of the scale economies of a monopolist is that there 
is greater certainty that the capital costs of a new investment will be 
recovered. For example, there is no possibility of a number of 
competing suppliers expanding capacity simultaneously, resulting in 
excess capacity. This greater certainty of cost recovery makes it 
easier to finance such investments, with the result being substantial 
reductions in the cost of capital. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, in the current situation in 
Ireland, where new investment is going to be required on a 
continuing basis over the coming decade, any policy that increases 
the cost of capital will have serious implications for consumers. For 
example, using the CER’s assumptions on the cost of capital, in 
particular assuming a pay-back period for new investment of 15 
years, the capital cost per kWh of a new gas generation station 
would amount to around €0.0091 while the non-fuel operating cost 
(labour cost) would amount to around €0.0700. However, if 
increased uncertainty were to lead firms to seek payback over 7 
rather than 15 years the cost of capital would rise to €0.0152. This 
increase in capital costs would almost equal the total operating non-
fuel cost of the plant.  
In the case of ESB generation, while a break up of the current 
portfolio would reduce or eliminate the ESB’s dominant position 
there are also possible disadvantages to such an approach. 
Experience elsewhere shows that there are economies of scale in 
managing generating stations. For example, large operators can 
obtain much better terms for supply of fuel, including gas, than can 
smaller purchasers. However, some of these diseconomies may be 
overcome if the independent generators are acquired or built by 
 
79 Albeit, operating costs today are lower than a decade ago, leaving smaller 
potential efficiency gains. 
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large operators from outside the Republic who can draw on their 
international resources.  
Thus in an environment where large-scale investment is a 
continuing requirement, the factors affecting the cost of capital are 
likely to dominate any issues concerning operating efficiency. Under 
these circumstances, if forced to choose between either monopoly 
provision or a fragmented “competitive” market, consumers could 
find themselves better off under the monopoly regime. However, 
the policymakers do not have to choose between these two polar 
cases but can seek to provide a market structure that would combine 
incentives for efficiency of operation with low cost of capital. 
The current proposals from the regulators for the all-island 
market appear to provide a reasonable compromise between 
incentivising competition and reducing the uncertainty of financing 
new investment in generation. 
In the case of ESB generation, time and an all-island market will 
help provide a more competitive market. However, this will not be 
enough to address its dominant position. Provided it is required to 
close plant that is uneconomic there will be significant reductions in 
its portfolio. From both the point of view of the ESB and the 
consumer it would be better if this process were hastened by selling 
off between 500 MW and 1000 MW of capacity over the next few 
years. Closures for economic reasons would sufficiently reduce the 
footprint of ESB generation such that the firm could be allowed to 
develop some new capacity. In the longer term, this would leave the 
company with a more sustainable portfolio of plant over the course 
of the next decade. 
Consideration could also be given to transferring the ownership 
of the ESB sites to a separate state company to create a land bank. 
These sites represent the cheapest and easiest location for new 
generating plant to be established, given the way that the planning 
system currently operates. The owner of the sites could then provide 
access to new entrants on a non-discriminatory basis. 
In the case of electricity transmission it would be better if the 
ownership of the infrastructure passed to ESB National Grid 
(EIRGRID) or even to an all-island transmission company. That 
company would then contract on a competitive basis with ESB, 
Powerteam (Viridian) or any other company to maintain and 
develop the infrastructure. This would make the cost base 
transparent and provide incentives to minimise costs. 
For the rest of the ESB, distribution and supply, the regulator 
should encourage an increase in the share of the business that is 
bought in from outside companies on a competitive basis. This 
would increase the transparency of operation. 
It is not clear just how much interconnection will be economic 
and how much will be needed to make Ireland part of a British Isle 
or North-West European electricity market. However, in the next 
decade increased interconnection to Britain will further enhance 
competitive pressures on the island.  
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• Decide at an early date on the integration of the electricity 
systems on the island.  
6.6 
Conclusions • Put in place a market system that provides guaranteed 
payments for capacity, reducing the cost of capital for new 
investment and increasing the transparency of the new all-
island market. 
• The regulators should insist on closure of uneconomic plant 
that is surplus to capacity requirements. 
• Additional interconnection of the Irish and British electricity 
systems would help enhance competition on this island. 
• The growth in demand and the operation of the new market 
structure should see significant closure of ESB plant over the 
coming 5 years to be replaced by new plant, generally built 
by different operators. Together with enhanced 
interconnection to Britain, this should see the ESB’s 
dominant position in the generation sector on this island 
substantially eroded by early in the next decade. 
• The ESB should sell between 500 MW and 1,000 MW of 
plant over the period to 2005. It should be allowed to replace 
some, but not all of this plant by new plant. 
• Ownership of the transmission system should be transferred 
to ESB National Grid or a similar all-island company and 
that company should contract with other companies, 
including ESB, to maintain and develop the system. 
• Where possible, ESB distribution and supply should move to 
buying in services on a competitive basis. 
 
7. ENVIRONMENT 
Today energy policymakers face an exceptionally difficult task, not 
only due to the complexity of the energy sector itself, but also due to 
the wide range of objectives that policymakers want to target. It is 
not a simple question of minimising the cost of providing energy to 
the economy. A wide range of other objectives is important, 
especially objectives concerning the environment. 
7.1 
Introduction
First, because of the uncertainty inherent in any forecasting 
exercise there is no simple answer to what will be the least cost 
solution to providing energy in the future. In particular, uncertainty 
about the stability of infrastructure and about future input prices 
means that there is no single “right” answer. The effects of this 
uncertainty are summed up in the debate about security of supply, 
discussed above in Chapter 3.  
Second, there are major environmental side effects from the 
production and use of energy. Burning fossil fuels, the chief source 
of electricity today, produces large quantities of greenhouse gases – 
the primary culprit in global warming. In addition, burning fossil 
fuels produces sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide 
and dust, among other emissions, that lead to adverse health effects 
and acid rain. Other emissions are also harmful; in particular the 
waste from nuclear reactors used to generate electricity potentially 
poses a serious environmental problem for future generations, and 
power transmission causes visual intrusion on landscapes. Reducing 
one set of emissions may not necessarily reduce other harmful 
emissions. In some cases reducing carbon dioxide emissions can 
actually increase other harmful emissions and vice versa. 
Third, there are social objectives. In the past, concern for 
domestic employment drove the investment in peat-fired electricity. 
However, with the advent of near full employment, the justification 
for such a policy is significantly reduced. If the Forfás framework 
for assessing the value of employment in new projects had been 
used (Honohan, 1998, and Murphy, Walsh and Barry, 2003) the new 
peat-fired power stations would almost certainly have failed to meet 
the required rate of return.  
Another important concern is the effect of energy policy on 
poverty. In these islands poorer households tend to spend a higher 
share of their income on energy than the average (Scott and Eakins, 
2004). Thus higher energy prices are likely to be bad for such 
households. In this case the objective of minimising the cost of 
energy can also help achieve the wider social objectives. However, 
this is not always the case. Where action to tackle global warming 
uses economic instruments, such as taxes or tradable permits, Scott 
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and Eakins show that poor households are likely to be 
disproportionately affected unless additional policy measures are 
taken. 
The environmental objective for energy policy should be one of 
long-term sustainability encompassing damage limitation and 
commitment to internationally agreed standards for the management 
of climate change. The specific environmental goals of EU energy 
policy on environmental integration (as detailed in the European 
Commission communication, 1998) are to reduce the environmental 
impact of energy production and use, promote energy saving and 
efficiency and to increase the share of production that uses cleaner 
energy.80 This broadly encapsulates the environmental objectives in 
the energy field of successive Irish governments. In particular, the 
objective of combating the threat of global warming is likely to be 
the single most important environmental driver of energy policy 
over the coming decade. 
This chapter considers some of the environmental issues which 
have to be taken into account in formulating energy policy for 
Ireland over the coming decade. It concentrates largely on the 
environmental problem of global warming. Section 7.2 briefly 
considers the existing policy framework, both at an EU level and a 
domestic level. The issue of policy instruments to use in 
implementing environmental policy is dealt with in Section 7.3. 
The chief long-term environmental issue facing energy 
policymakers throughout the world is the effect of burning fossil 
fuels on global warming. With the signing into law last winter of the 
Kyoto protocol the EU, and with it Ireland, is committed to taking 
significant action to tackle this problem. In tackling this problem 
some of the solutions may also contribute to enhancing the security 
of energy supply. However, this will not always be the case. Section 
7.4 considers current policy on tackling global warming and how it 
needs to evolve over the coming decade if the environmental 
objectives are to be met at minimum cost. 
Section 7.5 discusses policy on renewable energy. The logic of 
targeting renewable energy is not that such energy is “desirable” in 
its own right; renewables of themselves do not confer obvious 
benefits on society. Rather their value lies in how they can 
contribute to meeting the long-term policy objectives of providing 
security of supply and minimising emissions of harmful greenhouse 
gases. The developed world needs to wean itself off its dependence 
on fossil fuels, especially oil. The price of oil is likely to rise 
significantly in real terms, causing a move away from oil in the long 
term. With emissions trading the rising price of carbon is also likely 
to incentivise the  reduction in emissions. 
In a world where the cost of capital was low and investors in 
research into energy faced a reasonably certain future it would 
probably not be necessary to consider a “renewables policy” at all. 
 
80 The EU White paper on Renewable Energy noted the important role for 
renewables in responding to security of supply concerns and this theme is again 
reiterated in the EU Green Paper on Security of Energy Supply. 
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The optimal investment in renewable energy would occur as a by-
product of a suitably constructed set of policies to tackle global 
warming and security of energy supply. However in a second best 
world, as in all other areas of economic activity, the energy sector 
suffers from considerable uncertainty and the potential gains from 
research may not all be captured by those who invest in the research, 
leading to sub-optimal levels of energy research. As a result, there 
may be a need for some additional incentives to encourage research 
and development in renewable technologies. Part of such 
development can include the early deployment of such technologies 
on a trial basis. 
There are other environmental issues facing the energy sector 
which are discussed briefly in Section 7.6. First, there are other 
emissions to air, including emissions of gases that cause acid rain. 
Second, in the area of transport there are other environmental 
problems over and above the problem of emissions of greenhouse 
gases: in particular, the problem of congestion. 
Some conclusions are drawn in Section 7.7 on the priorities for 
policymakers in tackling the environmental agenda.  
 
 The key drivers of Irish environmental policy, in so far as it affects 
the energy sector, are the international commitments defined in EU 
law. The first and most important is a consequence of the Kyoto 
agreement and EU burden-sharing agreement whereby Ireland is 
committed to limiting greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2008-
2012 at 13 per cent above their 1990 levels. A second driver is the 
EU Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced 
from renewable energy resources in the internal electricity market, 
where Ireland has a 13.2 per cent target for the share of renewable 
energy sources in consumption by 2010. This equates to having just 
over 1,400 MW of installed renewable energy capacity. As argued 
later, it is not clear that this second instrument is actually wise. If 
properly implemented, the Emissions Trading Regime and the 
pricing of security of supply could well be sufficient (and efficient) 
to produce an optimal deployment of renewable technologies. 
Finally, there are the directives which regulate emissions of gases 
that cause acid rain, including the Large Combustion Plant Directive 
(2001/80/EC).  
7.2 
Policy 
Background
The commitment by the EU to take real action to combat global 
warming represents a major political achievement. This agreement to 
implement the Kyoto protocol has been made in the face of the 
limited support, or even opposition, of other major powers. The 
EU’s burden-sharing agreement involves a country-by-country 
commitment to limit emissions of greenhouse gases. The single 
most important policy instrument to bring this about is the scheme 
of emissions trading covering all EU members, which was agreed in 
December 2002 and which commenced in January this year. The 
extensive economic evidence available indicates that the actual cost 
to the EU of taking the lead in undertaking action to tackle global 
warming will, in fact, be small. 
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While the Emissions Trading Regime has the potential to achieve 
a significant reduction in emissions in the relevant sectors at least 
cost to the economy there are serious defects in the way the EU is 
actually implementing the scheme (see Fitz Gerald, 2004a, for 
details).  
In the case of Ireland the government formulated a strategy for 
tackling Global Warming, published in 2000. This policy statement 
included a number of measures affecting the energy sector. 
However, while the EU emissions trading regime has gone ahead, 
some important commitments have since been shelved or dropped. 
In particular, plans for a carbon tax were dropped in 2003. In the 
long term a failure to introduce such a tax to cover the sectors not 
covered by emissions trading could prove very serious. It will result 
in either a failure to implement the reduction in emissions required 
under the Kyoto protocol or else a very inefficient distribution of 
the burden of meeting those requirements. 
Over the last decade successive governments have taken 
initiatives to promote renewable energy. Policy in this area is 
described in Renewable Energy – A Strategy for the Future  in 1996 and 
developed further in 1999 in the Green Paper on Sustainable Energy. 
There were two important domestic commitments made:  
1. to support the building of up to 500MW of renewable 
energy based electricity stations to be connected to the 
electricity network by 2005;  
2. to explore other renewable energy technologies not 
supported at that time, e.g. offshore wind, bio energy etc.  
The EU Directive asserts the EU’s need to promote renewables 
due to their contribution to: …environmental protection and sustainable 
development. In addition this can also create local employment, have a positive 
impact on social cohesion, contribute to security of supply and make it possible to 
meet Kyoto targets…(Preamble 1). Ireland has opted for a 13.2 per cent 
target for renewable electricity sources in consumption by 2010 
consistent with the aspiration that it would have had the 500 MW of 
renewable electricity generation in place by 2005.  
As argued elsewhere in this paper, under current economic 
circumstances, energy policy and related policy initiatives should not 
be used to target employment creation. The best contribution that 
energy policy can make to economic development is through 
ensuring that a secure energy supply is provided at minimum long-
term cost to society. This definition of “cost to society” must take 
into account any external cost imposed by the production or 
consumption of such energy. 
 
 Generally, market based instruments are to be preferred to 
regulations. Because the regulator is not infallible and has limited 
information it is very difficult for the regulator to assess the cheapest 
means of meeting a specified objective. However, if the value of an 
objective (or the cost of environmental damage) can be translated 
into a price signal to the market, then market participants can 
7.3 
Policy 
Instruments 
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choose themselves what is the least cost solution (see Fitz Gerald, 
McCoy and Hore (2001), for a discussion of the literature). 
Economic theory suggests that in an ideal world with perfect 
information each policy target would be addressed by a single policy 
instrument. The use of multiple policy instruments can significantly 
increase the cost of meeting the desired objectives. It can give rise to 
uncertainty for all the players in the market, raising the cost of 
capital. In addition the cost of administering and complying with 
multiple regulations or price regimes can be very onerous. In some 
cases these transactions costs, which are a waste of resources, can 
dominate the other costs of a policy regime. However, in the real 
world with many constraints on policy and limited information, a 
second best solution may be necessary involving more than one 
instrument broadly targeted at the same objective. 
The instruments currently being used or considered in Ireland 
include the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (a quantity-based 
measure, implemented since January 2005); a possible carbon tax (a 
price-based measure); schemes to promote alternative energy (a 
series of Alternative Energy Regimes, AERs) and regulations 
affecting such things as housing insulation standards. Of these the 
most significant is the EU ETS. 
The distinctive difference between a quantity- and price-based 
solution is that, while as a regulator one is fairly sure of the outcome 
with quantities (such as permits), one is unsure at what cost this is 
achieved. The alternative, with price-based solutions, is that the 
outcome in terms of quantity is uncertain but the costs are likely to 
be minimised as individual agents make informed decisions given 
the price facing them. When permits are tradable among participants 
they can also possess the efficiency properties of price-based 
mechanisms (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Under conditions of 
certainty about costs and benefits the tradable permit system is 
equivalent in efficiency terms to a price-based system. 
Weitzman (1974) demonstrated that when there is uncertainty 
about the marginal benefits of pollution abatement (that is, there is 
uncertainty about the damage being done by the pollutants) there is 
no difference in terms of economic efficiency between a quantity or 
price-based approach. When there are uncertainties about the 
marginal costs of abatement (that is the regulator is uncertain about 
the costs faced by agents) then the relative sensitivity of marginal 
benefits to marginal costs determine which system is preferred. 
Where the marginal benefits are more sensitive than marginal costs 
to additional abatement the quantity based system is preferred. It 
would be fair to say that the marginal benefits of abatement, or 
damage to Ireland from marginal emissions of carbon dioxide, do 
not rise steeply in the medium term and that a price-based approach 
is preferable.  
Price mechanisms lead to uncertain emission outcomes but there 
is the option of ‘learning by taxing’ (Helm, 2005), while quantity 
mechanisms give rise to uncertain cost considerations but the target 
is more explicit. It has been shown that the nature of the uncertainty 
is such that price mechanisms are preferable in the context of the 
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problem of global warming. Pizer (2000) estimates that price 
mechanisms generate up to five times the net expected benefits 
associated with a prudent quantity control. However, when the EU 
attempted to introduce a carbon/energy tax in the early 1990s (Fitz 
Gerald and McCoy, 1992) they failed to get agreement. Since that 
failure the EU has concentrated on other approaches and on the 
alternative scheme regulating quantities, the Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS). The idea of marketable or tradable permits was first 
put forward by Dales (1968) and these have been successfully 
implemented in the US for trading in lead and sulphur emissions.  
The EU scheme that came into force in January 2005 covers a 
limited number of sectors including electricity generation. It involves 
a requirement that at least 95 per cent of the tradable quotas be 
allocated free to firms involved in trading. This procedure of free 
allocation is commonly referred to as “grandparenting”. The 
requirement that the allocation be free rather than auctioned will 
seriously aggravate the cost to the Irish and other EU economies of 
implementing the scheme (Bergin, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 2004). 
This is because no revenue will be available to the governments of 
the EU to offset the negative competitiveness and social effects of 
the rise in energy prices that the trading regime entails. If the original 
EU Commission proposal for a tax had been followed, or if the bulk 
of the quotas were auctioned, the economic cost of reducing 
emissions could have been greatly reduced. The original EU 
Commission proposals (for a tax) and the EU Parliament’s own 
preferred amendments to the ETS (to increase the amount 
auctioned) have shown greater wisdom than have the collective 
ministers for the environment of the EU who designed the policy 
that is actually being implemented today. 
In accordance with the EU directive, the Irish government has 
drawn up its own National Allocation Plan to allocate emissions 
quotas to all domestic firms in the relevant sectors for the period 
2005-2007. Over the next 3 years a similar plan will be prepared for 
each member state for the period 2008-2012. Under the ETS, firms 
in the sectors covered by emissions trading have to ensure that they 
maintain their emissions within the required limits or potentially face 
heavy penalties. If emissions are less than required, firms can sell 
their spare quota or permits on the EU market; where quota is 
inadequate additional permits must be acquired on the EU market. 
All the permits allocated to firms are freely tradable throughout the 
EU. If firms find it difficult to reduce emissions they will have to 
buy permits if they do not have enough. However, where the cost of 
abatement is low the firms will be able to sell surplus permits, 
providing a strong incentive to make the necessary investment in 
abatement. 
The emissions trading regime, if properly implemented could, in 
theory, serve to advance the EU’s environmental objectives while 
not imposing a significant cost on the bulk of EU producers and 
consumers. In principle, a trading scheme, or a carbon tax, by raising 
the cost of polluting, should persuade those who can reduce their 
emissions at least cost to do so, minimising the burden for the 
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economy as a whole. In the case of a scheme of tradable permits, if 
the permits were initially allocated by auction then the governments 
of the EU would have the revenue to reduce distorting taxes 
elsewhere in the economy and to compensate the poorest losers. 
Such a regime would have minimised the costs to society. If this 
allocation of permits were done on a once-off basis, with no 
prospect of future free permits, then the scheme would at least 
provide the appropriate incentives to reduce emissions in the most 
efficient way possible. However, by promising repeated rounds of 
free permits for polluting firms thereby encouraging them to hold 
back on abatement, the EU scheme greatly reduces the incentive for 
the dirtiest firms to reduce emissions, raising the potential cost of 
achieving the necessary reduction in emissions for the economy as a 
whole. 
The trading regime only covers a few sectors that are heavy 
energy users. If the competitiveness effects of achieving the required 
reduction in emissions are to be minimised and the social costs 
addressed, it is essential that a carbon tax be introduced to cover the 
sectors exempt from the ETS regime, in particular the household 
sector. A carbon tax represents the least cost method of reducing 
carbon emissions in those sectors not included in the trading scheme 
(Bergin et al., 2004). In the long run the tax rate should approximate 
the cost of carbon permits under the trading scheme. This would 
ensure that the burden of adjustment is carried equally by all sectors 
of the economy in a manner that will minimise the economic costs.  
The tax should only apply to sectors that are not covered by 
emissions trading. As a result, it should not apply to electricity. This 
is because the price of electricity will, as outlined above, already 
reflect the cost of carbon dioxide emissions. To apply a carbon tax 
on top of this would mean that electricity users would end up 
carrying a disproportionate share of the cost of compliance, raising 
the overall cost to the economy. 
It is useful to consider the approach taken to the implementation 
of environmental objectives in a number of other jurisdictions. The 
United Kingdom is an example of a country where a wide range of 
different policy instruments have been deployed to target the same 
objective – reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. According to 
Sorrell (2003), the experience from the UK has pointed out many 
contradictions and deadweight losses from this approach, showing 
instances where policy co-ordination would have achieved the same 
outcome at lower cost to electricity consumers. Some of these policy 
interactions have been the result of policies directly affecting the 
renewables sector. In addition, to the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS), the UK had its own emissions trading scheme, a 
climate change levy, introduced in the UK in April 2001, and a 
renewables obligation (ROCs). The Renewables Obligation is 
expected to lead to higher electricity prices: the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI, 2001) estimate that average UK prices will 
increase by a maximum of 4.4 per cent by 2010 as a result of the 
ROCs. There are also the legacy effects of previous schemes which 
still affect the energy sector through raising costs. The combination 
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of all these schemes involves substantial compliance costs, they 
create uncertainty for investors, and they add significantly to the cost 
burden for energy consumers over and above what would be needed 
to meet the given environmental objective. It is estimated that the 
different schemes designed to promote renewables in the UK 
account for about 2 per cent of household electricity bills in the UK 
(Simpson, 2004).  
Similar problems have arisen in other countries where multiple 
instruments have been used. In the case of Belgium a series of 
“voluntary agreements” with key industrial sectors effectively 
removed those sectors from the ambit of other policies. As the 
sectors excluded were those where the cost of emissions reduction 
was likely to be lowest, by shifting the burden of adjustment to the 
rest of the economy it substantially increased the potential cost to 
the economy as a whole of meeting the environmental objectives. 
The lesson to be drawn from experience elsewhere is that 
governments should avoid using multiple instruments to target the 
same objective as they are likely to increase the costs of compliance 
and the overall burden on the economy of meeting the specified 
environmental objective. In many cases the transactions costs and 
compliance costs of operating multiple schemes are high. To some 
extent the complexity of these regimes masks the waste and 
inefficiency that they involve. 
The Alternative Energy Regime (AER) operated in Ireland has 
involved competitive tendering or bidding by potential suppliers. On 
invitation, renewable energy suppliers bid in terms of the minimum 
subsidy which they would need to operate. Each round of the AER 
called for a prespecified amount of electricity generating capacity. 
This is an effective way to support renewables in the early phases, 
for as long as price-correcting economic instruments are absent.  
 
 The single biggest environmental issue facing energy policymakers 
is the need to tackle the problem of global warming. Given the 
uncertainties surrounding the causes and impact of global warming, 
the costs and benefits from the abatement of greenhouse gas 
emissions are also uncertain. The implementation of cost-effective 
risk reduction strategies in such a context becomes of central 
importance. While the arsenal of economic solutions for 
environmental problems is broad, ranging over prohibitions, issuing 
of standards, application of subsidies, the use of charges, taxes, fees, 
the creation of quasi-markets for tradable permits: they essentially 
boil down to price or quantity based solutions. As discussed, while it 
would have been preferable to adopt a common carbon tax across 
the EU (see Fitz Gerald, McCoy and Hore, 2001) the EU has 
instead adopted the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) that restricts 
the quantity of emissions. 
7.4 
Combating 
Global Warming
The EU adopted the ETS as it avoids disturbing the sensitivities 
of individual member states concerning their rights to decide on 
taxation. In addition, tradable permits can (and are) being 
implemented to confer a valuable property right, implicitly viewed as 
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a gain rather than a loss. The revenue from trades accrues to the 
owner provided that the owner can pass on the marginal cost of the 
permits in the price of output. The State would only receive revenue 
if it decides to allocate initially through auction.  
The EU emissions trading scheme as actually implemented is the 
product of a very long process of lobbying and debate. While the 
initial proposals of the EU Commission had a coherent economic 
basis, the scheme, as now implemented in law, will impose 
significantly higher economic costs on the EU economy than are 
necessary to meet the environmental objectives it sets out to 
address. It will adversely affect competition in the sectors affected 
through favouring incumbents. The EU scheme will also involve 
substantial transfers of resources from the bulk of companies and 
citizens in the EU to the shareholders in many of the plants covered 
by the scheme (Parry, 2003). In the case of the UK and Ireland the 
costs due to price rises are likely to fall disproportionately on poor 
households because they spend a much higher than average 
proportion of their income on energy (Scott and Eakins, 2004, and 
Smith, 1992). 
The key problems with the EU scheme are: the decision to give 
the permits for free to the relevant companies (referred to as 
“grandparenting” them) rather than to auction them; the decision to 
have multiple rounds of grandparenting – 90 per cent of permits will 
be given for free in the second period 2008-2012; the failure to 
ensure sufficient harmonisation of the scheme across different 
countries to minimise the negative effects on the single market; and, 
finally, the choice of a scheme of tradable permits with application 
to a limited number of sectors, rather than a scheme applicable to all 
sectors (or else a carbon tax applying to all sectors), involving a 
significantly greater burden on the regulating body. 
Economic theory suggests that a once-off allocation of quota, 
while having undesirable distributional effects, will still provide 
appropriate incentives to firms to reallocate resources efficiently to 
meet the environmental objective. Having received the allocation 
firms could then choose, either to use the quota themselves and to 
continue in production, or else to close and sell off the quota. This 
would provide an incentive for the environmentally less efficient 
firms to close, helping achieve the reduction in emissions at least 
cost.  
However, the scheme as implemented by the EU moves away 
from this ideal by providing for at least a second round of 
allocations, where the allocations may be based on historic 
emissions. This means that existing “dirty” firms that stay in 
business will receive another “free gift” from government in the 
form of permits for the period 2008-2012 (see Fitz Gerald, 2004a). 
As implemented there is effectively a “use it or lose it” provision, 
where firms would forego the free allowances if they abate seriously, 
or shut down, further incentivising dirty firms to remain in business, 
at least to the end of the relevant trading period.  
The prospect of a second round of allocations will initially result 
in a lower than planned reduction in emissions in the key sectors. 
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The very plants that are expected to close throughout the EU will 
only receive windfall gains in the form of free allowances in the 
future if they remain open. As the forecasts for reductions in 
emissions for the EU rely on such “dirty” firms abating or closing, 
their failure to do so will make the reduction in emissions more 
difficult, increasing the price of emissions permits throughout the 
EU. The result could be much higher prices for permits on the EU 
market than would otherwise be the case, with consequential higher 
prices for consumers. The value of the windfall gain to shareholders 
in the firms engaged in trading could also be enhanced by this higher 
price. 
A second very serious cost arising from the failure to auction the 
quotas or permits is that the loss of potential revenue from an 
auction means that EU governments will not have the resources to 
cut other taxes. As a result, the distortions arising from the 
imposition of the regime will not be offset by a reduction in 
distortions elsewhere in the economy. Economic theory (Goulder, 
Parry, Williams and Burtraw, 1999) and a series of empirical studies 
for the US (by the Congressional Budget Office, 2000), for Ireland 
(Bergin, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 2004) and for Belgium (Bossier et 
al., 2000) show that this is likely to be an important additional cost, 
aggravating the negative effect on the competitiveness of the EU 
economy in general, and of the Irish economy in particular. Bergin, 
Fitz Gerald and Kearney (2004), estimate that the additional cost of 
“grandparenting” compared to auctioning the permits, if applied to 
the economy as a whole, would amount to between 0.3 per cent of 
GNP and 0.5 per cent of GNP in the medium term. While the 
current scheme applies only to the most energy intensive sectors, it 
is clear that it will have a significant negative effect on GNP.  
A third problem with the scheme is that the granting of free 
tradable permits that can effectively be sold through raising the 
price of output, constitutes a very important capital subsidy to fossil 
fuel generators (see Fitz Gerald, 2004b, Appendix 1). While 
renewables generators will benefit from the higher price, no such 
capital subsidy is available to renewables generators.81 The net effect 
of these different offsetting implicit subsidies will be to give an 
unfair advantage to conventional carbon-intensive incumbents 
thereby displacing new entry and leading to a lower penetration of 
renewables than is economically efficient. 
In addition to the problems outlined above, implementation of 
the trading scheme will involve substantial compliance and 
verification costs. As the allocation plan for the UK recognises, this 
could be good for the City of London, which would help operate the 
EU market in permits. However, the benefits for the financial sector 
and the City of London will simply reflect a significant transactions 
cost burden that will ultimately be paid by the consumers of Europe 
as a result of the costs in actually operating the market. The 
 
81 The allocation of permits and the manner in which the cost of carbon is “passed 
through” impacts on the economics of Renewable Electricity (RES-E) generators in 
the market.  
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verification of the scheme will also involve a firm-by-firm audit to 
ensure compliance, further adding to costs. Compared to an across 
the board carbon tax, or an emission scheme imposed on producers 
or importers of primary energy (“upstream”), the costs of 
compliance of the current scheme applied at the level of individual 
firms will be significant. This is because of the need to verify each 
plant’s behaviour. For this reason the Consultation Group on 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading, set up by the Department of 
the Environment, recommended in 1999 against operating a trading 
scheme at the level of such “downstream” firms, preferring an 
“upstream” scheme involving very few firms that currently pay 
excise tax on most of their imports and which would have made use 
of the existing excise tax administration. 
As discussed in McCarthy (2003), good policy should be 
designed to minimise the incentive for corruption. The current 
scheme of emissions trading involves granting huge gains to 
individuals or companies through the allocation of emissions quotas 
and, therefore, has certain dangers. The Irish and UK governments, 
by adopting a consistent methodology in their plans, applied 
rigorously across all sectors, guard against this danger. By ruling out 
exceptional treatment for any individual plant, the process can be 
kept transparent, ruling out such dangers. However, if a similar 
approach is not adopted in all other countries, this could leave open 
the possibility of corruption. If, instead, permits were auctioned, the 
process would become completely transparent, provided that the 
auction is set up properly. 
These defects will significantly raise the cost of meeting the 
objective of reducing emissions in the period 2005-2007. It is urgent 
that the review of the current regime by the EU should deal with 
these problems by reforming the ETS to be implemented for the 
second commitment period of 2008-2012. Reform would 
simultaneously ensure that the costs suffered by the European 
economy would be minimised and that the desired reduction in 
emissions would actually be achieved. 
EU Ministers for the Environment, while showing admirable zeal 
in tackling the problem of global warming through the introduction 
of emissions trading, have shown scant regard for the economic and 
social effects of their chosen policy. Instead of designing the scheme 
in the interests of European taxpayers, they were unduly influenced 
by the strong lobbying of the large European firms that are major 
energy consumers. The economic “price” for getting political 
agreement was very high. A consequence of this is that the trading 
scheme will impose a much greater economic and social cost on the 
EU than is necessary in order to achieve the crucial reduction in 
emissions of greenhouse gases. 
The potential for distortions in the operation of environmental 
policy North and South of the border in the context of an all-island 
electricity market has been dealt with earlier in Chapter 4. 
A consequence of the introduction of emissions trading is that 
the cost of peat used in electricity generation has risen dramatically. 
As discussed elsewhere, this is likely to render the continued 
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operation of the new peat-fired electricity generation plants very 
uneconomic. Already consumers are paying a high price for this. 
However, recent work by Coford (O’Carroll, 2005) suggests that at 
the current price of carbon dioxide of over €20 a tonne it will 
become increasingly economic to substitute wood biomass for peat 
in these generating stations. The supply of potential wood biomass is 
likely to rise rapidly over the coming decade. 
This would suggest that at the very least the peat stations should 
be gradually moved to burning biomass. By 2012 up to a quarter of 
the peat currently used for electricity generation could be replaced 
by wood biomass, with the prospect of significant further reductions 
over the rest of the next decade. Under the current high prices for 
emissions of carbon dioxide this would simultaneously reduce the 
cost of electricity for consumers and also reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
For a substitution of peat by wood biomass to happen it will 
require the state as the shareholder in Bord na Móna to agree to 
renegotiate the current agreement. This would allow for an orderly 
wind down in the peat industry while simultaneously providing a 
growing market for the domestic production of wood biomass. 
 
 Renewable energy sources are those which are effectively 
inexhaustible (such as wind, wave, solar, hydro etc.) or which are 
replenished at or about their rate of consumption (such as managed 
forests and energy crops and other forms of biomass). The reasons 
for promoting renewables are first to provide advance signals to the 
market to invest in the new technologies in advance of the price 
rising and second to help fund new technologies that might not be 
fundable at a reasonable price – through support for research and 
development (R&D). Third, as discussed above, implementation of 
the EU ETS discriminates against renewables and fossil fuel prices 
inadequately reflect environmental damage so that, faute de mieux, it 
may be necessary to rebalance the playing field through limited 
additional intervention by the regulatory authorities. 
7.5 
Renewables
Sorrell (2003) lists three theoretical arguments for supporting 
renewables to enable them to compete with conventional fossil fuel 
generation:  
(i) the inability of private players to capture the 
positive externalities of R&D and adoption;  
(ii) the ‘option value’ of bringing forward technologies 
to mitigate the risk of continuing to use 
environmentally damaging technologies in a 
context of uncertainty and ignorance about the 
risks of climate change; and  
(iii) the scope for encouraging scale and learning 
economies that will drive down unit prices and 
form the basis for stand-alone viable industries with 
significant export potential.  
Other key justifications for promoting renewable energy forms 
include: changes in the plant mix and operation of the power system 
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to introduce fuel diversity; and hedging against fossil fuel price 
volatility for security of supply reasons.82 Policy on renewable energy 
sources should aim to establish equilibrium between the gains, costs 
and impacts involved and not distort or interact in a contradictory 
manner with complementary policies affecting the same agents. The 
most important issue in designing high-level policy for renewables is 
that it ultimately promotes efficiency simultaneously within the 
renewable and non-renewable markets. The support mechanism 
should aim to operate in a competitive and transparent way, 
guaranteeing some degree of certainty into the future but subject to 
progress reviews. 
The AER schemes over the last decade have helped to produce 
significant investment in renewables, chiefly in wind. However, the 
schemes have not produced nearly as much investment as had been 
hoped or expected. In many cases those bidding and getting 
contracts have been unable to deliver for a variety of reasons, 
including problems in getting planning permission.83 Thus the 
mechanism has produced less investment than anticipated, while at 
the same time ensuring that what investment has taken place has 
been at relatively low cost to the electricity consumer. 
There is a danger that the combination of the market structure 
and of direct support for renewables could either provide too little 
or too much support for wind energy at the expense of other 
renewables. To get the balance right within renewable sources of 
energy it is important that the issue of intermittency is reflected 
appropriately in the pricing of the market and the nature of the 
special support provided for renewables. The associated costs of 
wind in terms of necessary backup increase for a large deployment 
of wind generation. The total cost of wind (capital cost plus subsidy 
plus reserves) makes other forms of renewable power sources, which 
are readily dispatchable, gradually more competitive compared with 
wind. As a result, there is a danger that the consumer may end up 
paying a higher price than necessary to meet a given environmental 
objective. The volume and structure of support for renewables 
ought to be appropriately designed and calibrated, having regard to 
the marginal costs of carbon abatement of all options, including 
energy efficiency. 
Any policy or support mechanism in this jurisdiction must take 
account of the development of corresponding strategies in Northern 
Ireland to which the Republic is currently (albeit weakly) 
interconnected. It must also take account of the existing link to the 
British system, to which Ireland may become more fully 
interconnected in the future. Interconnected systems involve 
 
82 Additional less justified drivers for supporting renewable energy have centred on 
arguments related to indigenous industry effects and/or rural development with 
associated net job creation, to satisfy consumer demand (without compelling 
consumers to pay the premium cost).  
83 This issue was covered in the proposals of the Report of The Renewable Energy 
Strategy Group, 2001. Department of Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources. 
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economic interactions that could be distorted if a policy in one 
system creates opportunities for arbitrage by stakeholders.  
The availability of a very high level of support for wind in 
Northern Ireland through the UK ROCs system will incentivise 
significant wind development there. With the gradual integration of 
the all-island electricity system this may well see a disproportionate 
share of the economically viable wind generation being located in 
the North. This could put undue pressure on the Northern Ireland 
transmission system if these pressures are not reflected in the pricing 
of the All-Island Market infrastructure. 
The design of a suitable system of support is not attempted in 
this paper. Appendix 2 outlines some of the possible mechanisms 
that may be used. Whatever scheme is chosen the objective must be 
to ensure that the long-term cost to consumers of achieving the 
given environmental target is minimised. Were it not for the defects 
in the EU ETS it might provide adequate support for renewables on 
its own. As a result, in designing a support system for renewables 
the first objective should be to offset the existing disabilities arising 
from the operation of the EU ETS. The system of support should 
be neutral between the different types of renewables. In the case of 
wind, where nearly all the costs are incurred up front, it would be 
desirable to provide the support in the form of a capital subsidy. 
However, as the cost of wind increases with the volume of wind on 
the system such a support system would not be practical. For 
example, if the capital subsidy were to fall with the volume of wind 
generation on the system the result would be a significant economic 
gain for those who invest first. 
 
 Global warming is not the only environmental issue facing the 
energy sector in Ireland. Two other important problems affect the 
use of energy and its ultimate impact on the environment. The first 
of these is the problem of gases that cause acid rain and the second 
is a range of topics that come under the broad heading of 
sustainable living. 
7.6 
 Other 
Environmental 
Objectives
ACID RAIN 
Emissions of some gases, especially sulphur dioxide, give rise to acid 
rain when they mix in the air. The rain can cause significant 
environmental damage where it falls, in the form of acidification of 
soils and surface waters. Unlike the case of greenhouse gases, acid 
rain has a localised rather than a global impact, though it can travel. 
In the case of Ireland, with the prevailing westerly winds the damage 
from emissions in Ireland is caused either within Ireland or in the 
United Kingdom. Much of the acid rain actually falls in the Irish Sea 
or the North Sea without causing major damage. Acidification of 
surface waters is not a problem within Ireland, with a few exceptions 
due to acid rain that probably originates mainly from abroad (EPA, 
2000, 2004). 
Because of the potential damage from acid rain across borders 
the EU Commission introduced regulations to reduce emissions and 
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limit the damage caused. These regulations are applied on a similar 
basis across all EU jurisdictions. This application of similar rules is 
in spite of the evidence from Newbery (1990) that emissions should 
be reduced where benefits exceed costs of abatement and co-
ordinated payments be made to overcome the ‘free-rider’ problem. 
McCoy (1991), showed that in the case of Ireland the revenue could 
probably best be applied to investing in abatement in Central 
Europe rather than in Ireland. This was due to the fact that so much 
of the acid rain generated in Ireland falls harmlessly in the sea 
whereas in Central Europe all of it falls on land. 
Whatever the economic logic of the regime, the EU regulations 
have now been in force for many years. They involve major 
tightening in emissions standards for existing plant. Existing plant 
must either invest in abatement by 2008 if they are to stay in 
business indefinitely or else plan a phased closure of the plant. In 
Ireland Moneypoint was the biggest plant affected by this directive. 
It has been decided to invest in the necessary abatement technology 
for that plant at a cost of around €250 million.84 This will allow the 
plant to remain operational into the next decade. 
SUSTAINABLE LIVING 
The fastest growing area of demand for energy is the transport 
sector. With the advent of emissions trading there will be a brake put 
on growth in emissions from the energy-intensive electricity sector 
but unless there is a significant change in policy stance the growth in 
the transport sector’s demand for energy, and resulting emissions, is 
likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 
There is a range of strategies that can be adopted to modify this 
trend. One of the more important possible policy changes is the 
responsibility of the EU. If the EU were to introduce mandatory 
standards for fuel efficiency in cars beginning early in the first half of 
the next decade it could have a very significant effect on the motor 
industry. The adoption of such an approach in the past by the 
California administration saw major R&D undertaken by motor 
manufacturers.85 With a far larger market in the EU, the adoption of 
tighter emissions standards would evoke a major response in terms 
of R&D to ensure compliance on a least cost basis. Already the EU 
has a voluntary agreement with manufacturers calling for a small 
improvement in efficiency. If any individual member of the EU were 
to try and go it alone their small size would mean that no motor 
manufacturer would take them seriously. Thus, it would only be 
possible to use this instrument at EU level. 
Motor fuel is currently highly taxed in the EU. The tax paid is 
substantially greater than the environmental damage done in terms 
of global warming and maybe still somewhat greater when other 
motoring damage costs are included, though a total reckoning 
 
84 An additional €100 million will be spent on a refit of the plant. 
85 Research produced greater fuel efficiency but car owners decided to take the 
substitution benefit of the new technology in the form of bigger cars.  
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remains to be undertaken. However, the major environmental cost is 
the congestion that it causes. In the long run it would be better to 
partially replace the current tax on fuel with a charge for use of road 
space along the lines of the congestion charges in London. A 
comprehensive programme of charging for use of the road 
infrastructure would encourage more sustainable lifestyles while 
making better use of the existing road space. Such a move to 
calibrating charges and taxes more directly to the environmental 
damage done by cars would bring significant advantages. It would 
probably see drivers in rural areas paying less than today with 
significantly higher charges for urban driving. 
In the long run, with the growing urbanisation of Ireland the key 
to sustainability will lie in the development of denser cities with the 
appropriate infrastructure. With the cost of energy likely to continue 
rising in real terms for the foreseeable future it is appropriate to plan 
for cities which are denser and which rely to a much greater extent 
on public transport. It is important to signal today that a world of 
long-distance commuting may not be sustainable in twenty or thirty 
years time. 
Finally, as discussed in the next chapter on energy efficiency, the 
standards of insulation on new dwellings need to be tightened and 
enforced. With the housing stock growing at a very high rate, a 
change in standards today could make a big difference to the energy 
efficiency of that stock for the next century. In 15 or 20 years time, 
when the rate of growth is likely to fall or even stop it will be too 
late to influence the quality of the housing stock through influencing 
the quality of a limited volume of new build. Retrofitting the existing 
housing stock will be a much more expensive option. 
 
 
• In an ideal world one economic instrument would be used to 
achieve one objective. Using multiple economic instruments 
to target a single objective is likely to be inefficient and to 
raise the cost of meeting the objective. However, because of 
information deficiencies or other constraints it may 
sometimes be necessary to use additional instruments. It is 
important that the potential costs of using multiple 
instruments to target a single basic environmental objective 
are considered before deciding on the use of additional 
policy instruments.  
7.7 
Conclusions
• The single most pressing environmental issue facing energy 
policymakers is the problem of global warming. Ireland is 
committed to taking action to reduce emissions as part of the 
EU. 
• The EU emissions trading scheme, if suitably reformed, 
should provide an appropriate instrument for implementing 
the Kyoto agreement. However, as currently implemented by 
the EU it has some serious defects. 
• The emissions trading scheme needs to be reformed to 
mandate the auctioning of the bulk of permits in the period 
   ENVIRONMENT 111 
from 2008 onwards. Failure to do so will distort the 
electricity market, it will reduce the environmental 
effectiveness of the measure and it will substantially raise the 
cost of meeting the environmental objective. Finally, as 
currently implemented the emissions trading regime 
discriminates against renewable energy. 
• The current arrangements with Bord na Móna should be 
revised to allow for the gradual replacement of peat by wood 
biomass as the fuel in the three new “peat-fired” power 
stations. The best alternative from the environmental point 
of view would be to close these new stations immediately. 
• A properly designed emissions trading regime should 
generally provide the appropriate incentive to develop 
renewable electricity. Under such a regime special treatment 
of renewables would only be appropriate in so far as it was 
required to incentivise research and development. However, 
the current emissions trading regime discriminates against 
renewables and it may be necessary to offset this defect 
through a continuing special support regime. Any such 
regime must properly reflect the true costs and benefits to 
society of the different types of renewable energy. 
• For sectors not covered by emissions trading it will be 
important to introduce a carbon tax. Without such a tax 
there is a danger that Ireland will either fail to reduce its 
emissions by the required amount or else it will do so at 
undue cost, placing most of the burden on the electricity 
generation sector. 
• Tackling the rapid growth in emissions in transport will 
require special measures including the application by the EU 
of mandatory fuel efficiency standards for new motor 
vehicles. A move away from charging high tax rates on fuel 
to charging for use of road space could simultaneously 
reduce congestion, which has a high cost, and also reduce 
emissions. In the long run policy will need to focus more on 
developing sustainable cities and more energy efficient 
dwellings. 
 
8.  ENERGY  EFFICIENCY 
AND FUEL POVERTY 
Ireland’s expected overshoot of its Kyoto target for emissions 
reduction could be halved by a mere 10 per cent improvement in 
average energy efficiency.86 A figure of 10 per cent is instanced 
simply to show that widespread small improvements in energy 
efficiency could significantly help Ireland to achieve its commitment 
on Greenhouse Gases.  
8.1 
Introduction
Energy efficiency, however, does not have the attraction for 
investors compared to that of renewables and new technology. 
Energy conservation or ‘negawatts’ do not have the same allure as 
windmills. Yet opting for negawatts can be cheaper and 
environmentally superior, requiring less subsidies, fewer resources 
and having less impact on landscapes and biodiversity. When 
everything is counted in, energy efficiency can be a better 
investment. The more worthwhile opportunities for energy saving 
have a modest net cost when lifetime calculations are made, some 
can be costless and some advantageous even in private cost terms as 
will be discussed. Taking external costs into account improves their 
viability further. Given these opportunities, what should be the role 
of energy policy in relation to energy efficiency?  
The role to date, in broad terms, has been to seek out worthwhile 
energy efficiency opportunities and, failing spontaneous take-up by 
the public for whatever reason, to direct policy to encourage or 
impose their exploitation. This chapter looks at strategies within this 
context, while mindful that unpaid-for costs of external 
environmental damage underlie the problem. The damage in 
question includes all the well-documented negative side-effects of 
energy combustion, in addition to climate change (EPA, 2004, 
Chapters 14 and 15).  
Before proceeding, a brief definition of energy efficiency is 
required. Energy efficiency is achieved if the purposes of the energy 
use, be they lighting, motive power, warmth and the like, are 
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86 ICF and Byrne Ó Cléirigh (with ESRI), 2004. In terms of million tonnes of CO2 
equivalent of Greenhouse Gases, emissions in 1990 were 53.4 and the Kyoto target 
for 2008-2012 is 60.4. The currently projected annual outcome in the target period 
is 69.5, giving an overshoot of 9.1. Energy’s part of the projected outcome is 53.8 
so that a pro rata 10 per cent saving on projected energy (ignoring carbon intensity) 
would cut the overshoot by 5.4, which is a reduction of more than half in the 
overshoot. 
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supplied at minimum cost in terms of resources. The resources in 
question should comprise all those that have a value, including such 
environmental resources as urban air quality and the now-tightening 
assimilative capacity of the atmosphere. Improvements to energy 
efficiency can come about through investments. The investments 
can be of many kinds ranging from investments of time to learn 
about one’s energy use and modify one’s behaviour, to investments 
in equipment and in infrastructure, and to investment in 
development that takes the effects of location fully into account. 
Results of investments take time to materialise though in some cases 
the time can be quite short. 
The three main generic policy options available to policymakers 
are kept in mind, namely, education/exhortation, regulations, and 
economic instruments, including their variants and combinations. 
The discussion proceeds as follows. The next section sketches 
efficiency in its historic context and outlines its potential. There 
follows Section 8.3 that summarises current policies aimed at 
promoting energy efficiency and conservation. The chapter proceeds 
by outlining a selection of pertinent research results under two 
headings: Section 8.4 on the residential sector and Section 8.5 on the 
industrial and public sectors.87 Section 8.6 considers briefly the issue 
of fuel poverty. The concluding section, 8.7 evaluates the directions 
of policies on energy efficiency that are suggested by this chapter. 
 
 
HISTORIC 8.2 
Efficiency in 
Context – 
Historic and 
Potential 
Given the long-run nature of the challenge posed by global warming 
and the time it takes for the energy-use effects of investments and 
infrastructure to materialise, sketching past movements in efficiency 
is informative. Ideally in looking at trends in energy efficiency one 
would look at the disaggregated uses of energy, such as areas heated 
or passenger miles travelled. One would then see how the technical 
improvements have improved efficiency, separate from the effects 
of shifts in activity as some sectors grow faster than others and final 
uses and preferences alter. In the absence of such information it is 
worth viewing the record of energy intensity in national terms. 
Without a more detailed decomposition, energy intensity is a useful 
proxy for the inverse of energy efficiency, provided that the shifts 
are noted. Figure 8.1 shows energy intensity of GNP since the early 
sixties. Energy intensity is expressed in terms of final energy divided 
by GNP – that is, it omits the energy used in producing final energy, 
so that the large efficiency gains by electricity generation are not 
factored in. 
 
 
87 The transport sector is not covered here. Studies laying out issues in transport 
include Redirecting Transport Taxes (Scott, 1998) and Study of the Environmental 
Implications of Irish Transport Growth and of Related Sustainable Policies and Measures 
(Department of Public Enterprise and CIE, 1999) and Review of Transport 
Infrastructure Investment Needs (CSF, 1999).  
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Figure 8.1: Energy Intensity, 1970=100 
ergy consumption divided by real 
 
he first noteworthy point to emerge from the graph is the 
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ough much of the 1980s, real energy prices declined again 
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T
arkable decline in energy intensity since its peak just before the 
OPEC energy price hike of 1973. Energy prices had been falling in 
real terms prior to the price hike and this decline in energy intensity 
after the price hike was also widely observed in other countries.88 
The price increase, which provoked unease about security of supply, 
stimulated the investigation and installation of energy efficiency 
measures and alternatives. Energy intensity declined but, as the 
pressure eased and general inflation caused energy prices to fall in 
real terms, the decline in energy intensity slackened and even 
reversed momentarily in 1978. Energy intensity returned to its 
downward path after the second OPEC price rise which occurred in 
1979.  
Thr
 the economy stagnated in the face of internal and external 
imbalances. Encouraged by the slump in world energy prices in 
1986, energy intensity started to rise again. 
Turning to the steady decline in ene
0s, this can be attributed to a number of factors. Price was in fact 
not conducive to energy efficiency, in so far as price generally 
continued to decline in real terms. Had it been conducive the result 
could have been very powerful owing to the investment drive that 
took place. The overwhelming factors were structural change in the 
economy, which saw the rapid growth of the service sector, and 
88 The International Energy Agency (2002) describes how there has been a 38 per 
cent decline in energy intensity (total final consumption/GDP of OECD countries) 
since 1973, driven by improvements in end-use energy efficiency and by shifts in 
economic structure and consumer behaviour. 
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strong investment in equipment imported from countries where the 
drive towards improvements in energy efficiency impacted on the 
technology they developed. Other factors were increased penetration 
of natural gas, which is more efficient in use than the solid fuels, and 
the introduction of Integrated Pollution Control licensing. There 
was also some increased awareness of environmental and energy 
issues due to high profile events during the1990s, such as the Rio 
Declaration of June 1992, the coming into force of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
March 1994, the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997 
and the EU share-out of targets in the EU’s burden-sharing 
agreement of June 1998. The Irish Energy Centre (pre-cursor of 
Sustainable Energy Ireland or SEI) had a variety of schemes in place, 
such as the initiatives in hospitals and public sector buildings 
(Lawlor, 1998), the steam boiler schemes,89 and public awareness 
campaigns. Schemes were funded under the Sub-Programme on 
Energy Efficiency in the Operational Programme for Economic 
Infrastructure 1994-1999, with EU-supported funding of £34 million 
over the period. 
For recent years the graph suggests rather modest improvements 
in 
strates the importance of 
rem
 
energy intensity. By contrast the dramatic decoupling between 
energy-related carbon dioxide emissions and economic growth since 
2001, noted in the recent release of Energy in Ireland 1990-2003 (SEI, 
2005a, page 9), does not so much reflect efficiency improvements in 
final energy consumption as the use of less carbon intensive fuels, 
especially the introduction of high efficiency gas-burning electricity 
power plant in 2002 and 2003. The move is one of the actions 
presaged in the Climate Change Strategy. 
This overview of energy intensity illu
embering that there are many factors playing a role in the 
evolution of energy intensity, as demonstrated by results of 
econometric studies of energy over the last few decades. These 
studies have told a consistent story that while energy consumption is 
closely bound to economic growth, it is also being influenced by 
changes in the shares of sectors, by fuel availability and advances in 
technology and by price (Scott, 1980; Conniffe and Scott, 1990; 
Scott, 1991; Conniffe et al., 1997; Fitz Gerald et al., 2002; Bergin et 
al., 2004). The effect of price is perhaps not so noticeable 
immediately but is likely to occur after a time lag. In addition the 
manner in which price rises encourage technological development is 
likened to a ratchet effect in that advances in technology are not 
unlearnt, so that improvements encouraged by price hikes can 
persist systemically (Conniffe, 1993). 
 
89 The Steam Boiler System Evaluation Scheme ran from 1997 to 2000 and targeted the 
420 largest operators. One in seven had an audit completed, which identified 
average fuel savings of 9.5 per cent with half of these achievable at low cost, i.e. 
with a payback period of less than six months. This indicates that worthwhile 
savings exist and, importantly, that there is much variation according to individual 
circumstances.  
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POTENTIAL 
variation in the potential for energy efficiency in 
ations, though there may be some exaggeration of 
ial options where benefits in terms of reduced 
ene
ficiency, 
stat
There is wide 
individual applic
stated benefits when hidden costs are included. Nevertheless, there 
are significant profitable opportunities for investment in private 
terms. If external costs are taken into account the potential is 
improved of course.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001) 
pointed to the potent
rgy costs and local and regional pollutants would be at least as 
great as the costs of the required investment. These would be 
termed ‘no-regrets’ actions because even in the event of global 
warming not being a threat they would still be worthwhile.  
The UK’s Best Practice Programme, now run by the Carbon 
Trust,90 which identifies good investments in energy ef
es: 
 
The Carbon Trust has worked with thousands of 
companies to identify savings of 10 per cent – 30 per 
 
On  the 
rust 
hievable by most businesses – can have 
 
Of ind 
er cy, it 
is c
cent of their energy bills. The recommended measures 
include many NO and LOW cost actions that pay for 
themselves immediately or within a few months. 
 the question of scope for savings and the value of savings
states: T
 
A 20 per cent saving in energy consumption – 
realistically ac
the same positive effect as a 5 per cent increase in sales. 
 the options for mitigating CO2 release, ranging from w
 to Combined Heat and Power (CHP) to building efficienpow
laimed that energy efficiency initiatives in the EU with respect to 
major refurbishment programmes and new build, using existing and 
proven technology, are amongst the most cost-effective measures 
available to policymakers (CALEB, 1999). The best option is 
collective refurbishment and new building, with a positive lifetime 
saving net of investment. Their calculations are based on an 8 per 
cent discount rate. The incorporation of lifetime savings gives more 
positive results than would be obtained by the short payback rule of 
thumb that is usually employed in private calculation, but this is 
counter-balanced to some extent by the quite high discount rate in 
real terms that is employed.91  
 
90 www.thecarbontrust.co.uk  
91 The results are presented graphically as ‘cost per tonne of CO2 saved annually’ in 
ding cumulative annual tonnes of CO2 saved’. This 
sound basis for selecting and prioritising energy 
ascending order against ‘ascen
type of analysis provides a 
efficiency measures and could usefully be replicated on an annual basis covering all 
reasonable CO2 abatement options in Ireland, rather than calculated ad hoc as in 
Conniffe et al., (1997) p. 48, ERM (1998) pp. 13-14  and reproduced in Sustainable 
Energy (1999). 
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The preamble to a proposed EU Directive on “energy end-use 
efficiency and energy services” reports that energy consumption is 
potentially about 20 per cent higher than can be justified on 
economic grounds (CEC, 2003). The recent Green Paper that aims 
to stimulate debate on the topic, “Energy Efficiency or Doing More 
With Less”, says that saving 20 per cent on energy consumption by 
2020 would allow the EU to save an estimated €60 billion on its 
annual energy bill (CEC, 2005). It was estimated that the average 
cost in many Member States of investment in saving a unit of off-
peak electricity in the domestic sector works out at around 2.6 
cents/kWh. This is compared to the average off-peak price for 
delivered electricity of 3.9 cents (the average on-peak price is 10.2 
cents/kWh). Similar cost advantages to be derived from investment 
in energy saving exist for the other energy carriers. It was also 
proposed that instead of dealing merely with the sale of energy, 
suppliers should be encouraged to offer a certain level of ‘energy 
services’. If the suppliers sold energy services, examples being: 
• Indoor thermal comfort. 
• Lighting comfort. 
• Hot water. 
• Transportation. 
• Product manufacturing.  
they would compete among themselves to provide end-use energy 
services more cheaply through enhanced efficiency. For example, if 
annual lighting services were sold by different companies and priced 
in euro per square metre, or thermal comfort, or hot water priced in 
euro per cubic metre, the suppliers would compete through the 
efficiency of equipment, maintenance and fuels. The idea then is that 
the reform of the energy market should promote competition not 
only between different energy sources, as at present, but also 
between investments in energy end-use efficiency, on the one hand, 
and investments in energy supply, on the other.  
Other estimates of savings potential are cited in the proposal for 
the directive and in the Green Paper. Due to the many market 
barriers and market imperfections that still exist, there is said to be 
economic potential in the form of unrealised energy savings for 
industry of approximately 17 per cent of current final consumption, 
realisable by 2010. For the domestic and tertiary sector, the estimate 
is 22 per cent and for transport 14 per cent, excluding modal shifts. 
These are generally economically viable savings. By contrast the 
technical potential for savings is put at about 40 per cent, obviously 
higher than the economic potential.  
Turning to the academic literature, the study by Brown et al. 
(2001), analysed “hundreds of technologies and approximately 50 
policies” that can significantly reduce carbon emissions and 
inefficiencies in energy production and end-use systems at essentially 
no net cost to the US economy. They concluded that over time 
ergy efficiency. This could probably be the case at any 
 given the ingenuity of the human race, but funding for 
energy bill savings could pay for the required investments. 
This brief summary indicates that there is good potential for 
mproved eni
time,
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development of energy efficiency technologies over the past decade 
has probably enhanced the potential. The recent decline in energy 
int
hold expenditure on home fuels 
and
anagers’ and 
purchasers in all sectors and to introduce measures to achieve this. 
main official policy documents have been: 
0-2006, Operational 
ent & Local Government)  
Thes w outlined under the three main 
Th
t its work will include “promoting 
technical advice, and 
”. 
8.3 
ensity in Ireland has been fairly steady but not strong. Leaving 
aside the efficiency gains in electricity generation, the decrease in 
final energy intensity recorded in the 5 years since 1998, at 7.7 per 
cent, represents an annual reduction of 1.6 per cent. In the context 
of the baseline or ‘business as usual’ assumption in ICF et al. (op. cit.) 
of a 2 per cent per annum decline in energy intensity of GNP, recent 
performance is relatively modest.  
It can be noted at this stage that, setting aside a few energy 
intensive sectors of the economy, the share of energy in total 
expenditure is not large. Users are unlikely to be readily aware of 
how much they are consuming at any given moment or in any 
particular use. On average, house
 on transport fuels is 3.8 per cent and 3.5 per cent of disposable 
income, respectively. Expenditure by industry on fuel and power 
averages some 2.1 per cent of its expenditure on all “industrial 
inputs”. Leaving aside the energy intensive sectors it would appear 
that most people do not become exercised about energy efficiency. 
By contrast, new energy technologies and renewables on the other 
hand enjoy connotations of innovation and adventure. 
 
 Ireland’s policy on energy efficiency has been spelt out in a series 
of documents over the last decade. The task facing the policymaker 
is to incentivise action on the part of energy ‘mCurrent Policy on Energy 
Efficiency Th
1997 Sustainable Development – A Strategy for Ireland 
(Government of Ireland). 
1999 Green Paper on Sustainable Energy (Department of Public 
Enterprise). 
1999 The National Development Plan 200
e 
Programme for Economic and Social Infrastructure 
(Government of Ireland). 
2000 National Climate Change Strategy – Ireland (Department of 
the Environm
2002 The National Spatial Strategy (Department of the 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government).  
e policy documents are no
policy mechanisms listed above. 
(a) INFORMATION/EXHORTATION 
e provision of information has been central to policy on energy 
efficiency. Sustainable Development stated that the Irish Energy Centre 
will continue to develop, and tha
energy efficiency in industry, the provision of 
information campaigns and support measures
The National Climate Change Strategy fleshed out an information 
strategy that was broadly based. The proposed measures addressed 
all major sectors through an appropriately wide variety of policy 
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approaches. Education was highlighted, such as awareness 
programmes and energy efficiency rating of households. 
 a view to 
bri
 Sustainable Energy 
s ate is to promote and assist 
environ ustainable production, supply 
an s
sectors
advanci achieving more energy 
con
Annual Report for 2003 
des
s is the Large Industry 
En  is scheme SEI works in partnership 
wit sers. This is a voluntary scheme for 
com mmitted to reducing their energy intensity. 
Th is rgy auditing and management, 
and
 
The National Spatial Strategy, by way of exhortation, emphasised 
the importance particularly in urban areas of combining location of 
housing with good transport facilities. In relation to housing in rural 
areas the strategy provides guidance on the different policy 
responses appropriate to different circumstances, with
nging people, employment and services closer together. It pointed 
out that this would mean better quality of life – less congestion, less 
long distance commuting, more regard to the quality of the 
environment and increased access to services. 
The National Development Plan, in the Operational Programme for 
Economic and Social Infrastructure, included the Sustainable Energy 
priority which allocated €156 million for an intensified energy 
conservation and efficiency programme. This was to be spent: 
1. on the newly named energy agency
Ireland (SEI), the task of which is to prepare multi-annual 
programmes, with quantification of benefits and regular 
evaluation (30 per cent); 
2. on R & D (24 per cent); and  
3. on stimulation of energy efficiency awareness in relation to 
pre-1980 buildings and to develop an energy rating system to 
make energy performance explicit. 
tainable Energy Ireland’sSu  mand
mentally and economically s
d u e of energy, in support of government policy, across all 
 of the economy. It sees itself as having two main means of 
ng these objectives, namely, by 
servation and more renewable energy.  
SEI is less of a grant-giving body than its predecessor, the Irish 
Energy Agency, rather promoting and encouraging the application 
of knowledge and research. A prerequisite of properly functioning 
markets is full information and SEI’s role therefore can be viewed as 
filling this difficult and important gap. Its 
cribes its programme, which consists of four main programmes 
of work dealing with energy conservation: 
1. The built environment. 
2. Customer services. 
3. Industry and  
4. Sustainable energy services.  
An example of one of SEI’s scheme
ergy Network (LIEN).92 In th
h 80 or so major energy u
panies who are co
ere  a structured approach to ene
 firms present an annual statement of energy accounts. In 2002 
these firms saved about 2 per cent on their energy expenditure. In 
the 7 years of the scheme’s operation the energy intensity of the 
92 LIEN replaced the earlier Self Audit and Statement of Energy Accounts Scheme. 
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firms (the composition of which shifts somewhat from year-to-year) 
has decreased by about 1.8 per cent per year. The LIEN Annual 
Report for 2003 says that energy use avoided due to energy 
efficiency measures in 2003 was 123.6 GWh. This energy would 
have cost in the region of €5 million to €6 million had it not been 
saved, or an average of €65,000 to €75,000 per firm. It is probably 
fair to say that the measures were good investments from the firms’ 
points of view, in the sense that the measures had positive net 
present values. The cost incurred by SEI in administering the 
schemes was but €0.12 million and the reduction in CO2 was about 
43.5 thousand tonnes, or under €3 per tonne, so that this looks like a 
reasonable return to the state as well as to the firm. However, there 
is the issue of whether some of these changes would have taken 
place even without the benefit of the scheme. 
SEI’s Public Sector initiative under the Built Environment 
programme has no figures of energy saving though, in the example 
quoted of a school building, the building’s performance is said to be 
20 per cent above best practice. 
SEI’s scheme of R&D on the House of Tomorrow addresses the 
fac
ns of 2002 (€5,000 for 40 per cent 
red
s, not detailed here, are 
und
ctive 92/75/EEC, helps shoppers to 
buy
t that one-quarter of Ireland’s energy related emissions of CO2 
are accounted for by the residential sector. A grant of €2,400 is 
awarded to houses designed to fulfil a target reduction of 20 per cent 
relative to the building regulatio
uction) and these supports are based on an estimate of 50 per 
cent of the anticipated extra building costs. The Century Homes 
case-study aims to produce a ‘Formula 1 House’ using approximately 
80 per cent less energy than houses built to 2002 building 
regulations. These schemes have usefully exposed a number of 
weaknesses in the home-building industry, namely, scepticism about 
demand for superior energy performance, difficulty in introducing 
new building systems, delays in certification of products and 
systems, scarcity of energy efficiency expertise, and lack of training 
and certification of systems installers.  
Under various initiatives for improving energy efficiency in 
homes of low-income households, by 2003 over 6,000 homes had 
been improved. No figures are given, however, on the impacts on 
comfort levels and energy use. 
Many other information scheme
ertaken and the awareness raising, education and information 
roles are of fundamental importance. For example energy labelling 
of household goods, such as refrigerators and tumble-dryers, under 
the European Framework Dire
 machines that are economical to run. 
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Analysis of the outcomes of schemes in general, listed as number 
(1) of the National Development Plan’s remit for SEI above, is 
central to efficient decision making, and needs to be taken more 
seriously.93  
(b
uthorities had been requested to assign high priority to 
 their housing programmes and housing 
ossibilities had been outlined and to a 
transport, Sustainable Development stated that there would be 
clo
 Strategy (2000) announced 
tha
 by at least 30 per cent and that 
the
 2012.  
body representing them, is engaged by the issue of energy efficiency, 
 
) REGULATIONS 
Regulations have been widely introduced. Regulations relating to 
house building have been strengthened twice in the recent past. In 
1996 Local A
energy conservation in
stock. Work on the p
considerable extent energy conservation did not involve advanced 
technology (Green Design: Sustainable Buildings, Stationery Office, 
1996). 
In 1997 the Technical Guidance to the Building Regulations was 
strengthened (Stationery Office, 1997) to come into effect on 1 July 
1998. This was expected to yield savings in the order of 5 per cent in 
energy used for space heating, according to Sustainable Development. 
On 
ser co-ordination of transport and land use planning, the aim 
being to promote higher residential densities, particularly in 
redeveloping brown-field sites and in proximity to town centres, 
public transport nodes and access points. 
Statutory Instruments are in force, covering minimum efficiency 
requirements for new hot water boilers and efficiency requirements 
for household appliances, under regulations that were transposed 
into Irish law during the late 1990s. 
Meanwhile the National Climate Change
t the technical standards in the 1997 Building Regulations, Part L 
Conservation of Energy and Fuel, would be adjusted and radically 
amended. It was foreseen that over the succeeding decade the 
number of dwellings would increase
refore “appropriate insulation standards can achieve an impact on 
a very high proportion of the housing stock in a short space of time” 
(Fitz Gerald, 1999). 
These changes, aiming at a 20 per cent reduction in fuel use, were 
applied to work on or after 1 January 2003. Although too late to 
impact on the large increase in the housing stock that had already 
occurred, these regulations are projected to reduce CO2 emissions by 
0.3 million tonnes by
Architects point also to the need for concern about design faults, 
workmanship during construction and the operational management 
of buildings (Stuart, 2004). Unless the owner or occupier, or some 
93 Analyses should be available to the public and to other researchers. Despite 
requirements on Freedom of Information, studies in other important areas are often 
not readily available, such as the full reports on the environmental effects of 
transport growth (Department of Public Enterprise, 1999) and on costs and 
benefits of water infrastructure (Department of the Environment, Heritage and 
Local Government, 2004). 
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the outcome can be disappointing. To take an example from the 
UK, the Building Research Establishment recently released results of 
tes
nd, any new building 
rec
nergy efficiency. In its application to the High Court in 
200
ation must be given to energy efficient 
tec
ts carried out on newly-built homes. It found that almost a third 
of new properties failed to achieve the air permeability level required 
by the regulations. Luxury homes tended to reveal more 
shortcomings than average. A telling finding was that most 
householders were unable to produce any documentation relating to 
the specific installed boiler, heating systems and controls, indicating 
an absence of persons in the home who would be in a position to 
‘take control’ of their energy consumption.  
It is not known to what extent the technical guidelines regarding 
energy efficiency in the building regulations are complied with here. 
There are three compliance mechanisms in place: The Building 
Control Authority (the Local Authority) is pressed by the 
Department to inspect 15 per cent of buildings and possibly 80 per 
cent of authorities meet that target. Seco
eiving support, such as stamp duty relief, needs a Certificate of 
Compliance from the Department. These cases indirectly require 
compliance with the building regulations, and most of these new 
buildings are inspected at some period. Third, at point of sale a 
Certificate of Compliance with building regulations as a whole is 
requested. These mechanisms focus more on fire and safety aspects, 
however. 
To ensure compliance with energy efficiency regulations requires 
regular inspection during the building process, which would need to 
be resourced, as it is in some Nordic countries. The pressure for 
enforcement could logically come from house purchasers and such 
pressure would be forthcoming if they were truly engaged by the 
issue of e
1, the Office of the Director of Consumer Affairs obtained a 
judgment that certain house purchase contract terms were “unfair”. 
The potentially relevant unfair term was that which gave substantial 
powers to the builder to rescind the contract and offer the premises 
for sale elsewhere if a consumer queries the quality of workmanship 
prior to completion of the transaction. The problem of inspection 
remains, however. 
A system of Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) 
licensing came into effect in Ireland in 2004, replacing an earlier less 
comprehensive licensing system for bodies with significant polluting 
potential The primary aims of IPPC licensing are to prevent or 
reduce emissions to air, water and land, to reduce waste and to use 
energy efficiently. Consider
hniques and practices and to the efficient use of raw materials, 
chemicals and water. Measures such as in-plant changes, process 
recycling and reuse, improved material handling and storage 
practices, must be employed to effect reduction in emissions. The 
extension of IPPC to the power generation sector means that all 
large-scale new and existing power generation plants (greater than 50 
MW) are required to operate using the ‘best available technology’ 
(BAT). In the identification of best available technology, emphasis is 
placed on pollution prevention techniques, including cleaner 
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techniques and waste minimisation, rather than end-of-pipe 
treatment. There is a list of activities that require a licence from the 
EPA. The list is quite wide-ranging and would include all those that 
are relatively energy intensive. Licences are enforced by the Office 
of Environmental Enforcement utilising a variety of surveillance 
mechanisms.  
An analysis of the earlier licensing system points out that, unlike 
uniform regulation, integrated pollution control in principle takes 
into account the individual characteristics of the plant (Clinch and 
Kerins, 2002). Applying the principle of Best Available Technology 
Not Entailing Excessive Cost (BATNEEC) this system set out to 
balance the environmental benefit with the financial cost. The 
ana
onal Energy Agency stated in its 
nment should:  
lysis found the environmental performance of the licensing 
system to be impressive, except in the case of greenhouse gases, 
which were not covered in the licensing process at the time. The 
costs incurred by firms, mainly in 1998, consisted largely of current 
expenditure. The reason for this was that the administrative work 
involved was considerable and the capital costs were small, as many 
firms were already compliant with the prior licensing system. The 
benefit-cost ratio was found to be more than 1.2 (in terms of private 
costs presumably) based on the 46 firms analysed. However, the 
disparity in costs per tonne of pollution was also calculated from a 
selection of firms for which data were available and disparities were 
found to be high. The authors suggest that the costs incurred were 
five times higher than the costs that would have been incurred if 
abatement expenditure per unit of pollution were equalised across 
these firms, a result closer to that of flexible mechanisms such as 
carbon taxes or tradable emissions permits. They show that the 
result is in line with similar findings by Tietenberg (1990) and it 
strengthens the argument for using flexible mechanisms. It is noted, 
however, that only a small number of firms were investigated and 
that a final judgement would need to consider the fact that damage 
costs can vary geographically, so that different abatement costs 
might be justified in some places. 
(c) ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS  
Sustainable Development stated that “Ensuring sustainability in the long 
term will require the use of a range of measures to complement the 
regulatory approach” including the use of fiscal instruments. 
Endorsing this line, the Internati
review of energy policies in Ireland that the gover
 
Develop a programme of energy efficiency measures…, 
which includes the use of pricing and mandatory 
regulations, and is based on quantitative analysis of 
possible cost-effectiveness. (IEA, 1999.) 
 
The rationale for use of economic instruments and their 
articu
Paper o ent 
costs me 
applications will be better than in others and the same applies to 
p lar suitability for energy efficiency was spelt out in the Green 
n Sustainable Energy. It pointed to the fact that CO2 abatem
vary, meaning that energy conservation measures in so
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sector ost 
measu
s. Policy should also encourage adoption of least c
res first.  
Economic instruments would thus be an essential element to 
achieve Kyoto targets. These would include a planned and steady 
rise in energy taxes, with mitigating measures for vulnerable 
households and sectors, and potential recycling of revenues to 
reduce other taxes or charges such as PRSI.  
Other economic issues surrounding energy were discussed in 
Sustainable Energy. In particular it described (1) the need for 
monopolies (electricity, gas) to have associated regulation to 
encourage renewables and CHP and (2) the issue of under-provision 
of public goods such as Research and Development and 
information. Energy efficiency is encouraged by the availability of 
relevant information, but such information is difficult for individual 
consumers to come by; and (3) externalities in the form of unpriced 
damages and benefits means that they are not usually taken into 
account in decision making, and that “recognising the cost…of 
externalities… is closely related to ensuring sustainable 
development. In the absence of some mechanism that recognises the 
value of avoided emissions, this will lead to a level of consumption 
higher than that which is optimal.” It added that “ … it is also 
important for competitiveness to ensure that externalities are dealt 
with in the most cost-effective way to avoid unduly burdening the 
economy.” 
On the subject of grants, Sustainable Energy discussed the 
possibility of grants that were standardised in order to contain 
administrative costs, funded by a levy on all energy consumption. In 
determining the sources of funds, the ‘polluter pays’ principle should 
apply, so that costs of emissions are borne by energy consumers 
(p 158). Second, public funding should be available for those 
activities that have ‘public good’ characteristics. 
There are some grants that are currently available. The National 
Development Plan  under the Social Infrastructure Operational Programme 
provided €12.7 million for energy efficiency initiatives in public 
sector buildings.  
On the topic of transport, as mentioned, Sustainable Energy 
recognised that measures related to land use planning and transport 
development should be an immediate focus of attention. A broad 
range of short-term recommendations was put forward; along with 
economic polices that included road charging and development of 
infrastructure in the long term. The National Climate Change Strategy 
included the provision of incentives and disincentives (such as 
rebalancing of motor taxes), and public investment and activities at 
the level of Local Authorities (such as investment in suburban buses 
and waste management).  
The Climate Change Strategy, in addition, proposed emissions 
trading for the enterprises that are responsible for large quantities of 
emissions. Finally, and for the first time a ‘cross-sectoral’ carbon tax 
was proposed for introduction in 2002 on a phased and incremental 
basis. This proposal was endorsed by bodies with an important role 
in the strategy. The EPA’s State of the Environment report for 2004 
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described the use of appropriate fiscal instruments as a ‘key 
component of the NCCS’ (page 246). SEI’s Annual Report for 2003 
list
explicit by the 
po
1999 and introduction in April 
200
or. 
Th
 is item 5, i.e. the 
s instruments to encourage energy efficiency and in first place is 
“price signals”, via an emissions trading scheme and a carbon tax, 
adding “… without such price signals, it is very difficult for any 
other policy instrument combination to succeed.”  
Success also depends on the manner of introduction. The 
environmental tax reform aspect needs to be highlighted – the rise 
imposed in one payment allowing a decline in some other payment 
such as taxes on labour. The amount paid in environmental tax is 
then seen to be recycled as a reduction in some other tax. This 
would differ from the manner in which income taxes were reduced 
and bin charges were introduced, for example, where the link 
between the two was unfortunately not made 
licymaker. There would be losers but these would be the large 
energy users. Amongst industrial sectors, losers would be high 
energy and low labour users such as manufacture of metals. Gainers 
would be, for example, the Credit and Insurance Services sector and 
the Building and Construction sector, because like most of industry 
they use more labour than energy. 
As of now the introduction of the carbon tax has been 
abandoned, out of concern for “… some adverse economic and 
social effects that would not be fully dealt with by compensatory 
measures” and having regard also to the recent increases in the 
international oil price (Minister for Finance, 10 September 2004). 
Meanwhile the UK government have released an independent 
evaluation of the effects of the Climate Change Levy since its 
announcement in the Budget of 
1. The main conclusions are that the levy is expected to deliver 
3.5 as opposed to the original estimate of 2 million tonnes of carbon 
reduction in 2010. It also concludes that there was an 
“announcement effect” that brought about a 1.2 per cent reduction 
in energy demand in 2000 in the commercial and public sect
ird, because renewables and CHP (combined heat and power) are 
exempt from the levy and therefore enjoy a comparative advantage, 
the increase in CHP capacity by 2010 due to the levy is estimated at 
1.2 gigawatts (HM Treasury, 2005; Cambridge Econometrics, 2005). 
CURRENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
The main energy saving policy due for adoption is the Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive. The Directive will apply to almost all 
buildings, residential and non-residential, both new and existing. 
Member States are allowed to exempt certain categories of buildings, 
such as buildings of historical or architectural importance, religious 
buildings, and buildings of low occupancy or size. The requirements 
of the Directive are outlined in Box 8.1 
Probably the best-known requirement
mandatory provision of energy certificates or labels to prospective 
purchasers of buildings or tenants. This is set to have high visibility 
and to have an impact on the property sector. A rough estimate 
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suggests that in Ireland over 100,000 sale or rental transactions per 
year will be affected (SEI, 2004). 
The concept of “energy rating” of buildings has been in 
operation on a voluntary basis for several years in Ireland and other 
EU countries, most notably Denmark, and was signalled in the 
National Climate Change Strategy in 2000. But as well as being 
mandatory, the scope of the Directive is considerably wider.  
Box 8.1: Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
The main provisions of the Directive are as follows: 
1. It sets out a general framework methodology for calculating the 
energy performance of buildings. Provision is made for a 
review of this methodology. 
2. It requires Member States to set minimum energy performance 
standards (both for new build and major refurbishment) using 
a methodology based upon the general framework 
methodology. These standards are to be reviewed regularly. 
3. For new buildings over 1000m2, the feasibility of alternative 
energy measures is to be considered.  
4.  undergoing renovation, energy For buildings over 1000m2
performance is to be upgraded as far as is technically, 
functionally and economically feasible. 
5. For almost all buildings, an Energy Performance Certificate (or 
energy rating) is to be supplied by the owner to a prospective 
buyer or tenant when constructed, sold or rented. This 
certificate may include a CO2 indicator. 
6. The Certificate is to be accompanied by recommendations for 
cost-effective improvements to energy performance. 
(However, there will be no legal obligation on vendors or 
prospective purchasers to carry out the recommended 
improvements). 
7. For buildings of over 1000m2 “occupied by public authorities 
and by institutions providing public services to a large number 
of persons”, an energy certificate is to be posted in a 
prominent place. 
8. Regular boiler inspection for particular classes of boiler or 
alternatively the provision of advice on best practice in boiler 
use and replacement. Inspection of large air-conditioning 
systems. 
9. Assistance from the Commission for measures taken by 
Member States to provide information on heating systems and 
best use of energy in buildings. 
www.sei.ie  
 
T
boile
A al for the EU Direct
end-use efficiency and energy services and the subsequent green paper
esigned to launch debate (introduced above, CEC, 2005). The 
he Directive will be transposed into national law on 4 January 
2006, with an additional period of 3 years to apply fully the 
provisions on energy performance certificates and inspection of 
rs and air-conditioning systems. 
 major new policy is the propos ive on energy 
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ns trading mechanism 
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 Ownership of energy saving items in the home (Scott, 1997). 
 Cost-benefit analysis of upgrading energy efficiency of the 
und ta
sam le  
rec e  
con m
8.4 
ropean Commission proposed in December 2003 to improve the 
way in which energy is used to achieve its purposes, such as heating, 
lighting and motive power. The Commission also proposed to 
promote the market for energy service
rgy service companies). Mandatory targets and obligations were 
proposed, including annual energy end-use savings targets of 1 per 
cent, in absolute terms or compared to business-as-usual in the case 
of economic growth (1.5 per cent in the public sector). Other 
proposals in the directive include the creation of conditions for the 
development of a market for energy services and for the delivery of 
other energy efficiency measures to end users such as reader-friendly 
meters and energy bills as suggested by O’Malley et al. (2003). Apart 
from these worthwhile proposals to help overcome the problems of 
awareness and information, the targets would appear to be better 
achieved by less cumbersome means such as by carbon taxes or by 
extending and improving emissions trading.  
The details in the proposed directive on energy efficiency and 
energy services are revealing. The need for a framework and 
procedure for defining and measuring the ‘energy savings’ and for 
agencies to oversee the framework, verify the savings and report the 
results achieved points to the fact that energy use is determined by 
millions of micro-decisions. Influencing these is made simpler when 
the underlying pricing problem is addressed.  
Indeed the Green Paper on Energy Efficiency or Doing More With 
Less highlights the lack of appropriate incentives and financing 
mechanisms and lack of information. In its list of key actions that 
might be taken is a  suggestion of “… improving taxation, to ensure 
that the polluter really pays, without however increasing overall tax 
levels.” The Green Paper invites discussion on a number of 
pertinent questions, such as could the emissio
better harnessed to achieve energy efficiency.  
 
 This section looks at lessons learnt from recent research. Several 
studies have been undertaken in Ireland on the subject of energy and 
the residential sector. Some of the relevant findings about energy 
efficiency yielded by this work are now outlined. Research papers in 
this field include studies on: 
Residential 
Sector
•
•
housing stock (Brophy et al., 1999). 
• The survey of housing quality (Watson and Williams, 2003). 
• Energy consumption and low-income households (SEI, 
2003; Scott and Eakins, 2004; Healy, 2004). 
• Recent energy data (SEI, 2005a). 
The study of energy-saving items was based on a survey 
er ken in 1992 that ascertained the levels of ownership in a 
 of some 1,200 households (Scott,p  1993). The survey also
ord d subjective respondents’ opinions. Several predictions were
fir ed. 
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The importance of education and income levels, which are 
link
cation is also a useful indicator of the respondent’s 
gen
 
reg
a 
rgy-saving characteristics the older 
the
ontrast there was an increase in floor area of new 
ho
ed, was underlined by this survey. People that did not have 
energy-saving items despite their being highly worthwhile, such as 
insulation of their hot water cylinders or lofts, tended to have only 
completed primary level education and to have low incomes. The 
level of edu
eral knowledge and ability to use advice on energy conservation. 
Another important factor, namely, the ability to reap the benefits of 
one’s investment was well demonstrated by the low level of energy 
saving items in private rented accommodation. Having a mortgage 
was another positive factor that could be indicative of potential 
access to credit, which in turn meant that households could make 
investments in energy efficiency. There being a reasonable level of 
potential saving to be reaped is associated with owning central 
heating, which was another significant variable associated with take-
up. The costs in terms of the effort required to get round to 
obtaining the item, the ‘transactions costs’, were only limited 
deterrents. Perceptions too were important in that respondents 
generally had to feel that owning the item would save them money.  
Overall the report pointed to the existence of reasonable levels of 
knowledge but that education in energy matters would improve 
ownership levels of energy efficiency items, as would the ability to 
reap the benefits of energy efficiency. 
The cost-benefit analysis looked at the economics of upgrading 
houses to the energy efficiency standards in the 1997 building
ulations. A 10-year programme was seen to have sizable net 
benefits, not only in reduced emissions but also in increased warmth 
and comfort for the inhabitants.  
The Housing Quality survey obtained detailed information from 
representative sample of over 40,000 householders on 
characteristics and problems of the dwelling, and on the household 
members. Information on the presence of insulation and other 
energy-saving measures was collected. One fact to emerge strongly 
was that the building had less ene
 dwelling. This reflects the improvements brought on by the 
building regulations and a low level of retrofit. The survey revealed 
too the low level of ownership of energy-saving items, especially of 
low-energy light bulbs, which stood at only 36 per cent of 
households. The ownership of hot-water cylinder insulation, at 78 
per cent, also looks surprisingly low but the figure in fact also 
includes those not owning a cylinder, so that no clear-cut judgement 
can be made. 
Turning to recent data, according to the SEI (2005a) report on 
Energy in Ireland 1990-2003, energy consumption per dwelling 
declined by only 2.3 per cent in all over the whole period from 1990 
to 2003. Most of the reduction occurred in the early 1990s when 
more efficient fuels and appliances were supplanting open fires and 
back boilers. By c
uses starting in 1994 and in new flats starting in 1997, which 
would have slowed the decline in fuel consumption per dwelling. 
The 10 per cent decline in the real price of energy products in the 
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consumer price index would also have discouraged energy 
conservation. 
Electricity consumption per dwelling rose by 30 per cent over the 
1990-2003 period, owing to the increased ownership of household 
appliances and external lighting. Despite this growth, with reduced 
carbon intensity of electricity generation from 2001 onwards and the 
above mentioned switch from open fires and back boilers, carbon 
dioxide emissions per dwelling, taking account of electricity 
gen
better 
energy efficiency in companies and public organisations. Full details 
is research in Ireland can be found in O’Malley et al. (2003). In 
 such 
inv
of 
inf
den costs” associated with 
the
8.5 
eration, decreased by 3.9 per cent over the whole period.  
In sum this indicates steady but very small improvements in 
household energy efficiency. These studies build up a picture that 
suggests that there is considerable scope for efficiency gains in the 
residential sector and that these could be encouraged by 
information, conviction that financial savings can be made and 
assistance with investment costs for low-income households.  
 
 This section reviews the findings of a research project that 
examined energy efficiency in selected private sector companies and 
public sector organisations in Ireland. The research sought in 
particular to identify what are the main barriers or obstacles to 
Industrial and 
Public Sectors 
of t
addition, comparable studies were carried out at the same time in the 
UK and Germany as well as in Ireland, and findings from all three 
countries are given in Sorrell et al. (2000); Sorrell et al. (2004). 
The starting point for this research was the claim by many 
analysts that there are numerous unexploited opportunities for 
companies and other organisations to invest in measures that would 
improve their energy efficiency. Furthermore, it is claimed that 
investment in many of these measures would be cost-effective, 
meaning that there would be a good financial return from
h
estment. This raises the question why do organisations not take 
up these cost-effective opportunities to improve their energy 
efficiency. What are the barriers that impede them from doing so? 
The claim that there are many cost-effective energy efficiency 
opportunities that are not being exploited arises particularly from 
technologically-oriented analysts who use engineering-economic 
models (Sorrell et al. 2004). Some of these analysts have suggested 
that the common neglect of such energy efficiency opportunities is 
caused by barriers, such as a shortage of capital or a lack 
ormation, which prevent markets for energy and energy-using 
technologies from operating efficiently. 
On the other hand, many economists claim that the markets for 
energy and energy-using technologies are broadly efficient. They 
suggest that if energy consumers do not invest in energy efficiency 
measures that are claimed to be cost-effective, then perhaps the real 
barriers lie in the fact that there are risks attached to these 
investments. Or perhaps there are “hid
 measures concerned, meaning costs that are not included in the 
engineering-economic models, such as the cost of management time 
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required to identify and implement the measures or the cost of 
disruption to production. Thus, in this view it is questionable 
whether there really are many unexploited energy efficiency 
opportunities that are genuinely cost-effective, when all the 
enterprise’s costs and risks are fully taken into account. 
The study reported in O’Malley et al. (2003) examined these 
issues in the context of the Irish industrial and public sectors. It 
considered whether it is true that there are many opportunities for 
cost-effective energy efficiency investment that are being neglected. 
And it assessed the importance of a range of possible barriers to 
energy efficiency that have been suggested to explain why this 
hap
as selected as an example of an industry with above-
ave
t in energy 
 
 
that would have quite short payback periods (namely 3 
yea
energy efficiency, it is not surprising that the brewing industry would 
pens. 
To examine these issues, case studies were used from a variety of 
sectors. These case studies were drawn from the mechanical 
engineering, brewing and higher education sectors in Ireland. The 
mechanical engineering industry was selected as an example of light 
industry that has only low to average energy-intensity. The brewing 
industry w
rage energy-intensity. The higher education sector was selected as 
an example from the public sector; in this case energy-intensity is 
low to average but distinctive decision-making frameworks are in 
place and the availability of capital is constrained by public policy. A 
summary of findings from the case studies now follows. 
EXISTENCE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY OPPORTUNITIES 
In considering the question whether many cost-effective 
opportunities to improve energy efficiency are being neglected, it is 
important to note the meaning of the term “cost-effective” in this 
context. Cost-effective here means that an investmen
efficiency would have a significantly better rate of return than the
cost of capital to the organisation, when one takes account of the
readily quantifiable costs such as capital costs and energy costs (and 
therefore ignores any risks or “hidden costs” that could be difficult 
to measure). 
The findings from the organisations in the three sectors studied 
indicate that there are many such cost-effective opportunities, in this 
sense, still available in most of the organisations concerned. A 
majority of interviewees in each of the three sectors agreed that 
there were many energy efficiency opportunities available in their 
organisations 
rs, or 5 years in the case of brewing). Investments with such 
short payback periods would have a much higher rate of return than 
the cost of capital. Comparable research that was carried out on the 
same three sectors in the UK and Germany also concluded that 
there were many such unexploited opportunities to improve energy 
efficiency. 
Companies in the brewing sector generally considered that there 
were fewer energy efficiency opportunities still available compared 
to those in the other two sectors. Since brewing is a more energy-
intensive sector, which should cause it to pay more attention to 
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already have taken up more of the available energy-efficiency 
opportunities. 
ble to rate the importance of each of these fifteen 
her potential barriers to energy efficiency were identified 
and
e three 
sec
Table 8.2: Barriers Cons
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT 
BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
A review of existing literature indicated that fifteen different barriers 
to energy efficiency were previously suggested as being potentially 
important. For each of the three case-study sectors, it was attempted 
as far as possi
potential barriers. Table 8.2 shows that eight of the fifteen barriers 
were found to be of high importance in at least one of the three 
sectors. 
Within the group of eight barriers that appear at least once in 
Table 8.2, two stand out as being particularly important, namely 
access to capital and hidden costs. These two are very important in 
all three of the sectors studied. Imperfect information is very 
important in two of the sectors, while the other five barriers are of 
high importance in one sector each. It is also worth noting that 
seven ot
 considered, and although these are not included in Table 8.2, 
they are all of at least some importance in some sectors. 
These findings from Ireland are similar in three significant 
respects to the results from comparable studies of the same sectors 
in the UK and Germany. First, access to capital and hidden costs 
were found to be the most important barriers in all three countries. 
Second, imperfect information was found to be commonly of high 
importance in the three countries. Third, although two or three 
types of barrier were of widespread importance across th
tors, a substantial number of other types of barrier were also 
important in at least one sector. 
idered to be of High Importance in the Different Sectors 
Barrier Mechanical 
Engineering 
Brewing Higher 
Education 
Total 
Access to capital * * * 3 
Hidden costs *    *(1) * 3(1)
Imperfect information *  * 2 
Split incentives   * 1  
Principal-agent   *  1 
Form of information, credibility & trust   *  1 
Values & organisational culture *   1  
Power or status of energy management   * 1 
Notes e asterisk means that the barrier is iden  high i ce in
osts can be of high importance for sm er brewing firms, but not for lar irms. 
It is noticeable in Table 8.2 that the number and range of barriers 
of high importance varies between se tors, with  widest  
 in higher e cation and the narrowe in 
haps n h  interviewees in the brewing 
arrie to 
d more, 
since this is probably a reflection of the fact that brewing is more 
ene
:   * Th tified as being of mportan  this sector.  
(1) Hidden c all ge f
 
c the  range
occurring du st occurring 
brewing. It is per ot surprising t at
industry perceived only one or two really important b rs 
energy efficiency while those in the other sectors identifie
rgy-intensive. Since energy accounts for a larger part of total 
costs in brewing, the benefits that it can gain by investing in energy 
132 ASPECTS OF IRISH ENERGY POLICY 
efficiency would amount to savings of a greater proportion of total 
costs than in the case of less energy-intensive sectors. Compared to 
these relatively large benefits in brewing, most potential barriers to 
energy efficiency in the other sectors would appear quite small to an 
energy manager in that industry, and it would not be considered 
worthwhile to undertake the effort and expense required to 
overcome such barriers. Consequently, a range of barriers that 
would be overcome in a more energy-intensive sector may appear 
sufficiently great to actually prevent investments in energy efficiency 
in less energy-intensive sectors, and hence such barriers would be 
rated as very important. 
CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS 
A strong general message from the research is the importance of 
limited access to capital as a barrier to energy efficiency. This can apply 
at two levels: (1) an overall limitation on access to capital for the 
organisation as a whole; and (2) restricted access to capital for energy 
efficiency within internal capital budgeting procedures. The result of 
ors, from the perspective of those 
gement, is that they lack sufficient 
d difficulties in 
bo
me of the “hidden costs” such as the salary costs 
ass
either or both of these fact
responsible for energy mana
capital to invest in energy efficiency improvements. 
The limitation on access to capital tends to take different forms 
in the different sectors. In the higher education sector, there were 
overall constraints associated with public sector funding, especially 
in the Institutes of Technology, as well as internal budgeting 
constraints. But in mechanical engineering and brewing, the firms in 
principle have access to commercial capital markets. There was 
practically no evidence that the case study firms ha
rrowing capital at reasonable rates – as would be the case if there 
were capital market failures. Instead, the restrictions on access to 
capital were largely self-imposed internally through a reluctance to 
take on additional borrowing. These self-imposed restrictions mainly 
took the form of applying tight payback criteria (typically payback 
periods of just a few years) when assessing proposed investment 
projects, including investments in energy efficiency as well as other 
investments. 
There are a number of possible explanations for companies’ use 
of such stringent investment criteria. For example, this could be a 
method of making some allowance for risk – whether business, 
financial or technical risk. It could be an attempt to deal with 
“principal-agent” control problems by ensuring that only very clearly 
cost-effective projects are undertaken. Or it could be a method of 
recovering so
ociated with energy management. Thus, firms’ use of very 
stringent investment criteria could, in principle, be quite a rational 
reaction to factors such as risks, concerns about financial gearing, or 
hidden costs. On the other hand, such factors never seemed to be 
explicitly identified and put forward as a carefully considered basis 
for the application of very stringent investment criteria. 
Consequently, it seems that the use of tight investment criteria 
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represents a rather crude and imprecise rule of thumb that may be 
partly, but not entirely, rational. 
TIME CONSTRAINTS 
A second strong general message from the research is the 
importance of management time constraints as a barrier to energy 
efficiency. The general importance of “hidden costs” as a barrier 
(Table 8.2) is primarily a reflection of the hidden costs that involve 
agement time. When it is claimed that 
nvestments would be cost-effective, such 
e of both of these barriers 
e behaving rationally in 
xtent, in allowing such 
 a 
com
’Malley et al. (2003), a range of possible policy 
rec
ustries to use energy efficiently, as 
putting demands on man
certain energy efficiency i
claims may not take full account of the cost of management time 
that would be required to put such investments into effect. But it 
can take significant amounts of time for managers to keep up to date 
with technical information, to identify energy efficiency 
opportunities and to implement energy efficiency projects. Many 
interviewees across the different sectors emphasised that there were 
many competing demands on their time. Thus, their time is valuable 
and it cannot be regarded as costless. 
INDICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
The most widespread barriers to energy efficiency were identified as 
being: access to capital (in the private sector, specifically the use of 
very stringent payback criteria), and hidden costs (especially 
demands on management time). A featur
is that they may imply that organisations ar
their own interest, at least to a certain e
barriers to deter them from investing in greater energy efficiency. 
However, governments need to have a different perspective. The 
basic reason why governments should aim to improve energy 
efficiency is because of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
so as to combat undesirable climate change. If energy users cause 
environmental damage through greenhouse gas emissions, thereby 
imposing costs on society at large that are not reflected in
mensurate penalty or cost attached to the use of energy, this is a 
form of market failure. In this situation, there is a good case for 
policy intervention to improve energy efficiency and reduce energy 
consumption. 
The importance of some types of barriers varies considerably 
across sectors or companies. Therefore, effective policy solutions 
need to address the differing circumstances of energy using sectors 
and organisations. It is unlikely that there will be a single best policy 
solution for all. Consequently, for each of the individual sectors 
studied by O
ommendations was indicated. 
At the same time, that report also pointed out that there are 
certain broad-based national-level policy approaches that can 
influence many sectors or even all sectors. For example, a carbon tax 
would tend to raise energy prices across the range of sectors. The 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) licensing system 
requires a range of important ind
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we
es and organisational culture and the power or status of 
ene
gy labelling, meters and bills as well as 
dem
d no realistic 
po
n from 
its broader economic aspects and the fact that fuel poverty 
alleviation can be well or badly addressed. Fuel poverty, or its 
8.6 
ll as control their emissions of pollutants in general. These types 
of broad national policy measures are suited to addressing the two 
most pervasive barriers to energy efficiency, namely the access to 
capital barrier resulting from tight payback criteria, and the hidden 
costs barrier associated with management time. These types of 
measures would have the effect of increasing the incentive to invest 
in energy efficiency, while at the same time giving organisations 
cause to allocate more management time to energy efficiency 
matters. 
The broad national-level policy measures such as carbon taxes 
could also assist in overcoming some of the other barriers at the 
same time. For example, such measures should increase the 
importance of the energy management function within 
organisations, thereby helping to overcome the barriers associated 
with valu
rgy managers. 
In addition to these broad national-level measures, O’Malley et al. 
(2003) also indicated in the individual sector studies how other more 
specific measures at sector or firm level could address other barriers 
to energy efficiency that arise. Sectors with low energy intensity can 
ill-afford management time to become experts on energy matters. 
Informative ener
onstration case studies and encouragement to undertake audits 
could be targeted at these enterprises. Their industry associations 
may be the best conduits for this task, and these associations may 
need help to focus their organisations. More energy intensive 
enterprises could be encouraged to avail of energy service companies 
(ESCOs), as is occurring now in the higher education sector, 
provided that ESCOs can gain trust and expand their activities into 
genuine energy efficiency, with appropriate contracts. It would also 
be useful to promote more widespread application of energy audits 
and of industry-specific or technology-specific guidelines, and 
calculations of benchmarks of energy use. 
In addition in the public sector there is the issue of allowing 
energy managers to have discretion as to improvements in their 
energy technology. By contrast with the universities that had more 
control over their decisions, the Institutes of Technology would 
have difficulty making efficient investment decisions owing to the 
manner in which they were funded. Annual budgets an
ssibility of funding for energy saving items meant that energy use 
remained inefficient. The inadequate framework for funding has 
meant that efficient investment decisions could not be taken. 
 
 Fuel poverty provides an extreme example of the energy efficiency 
problem. Most of the barriers to achieving energy efficiency, and 
affordability in particular, are stronger with fuel poverty. The ‘merit 
good’ aspect of fuel poverty alleviation has detracted attentio
Fuel Poverty
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potential aggravation, is also often cited as an important reason for 
not introducing carbon taxes,94 out of concern for social effects.95  
DEFINITION 
Fuel poverty is the term used to describe the situation faced by low-
income households who are unable to afford adequate home 
heating. In addition to facing the general problem of reduced ability 
to afford fuels, low-income households are caught three ways w erh e 
ned. The cheapest fuels at point of purchase 
ls – apart, that is, from gas, which may not be 
equate temperature. The figure is somewhat less 
tha
ups with high incidence of fuel poverty 
, lone parents, households with 
endent children, local authority tenants, the 
 
fuel efficiency is concer
are the solid fue
available in their location. In terms of the “useful heat” that they 
produce however, such seemingly cheap fuels are relatively 
expensive. Second, these households are often stuck with equipment 
that can only use these solid fuels and they would face difficulty 
accessing funds to invest in equipment that would burn more 
efficient fuels. Third, their houses tend to be badly insulated and the 
problem of access to credit to invest in improving the building fabric 
applies again. Inadequate income underlies the problem but other 
factors play a role. 
Despite improvements, due largely to new house building and to 
a small extent to upgrades, a national estimate of the number of 
households suffering fuel poverty stood at 226,000, according to a 
national household survey of Ireland undertaken in 2001 (Healy, 
2004). These were the households that declared an inability to heat 
the home to an ad
n that obtained by using the definition which classifies 
households as fuel-poor if they spend in excess of 10 per cent of 
disposable income on domestic energy requirements. The latter 
definition proposed by Boardman (1991) is also frequently used. The 
226,000 households represent some 17 per cent of total households. 
Over a quarter of these fuel-poor households were estimated to be 
constantly unable to heat their home adequately, being caught in a 
persistent fuel poverty trap. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Apart from the unpleasantness of cold conditions, and the problems 
they pose to domestic life, including difficulty for school children 
carrying out homework for example, there are also clear health 
associations. Identifiable gro
include the long-term ill and disabled
four or more dep
unemployed, one-person households, the elderly and those who 
completed their education at primary level. It is the association 
94 Or, as in the UK, for exempting domestic fuels from VAT or again, later, 
exempting electricity in the application of the Climate Change Levy, to shield the 
fuel poor from electricity price rises.  
95 Another prominent reason given for not introducing carbon taxes is the effects 
on industrial competitiveness, which is the subject of a project called COMETR, 
currently underway for the European Commission (www2.dmu.dk/cometr/). 
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between fuel poverty and health that merits particular attention. The 
inability to heat the home adequately is associated with higher 
instances of poor health in the EU states analysed. While it would be 
incorrect to attribute this simply to fuel poverty, twice the level of 
poor health is reported among fuel-poor households. It was also 
found that the least energy efficient housing stocks tend to suffer 
from the highest levels of poor health (Healy, 2004).  
In Ireland too, fuel-poor households report lower levels of health 
status and higher levels of poor or impaired health than other 
households. The fuel-poor households are up to four times as likely 
to suffer from specific chronic conditions. With respect to 
respiratory conditions in particular (other than asthma), 27.5 per 
cent of households in fuel poverty record such conditions, 
com
ss winter mortality is 
def
ared to the rest of the year. Excess winter 
mo
pared with 7.1 per cent of other households. Increased 
incidence is also found with arthritis and with chronic depression. 
These were subjective measures of health status. Using objective 
measures it was seen that the fuel poor are more likely to visit their 
GP regularly and to be admitted to hospital. 
As stated, the associations of fuel poverty with health conditions 
do not point to fuel poverty being the cause of poor health. Rather, 
broad socio-economic circumstances are the cause, of which fuel 
poverty is an aspect.  
A stronger message and further insights are gained when 
considering excess winter mortality. Exce
ined as the surplus number of deaths occurring during December 
to March inclusive, compared to the average for non-winter seasons. 
Most countries experience higher mortality in winter, in a range of 5 
to 30 per cent comp
rtality is found to be highest in Southern Europe, Ireland and the 
UK, ranging from 18 to 28 per cent. These are the countries with 
the mildest winters and poorest thermal efficiency standards in 
housing. Scandinavian and other north-European countries are 
relatively unaffected by the problem. The implication is that both 
income and housing play a role in people’s ability to protect 
themselves in winter.  
These associations suggest that excess winter deaths could be 
reduced through improved protection from the cold by means of 
better thermal standards alongside other improvements such as 
increased public spending on healthcare and better socio-economic 
circumstances. Healy concludes that, though his research did not 
prove causality,  
 
… improving the thermal efficiency of housing in 
southern and western Europe could play a strong role in 
reducing the large seasonal variations in mortality found 
in these countries. 
 
Perhaps a measure of the lack of importance attached to the 
issue the 
conseq y 
efficie e of 
seriou lysis 
is the small amount of research afforded to examining 
uences for health, wellbeing and energy use of energ
ncy interventions by governments. The seeming absenc
s engagement here is exemplified by the lack of proper ana
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of 
n mainly viewed as an issue under the heading of 
social welfare, and domestic energy efficiency per se was seen to be a 
ate issue. Indeed the likelihood that a sizeable share of 
 
schemes. Such analysis requires that there be adequate assessment 
of the situation before as well as after the intervention. The Institute 
of Public Health in Ireland (2004) says that ideally the same persons 
should be engaged in the analysis of the situation before and after 
the intervention to ensure consistency. Their experience with 
evaluating a project dealing with rural fuel poverty in Northern 
Ireland, where they found that data relating prior to the project was 
inadequate for proper analysis, is a familiar case in point. 
Participating households in the Northern Ireland scheme receiving 
full upgrades numbered 65 and a further 225 households received 
lesser energy efficiency upgrades, and the scheme was based on 
community partnership which was an important factor in the 
scheme’s success. The outcomes of the scheme showed increased 
satisfaction with the temperature in the home and a decrease in 
reported illness.96  
POLICY  
The issue of fuel poverty and thermal efficiency of fuel poor 
housing has received some attention in formulation of energy policy. 
However, it has bee
largely priv
any efficiency gain from thermal upgrades would be taken up in the 
form of higher indoor temperatures detracted from the value of 
implementing improvement schemes as a climate change strategy. 
This ignored the fact that, were the fuel poor to become better off, 
their fuel use would grow, with its inefficiency intact. 
With regard to the efficiency of social policy, it was noted that 
state expenditure on fuel allowances should allow households 
flexibility as to fuel, which was duly introduced. The question also 
arose as to whether a better return on the state expenditure could be 
gained from thermal upgrades. Technically this was found to be the 
case (Scott, 1996) and the argument for home upgrades for the fuel 
poor, in terms of wellbeing and general economic efficiency, was 
found to be compelling.  
Attention was paid to fuel poverty in the discussions on carbon 
taxes and in the National Climate Change Strategy. The strategy 
included increased enforcement of standards in private rented 
dwellings and tighter application of reliefs. It also pointed to 
strengthened government assisted schemes, operated by local 
authorities and Health Boards, to improve the housing conditions of 
those considered most at risk of fuel poverty, of local authority 
tenants (80 per cent of whom were on social welfare) and the 
elderly. Schemes included the Essential Repairs Grant Schemes and 
the Remedial Works Scheme. Increased funding was made available 
96  Expenditure by the National Health Service in Northern Ireland on cold related 
illnesses is assessed at £21 million per year (NEA, 2004).  
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to Energy Action, the body that provides insulation to homes of the 
needy and provides training on insulation.  
Fuel poverty is now being addressed through SEI’s Low Income 
Housing programme with funds disbursed under the Warmer 
Homes Scheme. The designated budget for the 2002 to 2006 period 
is €7.62 million (SEI, 2002). The programme focuses on installation 
of 
es not indicate the integration of third-
par
energy efficiency services in low-income households and on 
building up installation capacity, awareness and partnership, and is 
undertaken by community-based installer agencies. Over the period 
of the programme it is intended that 18,000 low-income households 
will benefit from improvements carried out on their homes. There 
are now eight community groups delivering thermal efficiency 
services and expenditure on the programme in 2004 amounted to 
about one million euro. SEI would like to see the programme 
accelerated (SEI, 2005b).  
It is noted that SEI’s call for proposals from community-based 
organisations to undertake installation of energy efficiency measures 
lists the tasks, which include the identification and surveying of 
target households, but do
ty collection of baseline and subsequent economic and important 
other information (www.sei.ie). This means that “before and after” 
economic analysis cannot be applied to indicate the effectiveness of 
the expenditure. 
As described, the proposed carbon tax was abandoned out of 
concern for some adverse social effects “ … that would not be fully 
dealt with by compensatory measures” (Minister for Finance, op. cit.). 
The decision did not seem to allow for the fact that the total 
rev
 income tax where this applies. Compensating all 
ho
 from the tax should be used to 
upgrade the energy efficiency of low-income homes. They added 
enues from the carbon tax would come to over six times the 
carbon tax paid by households in the entire lower half of the income 
distribution. This means that there would be good opportunities for 
compensating the vulnerable households, for house upgrades and 
additionally for advancing some of the other general anti-poverty 
measures, as advocated by Combat Poverty, or for enhancing the 
efficiency of the economy, as advocated by some economists (Bergin 
et al., 2004). 
One analysis found that with existing systems over 90 per cent of 
households in income deciles 1 to 5 could be targeted for carbon tax 
compensation through increases in fuel allowances and by 
reductions in
useholds on social welfare payments and reducing tax on low 
incomes, by an amount equal to the national average household 
carbon tax paid, would use but 21 per cent of the revenue from a 
carbon tax (Scott, 2004). It was suggested that some additional 
amounts of the revenue be used to help households adapt their 
homes and equipment and provide help-lines and domestic energy 
advice to those still losing out. 
The Combat Poverty Agency made similar recommendations in 
its submission to the Department of Finance on the introduction of 
a carbon tax. The Agency also said that in addition to providing 
compensation, other revenues
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tha
 found a 
sim
ped up by improving energy 
eff
t remaining revenues should be used to raise general social 
welfare payments to work towards achieving the National Anti-
Poverty Strategy target. Combat Poverty also viewed the carbon tax 
as an opportunity for a high-profile publicity campaign to improve 
take up of benefits (Combat Poverty Agency, 2003, 2004).  
In a study for the UK, Dresner and Ekins (2004) find that the 
average result after compensation schemes conceals wide differences 
in net gains and losses, even though the compensated households 
are gainers on average. They find that some 20 per cent of the 
lowest decile would end up being net losers. Scott (2004)
ilar 16 per cent of targeted households in decile 1 in Ireland 
could be net losers, with 21 per cent of the carbon tax revenues used 
and no assistance to alter energy use. 
In writing on the subject of compensation schemes to mitigate 
the effects of a carbon tax on the fuel poor, authors have 
emphasised the care that is needed to ensure that the issue is 
addressed seriously. This should not be interpreted to mean that 
mitigation through compensation top
iciency in low-income homes is infeasible. As Healy (2004) states:  
 
In conclusion the carbon tax clearly presents challenges 
but also real opportunities to policymakers to improve 
the position of low-income homes.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policy ying 
proble and 
energy reness. Healy found that 
acking various energy-saving measures 
ts or did not know of the existence of 
ogramme – which is a 
rep
 on fuel poverty needs to concentrate on the underl
ms of low incomes, on the thermal inefficiency of homes 
-using equipment and on energy awa
over half of respondents l
were unaware of the benefi
these measures. Trying to keep energy prices low because of the fuel 
poor has too often taken the place of action on improving social 
welfare take-up and other improvements, on thermal upgrades of 
homes and equipment, and on information. 
Many countries have implemented grant schemes to low-income 
households (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands) or tax credits, which 
are more limited in their effectiveness (Denmark, Norway and the 
US). The main UK instrument employed by the UK Fuel Poverty 
Strategy (DTI, 2001) is the Warm Front pr
lacement for an earlier home energy efficiency scheme. Operating 
as a capital assistance initiative, this scheme aims to end fuel poverty 
among vulnerable households as far as reasonably practicable by 
2010. Funding of £251 million is envisaged in 2007-2008 to tackle 
fuel poverty. It is noted that the scheme has been criticised by the 
National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee for not 
being sufficiently targeted on the fuel poor (DEFRA, 2004), 
indicating the importance of careful co-ordination with social 
welfare services and indeed with the many organisations involved. 
But the schemes have been able to demonstrate appreciable 
improvements. 
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In sum, policy options for addressing fuel poverty include the 
same generic three, namely, information (on energy use and energy 
efficiency), regulations (on landlords and utilities), and economic 
instruments. The main economic instruments appropriate for fuel 
po
as the rest of the population grows richer. Further, due 
to 
nd at 
important pointers for policy that are highlighted by research.  
he evidence indicated that energy use has many determinants 
 into 
acc
 However, of the main generic policies available, 
nam
ot of some of the difficulties that regulations aim to 
add
8.7  
verty are cash-based fuel allowances that might incorporate 
carbon-reducing incentives, and subsidised schemes for capital 
investment. The type of policy and manner in which schemes are 
applied can vary widely and studies, properly prepared before the 
schemes start up, could tell us how effective they are and what 
works best.  
The elimination of fuel poverty plays a role in curbing emissions 
from the domestic sector, as the fuel poor tend to use the highest 
carbon-intensive fuels. The fuel poor could become increasingly 
marginalised 
the expected price rises for fossil fuels due to market 
circumstances and the EU Emission Trading Scheme, measures to 
promote carbon and energy efficiency are all the more urgent. 
 
 This chapter has looked at energy efficiency in its historic context, 
at the potential for improved efficiency, at policy to date a
T
and that the potential for raised energy efficiency is large in 
engineering terms. In economic terms the prospects are also good 
when all costs, including external damage costs, are taken
ount. Evidence from various schemes and studies indicates that 
even without including the public benefits (externalities) there exists 
broad potential for private gain from investment in energy 
efficiency. 
The barriers to energy efficiency are wide-ranging. The policies 
that Ireland has implemented so far are applied on a broad front 
with a large number of different schemes and approaches that are 
well-targeted.
ely, information policies, regulations and economic instruments, 
it is economic instruments that hold out most promise. They address 
the underlying problem that we over-pollute because we are not 
directly affected. Of the economic instruments, subsidies and, 
recently, limited emissions trading have been applied, but carbon 
taxes, arguably the best economic instrument, have been avoided 
(Helm, 2004, Parry, 2003). An unbalanced mix of policies has been 
employed. 
Recommendations are made here to improve some of the 
information schemes. Regulations are becoming more extensive 
though it is the inadequate application of economic instruments that 
is at the ro
ress. As a consequence, existing schemes have had to operate 
without the benefit of a framework where correct costs helped to 
motivate energy managers. 
More emphasis needs to be put on incentives. Without it policy 
on energy efficiency is still ‘not for real’ and the level of engagement 
Conclusions
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by many people is low. The other two main policy tools, information 
and regulations, are quite comprehensively applied although 
imp
ore effectively 
pro
ation targeted at many sectors. Improvements in the 
re seen to have been modest and an important 
tion could be stepped up is the provision of 
sually cannot tell what they are using, in conflict 
wit
efficiency would help people to take the opportunities for 
imp
 
rovements are still possible as suggested below.  
In meeting the Kyoto requirements on greenhouse gases, policy 
on energy efficiency can learn from the rationale for government 
intervention in energy efficiency. The rationale includes the fact that 
the requisite information for efficient energy use is m
vided by experts and could be under-provided if left to 
individuals, and that a combination of regulations and price 
corrections (economic instruments) is needed to take external 
damage and its costs into consideration. The balance between 
regulations and price corrections should be informed by the extent 
of variation in abatement costs, the costs of bureaucracy, 
administration, supervision, verification and enforcement (which 
apply to regulations in particular). It has to consider how to deal 
with losers, the flexibility of the policy in the face of developments 
in technology and indeed the long-term encouragement to that 
development.  
INFORMATION 
Sustainable Energy Ireland has a useful broad programme that 
provides inform
residential sector we
area where informa
advice to households. Research on house-building techniques is 
providing valuable information and there is some information for 
householders,97 but enhanced advice that helps householders in the 
final hurdle of implementation of energy efficiency improvements 
would be valuable. 
Meters that are more easily read and that provide helpful 
information, as with utility bills, are among the proposals in a 
directive currently under discussion. Energy is one of the few items 
where consumers u
h sound economic principles. The directive on the energy 
efficiency of buildings will require home energy rating. This could be 
helped by encouraging people to familiarise themselves with the 
important facts of their energy consumption, for example during 
energy awareness week, with such subjects as what is one’s “usage in 
terms of kWh/sq metre or kWh/day” – of heating fuels and all 
fuels. At present SEI is not concentrating strongly on the domestic 
sector. 
One of the most useful aids to energy efficiency, judging from 
the responses from businesses and public sector organisations, was 
to have relevant case studies. More case studies of investments in 
energy 
roving efficiency themselves but this requires more emphasis on 
documenting the results of SEI schemes. People need convincing 
97 The “MyHome” information from the Carbon Trust www.thecarbontrust.co.uk  
in the UK is another practical example. 
142 ASPECTS OF IRISH ENERGY POLICY 
verified examples. Clearer statements of the lifetime or net present 
value of investments would help, with explicit statements to the 
effect that the investment cost has been taken into account. 
SEI has a programme of research that informs both the public 
and its own approaches. The estimation of marginal abatement costs 
of different energy saving options, readily capable of translation into 
carbon reduction options, needs to be put on to a regular basis. 
Th
nless there is adequate enforcement. There is 
out the extent to which new buildings comply 
egulations. It is still difficult for purchasers of 
d in such a way as to engage with the 
ho
EC
 taxes on carbon, fuels and 
able emissions permits. The 
ecently come into play for large 
ant schemes operating in the past found 
that this had implications for policy, in that schemes offering small 
ese calculations would help to show how to apply policies to get 
the best results for the least national cost. They would be especially 
helpful in ranking policies that award subsidies to various types of 
carbon reduction.  
REGULATIONS 
While regulations and standards are vitally important they will prove 
totally ineffective u
little information ab
with the building r
newly constructed buildings to ensure that they are being supplied 
an energy efficient building. The energy conservation aspect of the 
building regulations does not appear to have the resources for 
inspection required to ensure that it is adhered to. Even then it 
would help if house purchasers were engaged in the energy 
efficiency aspect of the house they are buying.  
More flexibility appears to be needed as to the house building 
options. More emphasis should be placed on the training of 
personnel in the building sector, including heating system installers 
and design personnel.  
Forthcoming legislation that will require house transactions to be 
accompanied by a Certificate of Energy Rating will increase the 
amount of attention paid to energy efficiency, provided that the 
scheme is implemente
useholder. For example, the suggestion for improvements to the 
dwelling that will be contained in the certificate should be 
accompanied by information on fuel reductions/money saved, 
derived from case studies. 
The proposed EU directive on energy efficiency includes helpful 
actions on information and for promoting a market in energy 
services (heating, lighting and so forth).  
ONOMIC INSTRUMENTS 
Economic instruments put a price on externalities. These 
instruments include grants and subsidies,
on energy-using equipment, and trad
Emissions Trading Scheme has r
energy users.  
With some exceptions, energy is not usually a major item of 
expenditure and is not likely to be given much consideration. 
Among the priorities that people face, reducing energy costs rarely 
feature highly. Studies of gr
   ENERGY  EFFICIENCY AND FUEL POVERTY 143 
gra
sets these 
are
ates. 
d by using part of the 
rev
al time before the start of the investment 
bo
nts received low uptake, possibly because the time spent on 
reading details and on form-filling are real costs that lower the 
scheme’s attractiveness. By contrast a generous grant scheme was 
over-subscribed, leading to criticism of wasteful use of public funds 
and deadweight: people were being grant-aided to do what they 
would want to do anyway, had they thought of it. The point to be 
drawn is that it is hard to raise the profile of energy and grants 
would have to be high to have much effect. A grant scheme requires 
taxes to be raised to fund it, which, unless raised on ‘polluters’, is 
unfair to those practicing good environmental behaviour.  
Promotion of renewables as a higher priority than energy 
conservation such as energy-efficient building is sub-optimal, 
judging from other studies. Priorities for promotion should be the 
cheapest options on the marginal abatement cost schedule. In so far 
as renewables cause disruption to scenery and to other as
 costs that need to be factored in.  
Apart from direct subsidies, there are other economic 
instruments currently in operation that need to be investigated. A 
priority is to check for, and reform, taxes and fiscal provisions that 
operate on energy efficiency in a perverse way, in particular the 
relative taxes on fuels, inclusive of reb
The remaining economic instrument, a carbon tax, is a highly 
precise instrument. It would remove the need for policymakers to 
pick winning technologies. It would also reduce the need for 
calculations of marginal abatement costs to prioritise activities. The 
impact on low-incomes can be addresse
enue for that purpose and there are various means of addressing 
competitiveness concerns. 
Ireland’s performance on energy efficiency suffers from being 
unbalanced, particularly in relation to economic instruments and in 
relation to the residential sector. Lessons from analyses at home and 
abroad are being learnt too slowly. Opportunities for introducing 
optimal policies at the cruci
om of the mid-1990s were lost and a more balanced policy is as 
urgent as ever. 
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9.  SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
The challenges facing those responsible for energy policy in 
Ireland are considerable, spanning a wide range of different areas 
and a number of difficult economic and organisational problems. 
This paper considers some of the key energy policy issues facing 
Ireland over the next decade suggesting how best they might be 
resolved by policy initiatives. We draw on a range of recent research 
in The Economic and Social Research Institute and elsewhere that 
has informed our understanding of how some of these knotty 
problems in the area of energy policy might best be addressed. 
Looking to the future, the rapidly rising demand for energy due 
to the growth in the world economy is eroding the potential spare 
world oil and gas capacity. With limited prospects of new finds of 
fossil fuels over the coming decades it seems quite likely that real oil 
and gas prices will rise substantially in the longer term. In addition, 
the need to tackle the problem of global warming will also lead to 
increasing real prices for fossil fuels. Preparing for a world of much 
higher energy prices will require significant policy changes. This is 
the context in which energy policy is being formulated in Ireland. 
Ireland does not have a natural advantage in the supply of 
energy, except in the area of renewable resources where, with the 
exception of onshore wind, the technologies are not today 
competitive. As a result, it would not be expected that very energy- 
intensive businesses would locate here. In order to ensure that 
increasingly expensive energy resources are allocated among users in 
an optimal manner it is essential that in all cases business and 
households should pay the full economic cost of energy: there 
should be no explicit or hidden subsidies, even if Irish costs are 
higher than among some competitor countries. However, every 
effort needs to be made to ensure that the energy required is 
delivered at minimum possible cost to both business and household 
customers. 
OBJECTIVES OF ENERGY POLICY 
The overall objective of the state in regulating the energy sector is to 
ensure the lowest possible cost of energy in the long term subject to 
supply being secure and subject to meeting the environmental 
constraints. In this paper we have adopted a simplified approach by 
assuming that energy policymakers will take as given certain 
environmental and security of supply standards and that, conditional 
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on these standards, they will then aim to meet the nation’s energy 
requirements at minimum cost. This avoids the problem of having 
to consider possible trade-offs or conflicts between these multiple 
objectives. 
The need for state intervention in the energy sector arises for 
three reasons: 
1. The presence of economies of scale in parts of the industry, 
which make competition difficult.  
2. Energy is a vital ingredient of modern life and the state has 
an important role in ensuring a secure energy supply, 
including a secure supply of electricity. 
3. The negative environmental externalities that arise from 
energy production and consumption (of which the most 
pressing is global warming) require state intervention to 
move the economy to a more sustainable path.  
ENERGY NEEDS OF A GROWING ECONOMY 
Ireland has seen exceptional economic growth over the last 15 years. 
However, the growth in energy demand has been much slower. For 
the future the rate of growth of the Irish economy is likely to slow 
(Bergin et al., 2003), though still remaining more rapid that that of 
the EU generally. The growth in the demand for energy is likely to 
slow further. The two exceptions to this trend are the demand for 
energy from the transport sector and the demand for electricity.  
Demand for energy use from transport is likely to continue to 
grow for the foreseeable future. While this will require a further 
increase in the supply of energy, even more important, it will pose 
significant congestion problems. The solution lies in moving Ireland 
towards a more sustainable model of development involving less 
congestion. This would, in turn, deliver significant benefits in terms 
of reduced energy use and emissions. 
While the growth in demand for electricity is slower than that of 
GNP, it is still significant. This means that for Ireland to have a 
secure electricity supply, investment in electricity generation and 
electricity transmission infrastructure will be required for at least 
another decade. Significant additional investment will also be needed 
in transmission infrastructure in order to reap the benefits of an 
integrated all-island electricity market. 
This need for new investment makes Ireland rather different 
from the rest of the EU where capacity is generally adequate. The 
cost of the new investment will have to be paid by consumers in 
Ireland over the next decade whereas in many other EU countries 
the cost of the necessary infrastructure has already been substantially 
paid off. Thus, policy measures to minimise the cost of financing 
infrastructural investment will be more important for consumers in 
Ireland than in much of the rest of the EU. 
SECURITY OF SUPPLY 
Ensuring a secure energy supply for the foreseeable future is of 
crucial importance for the health and economic welfare of the 
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country. In the case of oil supplies there is limited action the 
government can take to ensure physical security. While very unlikely, 
physical interruption to supply would have grave consequences. In 
the very unlikely event of it happening it would affect all of the EU 
and an integrated response at EU level would offer the best chance 
of minimising disruption. 
Over the coming decade Ireland is likely to become increasingly 
dependent on gas to supply its energy needs. In particular, by 2010 
the bulk of electricity generation will depend on gas. This means that 
any physical interruption of gas supply could have very serious 
consequences. If such an interruption were to be sustained for more 
than a few days it could see the island of Ireland lose the bulk of its 
electricity supply with very serious consequences for the health and 
welfare of its citizens.  
While the chances of a break in an undersea pipeline are very 
small, if such an event were to occur it would take some 
considerable time to repair. It is for this reason that the second gas 
pipeline to Scotland was of major importance to the energy security 
of this island. The provision of the second pipeline greatly reduces 
the probability of what was already a very unlikely event. However, 
the vast bulk of the island’s gas supply still goes through a single 
onshore pipeline in Scotland. As a result, it is important that the 
supply of gas from the Corrib gas field is brought onshore as soon 
as possible to enhance the physical security of Irish energy supply. In 
addition, consideration should be given to strengthening the 
onshore gas transmission system in Scotland on which nearly all of 
Irish gas supplies currently depend. 
Ireland, along with other developed economies, faces a much 
greater risk to its economy from sudden shocks to energy prices 
than it does from a possible interruption in physical supply. For 
example, even if there were major disruption in the Middle East, oil 
supplies would still be available – at a price. However, major price 
shocks could have serious economic consequences and the 
regulatory authorities need to consider how best to insure against 
such future shocks. A number of instruments can be used to provide 
such insurance: fuel diversity and financial instruments both have 
roles. The National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) should 
consider whether the desirability of hedging against such risks 
should affect policy on the portfolio of the national pension fund. 
The regulatory authorities should ensure that consumers are aware 
of potential risks and that, where feasible, suitable instruments for 
hedging risk are available. 
As the price of gas and oil are linked and are both likely to rise in 
real terms it is desirable to have some diversity in the source of 
electricity supplies. For example, undue reliance on gas could be 
limited through a levy on gas used in electricity generation with the 
proceeds of the levy returned to consumers. The need for some 
diversification would suggest awarding some premium to renewable 
energy over and above the market price. This paper provides a 
model for considering the trade off between risk and price in 
deciding on the appropriate fuel mix for electricity generation. Fuel 
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diversity should be managed by using market instruments rather 
than by regulation. Research and Development in alternative energy 
sources will be important in securing the long-term security of 
energy supply for the island. 
With the full integration of the island gas market consideration 
should be given to developing gas storage facilities either in the old 
Kinsale gas field or else in salt caverns near Belfast. At present it 
does not seem wise for the Irish authorities to specifically encourage 
facilities for the supply of Liquified Natural Gas. It should be left to 
market forces to determine if and when such a development should 
take place. 
INTERCONNECTION AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
MARKETS 
An all-island electricity market is likely to confer significant benefits 
on consumers, reducing the long-term cost of a reliable electricity 
supply below what it might otherwise be. To allow an integrated and 
efficient all-island electricity market to develop it is essential that 
there is adequate investment in electricity transmission to physically 
link the existing separate systems. It seems likely that a second 
interconnector between Ireland and Britain could produce 
significant benefits for electricity consumers on the island. 
AN ALL-ISLAND ELECTRICITY MARKET 
The structure proposed for the all-island electricity market by the 
two regulators seems likely to provide the best opportunity for 
securing a competitive supply of electricity for consumers on the 
island of Ireland over the next decade. The electricity pool into 
which all generators will sell their electricity, when combined with a 
suitable regime of capacity payments to electricity generators, should 
encourage supply at a minimum price. It should also increase the 
transparency of the regime making for cheaper and more effective 
regulation.  
The cost of capital is a key ingredient in determining the final 
price of electricity for consumers. The capacity payments regime 
proposed by the regulators will play an important role in minimising 
risk for investors and reducing the cost of capital. Investors will 
know that they will get the bulk of their capital and non-fuel 
operating costs in the form of capacity payments if stations are 
available to generate and if they operate efficiently. This regime 
would provide the right signals for new investment, ensuring the 
provision of adequate electricity generation capacity at least cost. 
Nothing in this regime would prevent the electricity market of the 
island of Ireland being eventually integrated into a British Isles or a 
northwest European market by the end of the next decade. Under 
the new regime the regulators should insist on closure of 
uneconomic plant that is surplus to capacity requirements. For this 
market to operate it is important that the all-island market go ahead 
as planned in mid-2007.  
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MARKET STRUCTURE 
The move to the new all-island market will make the electricity 
sector much more transparent. In the market (pool) each firm will 
offer to supply electricity at a pre-specified price. All firms will know 
that they will receive most of their capital and non-fuel operating 
costs from capacity payments As a result, in the auction to supply 
electricity to the pool each firm will bid in only their fuel costs. This 
will greatly facilitate the information flow to the regulator. The 
regulator will know the price bid by each station and will be able to 
check that price against the price of the fuel delivered to that station. 
This will facilitate the regulatory authority in its task of ensuring a 
level playing field for all market participants.  
The research described in this paper indicates that the move to 
the all-island market will somewhat reduce the ESB’s dominant 
position. In considering the economics of enhanced interconnection 
to Britain the value of such interconnection in enhancing 
competition on the island should also be taken into account. The 
growth in demand for electricity, with further new independent 
generation coming on-stream over the coming decade, will also 
reduce the ESB’s market share. However, even after these changes 
the ESB will still be in a dominant position. 
The operation of the new market structure is likely to encourage 
new investment in generation in segments of the market where the 
existing ESB plant is not very economical. This should see 
significant closure of ESB plant over the rest of the decade to be 
replaced by new plant, generally built by different operators. 
Together with enhanced interconnection to Britain, this should see 
the ESB’s dominant position in the generation sector on this island 
substantially eroded by early in the next decade. 
Finally, the ESB should sell between 500 MW and 1000 MW of 
plant over the period to 2010. If this happens, with the closure of 
uneconomic plant, the ESB could be allowed to replace some of the 
plant that will close. By early in the next decade this would achieve 
the necessary reduction in the ESB’s dominant position. 
It is important that the operator of the transmission system for 
the all-island market should be established on a basis independent of 
all other players. When this happens consideration should be given 
to transferring ownership of the transmission system in the Republic 
to ESB National Grid. Whoever owns the transmission system it will 
be important that that company would contract with other 
companies, including ESB, to maintain and develop the system, 
ensuring competitive pressure on costs. Where possible, ESB 
distribution and supply should also move to buying in services on a 
competitive basis. This is the model that was adopted by Bord Gáis 
Éireann in the late 1980s and it would make the cost structure of 
operators transparent, facilitating regulation. 
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THE ENVIRONMENT 
In an ideal world one economic instrument would be used to 
achieve one objective. Using multiple economic instruments to 
target a single environmental objective is likely to be inefficient and 
to raise the cost of meeting the objective. However, because of 
information deficiencies or other constraints it may be necessary to 
use additional instruments. It is important that the potential costs of 
using multiple instruments to target a single basic environmental 
objective are considered before deciding on the use of additional 
policy instruments.  
The single most pressing environmental issue facing energy 
policymakers is the problem of global warming. Ireland is 
committed to taking action to reduce emissions as part of the EU. 
The EU emissions trading scheme, if suitably reformed should 
provide an appropriate instrument for implementing Kyoto. 
However, as currently implemented by the EU it has very serious 
defects. A reform of the emissions trading scheme should require 
the bulk of permits to be auctioned from 2008 onwards. Failure to 
do so will distort the electricity market, it will reduce the 
environmental effectiveness of the measure and it will substantially 
raise the cost of meeting the environmental objective. Finally, as 
currently implemented the emissions trading regime discriminates 
against renewable energy. 
The current arrangements with Bord na Móna should be revised 
to allow for the gradual replacement of peat by wood biomass as the 
fuel in the three new “peat-fired” power stations. If this is not 
possible the best alternative from the environmental point of view 
would be to close these new stations immediately. 
A properly designed emissions trading regime should generally 
provide the appropriate incentive to develop renewable electricity. 
Under such a regime special treatment of renewables would only be 
appropriate in so far as it was required to incentivise research and 
development. However, the current emissions trading regime 
discriminates against renewables and it may be necessary to offset 
this defect through a continuing special support regime. Any such 
regime must properly reflect the true costs and benefits to society of 
the different types of renewable energy. 
For sectors not covered by emissions trading it will be important 
to introduce a carbon tax. Without such a tax there is a danger that 
Ireland will either fail to reduce its emissions by the required amount 
or else it will do so at undue cost, placing most of the burden on the 
electricity generation sector. 
Tackling the rapid growth in emissions in transport will require 
special measures including the application by the EU of mandatory 
fuel efficiency standards for new motor vehicles. A rationalisation of 
the tax rates on vehicles and fuel and introduction of charging for 
use of road space could simultaneously reduce congestion, which 
has a high cost, and also reduce emissions. In the long run policy 
will need to focus more on developing sustainable cities and more 
energy efficient dwellings. 
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ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND FUEL POVERTY 
The last decade has seen significant improvement in the aggregate 
energy efficiency of the Irish economy. There has been a modest but 
steady decline in the energy intensity of GNP. Policies to promote 
energy efficiency have been directed mostly at the industrial, 
commercial and institutional sectors and at promoting renewable 
energy. Energy conservation in transport and by households has 
been relatively neglected. 
Of the main policies for overcoming barriers to energy efficiency   
provision of information, regulations and economic instruments –  
economic instruments have been least used. Inefficient subsidies 
have been granted and emissions trading has begun for energy 
intensive industrial sectors. However, without targeted policies for 
improvements in energy efficiency, the result will be patchy and fall 
short of its potential. Regulation has been the policy most widely 
employed, but late adoption of energy efficiency standards in 
buildings, difficulties in ensuring compliance, lack of engagement in 
energy efficiency by customers and users, and disparities in 
abatement costs, mean that potential benefits are foregone. 
Application of economic instruments, such as a carbon tax, is 
needed. However, in view of recent energy price rises a sensitive 
approach is needed. Economic instruments would reinforce the 
benefits and reduce the shortcomings of regulations and would 
encourage the take-up of energy efficiency advice. Increased 
information is needed on examples of energy conservation that can 
be directly replicated, and on how to access expertise and overcome 
the final hurdle to implementation. The economic benefits of 
Sustainable Energy Ireland’s energy saving schemes needs more 
quantification. 
Fuel poverty is the inability to heat one’s home adequately. It is a 
significant contributor to overall poverty requiring special measures 
to enable households to break out of the spiral of inefficient houses, 
equipment and fuels. Ireland’s winter mortality compared to that in 
the rest of the year is high and it is associated with fuel poverty and 
poor insulation. Fuel poverty is an important energy and economic 
issue because of the inefficiency involved. Tackling the thermal 
performance of dwellings occupied by low-income households 
would greatly reduce or remove the problem of fuel poverty as a 
barrier to the introduction of carbon taxes. 
A major upgrade of policy on fuel poverty is needed  and should 
be focused primarily on improving buildings and equipment, 
combined with education and other supports to efficient behaviour 
and with properly prepared policy evaluation. Fuel poverty should 
not be seen as a reason for avoiding carbon taxes, but rather carbon 
taxes should be viewed as a reason and an opportunity for extra 
funding for policies to tackle fuel poverty. The current very 
substantial energy price rise necessitates action in any event. 
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APPENDIX 1. GLOSSARY 
OF TERMS 
AER Alternative Energy Requirement/Regime 
AIP/M All-Island Project/Market 
BGE Bord Gais Éireann 
BNE Best New Entrant 
CCGT Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
CCL Climate Change Levy 
CER Commission for Energy Regulation  
CHP Combined Heat and Power 
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
DCMNR Department of Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
DSO Distribution System Operator 
EPA Environment Protection Agency 
ESB Electricity Supply Board 
ESBNG ESB National Grid – renamed Eirgrid 
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme 
FGD Flue-gas desulphurisation (for coal burning plant) 
GB Great Britain  
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LNG Liquified Natural Gas 
LOLE Loss of Load Expectation 
MW Mega Watt (measure of generation capacity) 
MWh Mega Watt hour (measure of electricity) 
NAP National Allocation Plan 
NESC National Economic and Social Council 
NI Northern Ireland 
NIAER Northern Ireland Authority for Energy Regulation 
NIE Northern Ireland Electricity 
NPRF National Pension Reserve Fund 
OCGT Open Cycle Gas Turbine 
O&M costs Operation and Maintenance costs 
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries  
PPA Power Purchase Agreement 
PJM Pennsylvania Jersey Maryland – electricity market 
(US) 
PSO Public Service Obligation 
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PV Photovoltaic 
TWA Time-Weighted Average  
R&D Research and Development 
REDG Renewable Energy Development Group 
RES-E Renewable Energy Sources for electricity 
ROC Renewables Obligation Certificate 
ROI Republic of Ireland  
RSI Residual Supply Index 
SEI Sustainable Energy Ireland 
SEM Single Electricity Market  
SO System Operator 
SONI System Operator for Northern Ireland 
t Tonne 
TFC Total Fuel Consumption 
TPER Total Primary Energy Requirement 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
UK United Kingdom 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
VOLL Value of Lost Load 
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APPENDIX 2. THE 
CURRENT RENEWABLES 
SITUATION 
Wind farms with a combined capacity of almost 400MW 
together with 24MW landfill gas and 237MW hydro brings the total 
to over 650MW of renewable electricity actually operating at present 
in the Republic of Ireland. There is also significant renewable 
energy capacity currently under construction: connection 
agreements exist for a further 550MW and connection offers are 
currently issuing to a further 330MW of applications. Further 
applications are currently queuing with the System Operators 
(North and South) to bring an excess of 2,000MW of wind 
potentially on the All Island system. With the 2005 deadline upon 
us and having achieved the 500MW Irish RES-E target, it is timely 
to examine the issue of renewable energy in Ireland.   
RES-E Installed Capacity Currently Generating (August 2005) 
Technology Republic of Ireland 1 Northern 
Ireland2 
All-Island  
Wind  382 MW 107 MW3 489 MW 
Biomass 24 MW 3 MW 28 MW 
Hydro 237 MW 3 MW 240 MW 
Ocean 0 MW 0 MW 0 MW 
Solar PV 0 MW <1 MW <1 MW 
Totals 624 MW 113 MW 737 MW 
1. All RoI data from DCMNR website 
2. All NE data from NIAER (2005) 
3. Includes Snugborough (located in RoI but connected to NI system) 
4. As of beginning of July 2005, there was approximately 46 MW of wind with 
connection offers in NI (NIE). 
 
Generation based on fluctuating renewable energy sources 
(wind, solar and wave) are characterised by relatively high 
investment costs and relative low running cost. The various 
technologies are at very different levels of economic maturity. 
Typically, more than 85 per cent of the total production costs of 
wind power are investment costs, while fossil fuel systems are well 
under 50 per cent. Fuel for wind turbines is free and the 
maintenance costs are recorded as low. The implication is that once 
a wind turbine is installed, market competition cannot make it work 
more efficiently. This implies high investor risks in an uncertain 
competitive market context. After market liberalisation, competition 
has reduced production costs of traditional systems, mainly through 
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reducing the numbers of employees. This possibility does not exist 
for wind generation. Competition in the field of wind power is only 
related to production costs where turbine costs have decreased very 
significantly during the past 20 years.  
The contribution from wind power to national electricity 
demand in 2003 was 465 GWh, up 20 per cent on 2002. The 2003 
annual percentage contribution of wind to gross national electricity 
demand was 1.84 per cent. In July 2005, there was  almost  400MW 
of wind turbines connected in the ROI and a further 1,300MW with 
signed connection agreements but not guaranteeing their 
construction. This gives a potential total of approximately 
1,700MW.98 In Northern Ireland there are 107MW of wind 
generation connected as of 1 July 2005 with a further 46MW of 
committed capacity and over 500MW of connection enquiries. This 
suggests a potential wind capacity on an all-island system of up to 
3GW – a threefold increase on what is currently in place – though 
there are doubts whether all the planned capacity is likely to go 
ahead.  
Ranking of Countries by New Wind Installation in 2004 
Rank Country Population (Million)  
Installed in 2004  
(MW) (new) 
Installed in 
2004 
(watts/capita) 
1 Spain 39.4 2,065 52.4 
2 Ireland 3.7 148 40.0 
3 Luxembourg 0.4 14 35.0 
4 New Zealand  4.0 132 33.5 
5 Germany 82.0 2,037 24.8 
6 Austria 8.0 192 24.0 
7 Portugal 10.0 226 22.6 
8 Norway 4.5 59 13.1 
9 Netherlands 15.8 197 12.5 
10 Australia 19.3 182 9.4 
Source: Windpower monthly, New Zealand, February 9, 2005 
http://www.windenergy.org.nz/FAQ/global04percap.htm
 
This growth in wind generation is largely in response to 
government support and incentives designed to promote renewable 
technologies to meet EU commitments under the Renewable 
Energy (RES-E) Directive99 and the Kyoto Protocol. There is still 
considerable work to be undertaken to meet the 2010 targets with 
approximately 769MW required by the end of 2009 to meet the 
ROI commitment and approximately half this to meet the Northern 
Ireland commitment. There are a number of instruments in place to 
 
98 ESB NG Response to Consultation Document “Options for Future Renewable 
Energy policy, Targets and Programmes”, February 2004. It is very unlikely that 
this amount will actually be delivered. 
99 Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced from 
renewable energy resources in the internal electricity market 
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support these targets. However, 83MW (36 per cent) of the wind 
generation installed trades as merchant plant without government 
price support or green credits and another 82MW was under 
construction in early 2005. Other positive effects of increased wind 
powered generation include short construction times, its distributed 
nature and as a hedge against traditionally volatile fossil fuel prices 
improving both the security of supply and fuel diversity in energy 
sources.  
In addition to providing benefits some challenges will be 
associated with an increased penetration of wind into total 
electricity generation. There are a number of physical, technical and 
controllability characteristics that are very different to the 
conventional generation it can displace. These engineering 
characteristics are noted as: 
• A lack of inertial response 
• A limited ability to provide reserve 
• Intermittent and potentially unpredictable electrical output 
that is highly correlated with that from other windfarms; and 
• A varied ability to ride-through system faults. 
These characteristics of wind increase the requirement for 
reserve. The extra costs associated with intermittency have two 
components: the capital cost of the plant and the additional running 
cost (operational and environmental) that is incurred when this 
plant provides reserve. The reserve plant may be operating at part 
load and reduced efficiency and hence incurring higher costs. 
OCGT plant is considered one of the most suitable and 
complementary operational reserve sources for use with wind as 
this type of plant can start and stop quickly without significant NOx 
effects from running at less than full output.   
Milborrow (2004) estimated that the extra costs associated with 
wind backup increase (albeit at a declining rate) with additional 
wind resources on the system.100 ESBNG carried out a study which 
used a concept of “capital cost for extra capacity”. This unusual 
benchmark was based on the assumption that at times of peak 
demand, 100 per cent of the rated output of the wind plant is 
expected to be available (ie. 100 per cent rather than 35 per cent 
standard capacity credit for wind implying 65 per cent of the rated 
output must be provided as backup).101 On the basis of the ESBNG 
study, the CER implemented a request from ESBNG for a 
moratorium on the signing of new wind connection agreements on 
 
100 The extra costs imposed by wind comprise costs due to extra start-ups, 
ramping, regulating reserve and replacement reserve. The SEI ILEX and Brattle 
studies for SEI both produced estimates for the first three and found them to be 
relatively minor. The ESBNG study was the only one to look at the cost of 
replacement reserve and it used pessimistic assumptions. Part of the problem was 
the assumption made about the rest of the electricity generating system. In the ESB 
National Grid study the bulk of non-wind generation was assumed to be gas-fired 
CCGTs, which are very inflexible and mix badly with wind. 
101 This study assumed a system based substantially on the use of CCGTs which 
would neither be realistic nor appropriate reserve capacity supporting wind.  
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3 December 2003. The moratorium was subsequently renewed until 
the publication of a Grid Code for Wind in Summer 2004.102  The 
grid code for wind involves stringent requirements regarding 
dynamic modelling both at the level of the individual turbine and 
the effect on the entire system. These models are proving 
problematic. The cost of complying with the Grid Code for Wind 
has been estimated at between 5 and 12 per cent of total new wind 
farm costs.103  
The economics of wind is invariably intertwined with the market 
value for carbon. The carbon dioxide savings that result from the 
introduction of renewable energy depend on which fuel is displaced. 
At high carbon price levels, substantially higher wind penetration 
becomes more economic. The Eirgrid analysis on the “Impact of 
Wind Power Generation in Ireland” suggests the reduction in CO2 
emissions for a 6,500MW system with 1,500MW of wind powered 
generation (over the case with no wind) was found to be 1.42 
million tonnes. However, total generation cost was modelled to 
increase by €196m (due to the retention or installation of surplus 
conventional capacity for system security reasons). This implies a 
cost per tonne of carbon mitigated by wind to be €138 per tonne. 
The study for SEI by ILEX Energy Consulting suggests that the 
displacement cost of wind would be substantially less.  
POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR RENEWABLE  
ELECTRICITY 
The following sections discuss the design elements in three widely 
used policy instruments: i. feed-in tariffs, ii. quota obligations in 
combination with a green certificate system, and iii. 
tendering/bidding schemes. Besides the primary support 
instrument, there are complementary or secondary mechanisms 
possible which include investment subsidies and fiscal measures.  
Some schemes conform better to the market than others and some 
are claimed to be more efficient at promoting the penetration of 
renewable energy. As a consequence of no general agreement at EU 
Commission level on the preference for different schemes, the EU 
Commission has postponed its plans of harmonisation in relation to 
this market. It would probably be best if they avoided any attempt 
to design a harmonised instrument and, instead, concentrated on 
reforming the emissions trading scheme.  
Feed-in Tariffs 
In April 2005, the Minister for Communications Marine and 
Natural Resources announced that the next market support 
mechanism for renewables will be based on a fixed feed-in tariff 
system. This support system will be designed specifically to 
 
102 CER “Wind Generator Connection Policy: Draft Decision”, 11th May, 2004 
(CER/04/183).  The DSO grid code will be published in early Autumn 2004 but it 
is expected to have similar requirements to the TSO Grid code. 
103 Personal communication Dr. P. O Kane, IWEA, September 2004. 
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encourage new capacity development and will only apply to newly 
built projects. Feed-in tariffs (FITs) were a commonly used policy 
instrument for the promotion of renewable electricity production 
and have proven to be the most effective at bringing forward 
capacity in the short and medium term. They are typically used 
where the market structure is characterised by monopoly suppliers 
or vertically integrated utilities. The term feed-in tariff is used to 
cover a minimum guaranteed price per unit of produced electricity 
to be paid to the producer, as well as the premium in addition to 
market electricity prices that may be paid. The support is set with an 
agreed rate of return. It is not surprising that the renewable energy 
industry tends to favour this option. Regulatory measures are 
usually applied to impose an obligation on electricity utilities to pay 
the (independent) power producer a price as specified by the 
government. The market players determine the quantity 
forthcoming of renewable electricity.  
The FIT system can be criticised on a number of key 
dimensions which should be considered in putting together the 
finer details of the new scheme for Ireland. A potential mistake 
would be to lump all our renewable technologies together, 
discouraging development of the less mature technologies. Second, 
in assigning the number of years to operate the tariff, it should be 
noted that investors will push for a longer period to give them 
income security for a substantial part of the project lifetime. A 
longer guaranteed market lowers their risk at an increasingly 
uncertain but exponentially increasing cost to the 
taxpayer/consumer. Third, supply companies will complain that it 
loads them with extra costs based on their purchase obligation, 
which is not market determined and may not reflect consumer 
preferences. A major problem with the FIT is that a fixed price 
level does not conform to traditional market principles and it 
generally is not reduced in step with technological development. 
The level of the tariff does not have to be directly related to either 
cost or price, and is generally chosen at a level to motivate investors 
for green power production. The Danish government regretted that 
windfall profits accrued to wind generators who availed of the 
Danish scheme.  
Some adaptations of the instrument can be applied to correct for 
past mistakes including taking into account the best technology on 
the market and benchmarking the tariff at regular intervals. This 
would introduce an element of competition into the system. As the 
market share of wind power increases, the burden of the feed-in 
scheme on government finances or electricity consumers could 
become politically unacceptable. It is also possible to design a feed-
in mechanism that gives producers a fixed premium on top of the 
market price of all electricity.104 Such a fixed premium per kWh of 
 
104 The German utilities have never been happy with the feed-in schemes in 
Germany claiming that they conflicted with EU rules for state aid. It was referred 
to the European Court of Justice and it was ruled in 2001 that the scheme did not 
constitute State Aid. 
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“renewable benefit” was financed in Spain from a tax on all 
electricity consumption with the remainder of the price reflecting 
current market electricity prices.  
The administrative costs and complexity involved for 
governments in implementing fixed feed-in tariffs are low; however 
this instrument does not ensure that consumers will be paying the 
lowest cost possible. There is no competitive mechanism to 
determine a fair price and prices tend to be set for many years in 
advance with little scope to reduce prices paid even when costs are 
falling.  This instrument is not consistent with liberal markets 
without some mechanism in place to distribute the obligation of 
purchasing highly priced power to all electricity suppliers. FITs are 
certainly not consistent with developing a pan-European support 
system for renewables which would be easier to harmonise if a 
developed certificate trading system was in place.  
¾ There are some very real dangers which persist with the 
FIT support instrument: the feed-in tariff price will not 
relate to the cost structure of the firm and will be set at the 
marginal cost of the last firm to meet the target. This 
means that the inframarginal plant could make substantial 
profits out of fixed tariff set ex ante. The cost to consumers 
of the last few MW could be very high and the provision of 
a feed-in tariff effectively derisks the investment at 
consumers’ expense.  
¾ The price set for the FIT is critical in obtaining a certain 
target but in order to set the correct price many 
assumptions have to be made including the relevant Best 
New Entrant (BNE); the weighted average cost of capital 
for each of the technologies; the length of the power 
purchase agreement; the relevant rate of return; the 
assumption of the distribution between equity and debt 
financed capital. 
Quota Obligations/Green Certificates  
The aim of the certificates trading model is to introduce conditions 
of market competition into the production of green energy for 
technologies that are not fully competitive with the traditional 
supply systems. Quota obligations are set to impose a minimum 
production or consumption of electricity from renewable energy 
sources. Prices are set by the market that produces, sells and 
distributes the stated amount of energy from renewable sources. 
The obligation is imposed on consumption (often through 
distribution companies) or production. Governments may choose 
to establish 'technology bands' in order to protect technologies 
from strong competition by lower cost options. The quota can 
usually be traded between companies to avoid market distortions. A 
tradable green certificate is needed for this system. These green 
certificates provide an accounting system to register production, 
authenticate the source of electricity, and to verify whether demand 
has been met.  
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A green certificate market has operated in Holland since the 
beginning of 1998 and is supported by a voluntary consumer quota 
of green electricity. Since 2001, Dutch consumers have a free choice 
of suppliers of renewable electricity. At the same time, they have 
been exempted from paying environmental tax on their renewable 
electricity consumption. This corresponds to a rebate of about 6.7 
cents per kWh and puts renewable electricity at the same price level 
as traditional energy sources. The demand for renewable electricity 
has increased dramatically and the Dutch suppliers cannot fulfil this 
demand domestically. Since 2002 Dutch electricity suppliers have 
imported renewable electricity from abroad subject to the condition 
that it is certified as green; it cannot have received subsidies in 
another state and the market opening in the exporting country is at 
least the same level as in the Netherlands. The relatively high Dutch 
rebate on renewable electricity may have the consequence that it is 
supporting renewable electricity installations in the exporting 
countries.  
Sweden, Italy and Belgium have also initiated green certificate 
trading schemes. However, the success of the schemes has more 
been driven by whether the green certificate markets operate in 
conjunction with an obligatory consumer quota or not. Where 
quotas do exist, the price of green certificates has fluctuated 
significantly and at times are a very scare commodity. The 
uncertainty about the price has been regarded as a disincentive to 
investors in renewable technologies. In the Danish system, 
minimum and maximum prices105 are defined for green certificates 
to allay some of the investor uncertainty. The problem is also 
alleviated by long-term electricity supply contracts and the use of 
financial instruments including futures trading.  
Voluntary buying in excess of renewable electricity obligatory 
quotas is known as green pricing. It may be accommodated in a 
certificates trading model if voluntary green electricity consumption 
absorbs over-quota green consumption. Otherwise consumers who 
do not fulfil their obligations would be “let off” their obligation at 
the expense of the over-subscribed green pricing customers. This 
‘free-rider’ potential may dissuade the over-achievers if some 
additional incentive is not in place (e.g. exemption from green 
taxes). Transactions costs are also very high with a certificates 
trading system.  
Tender Systems 
This was the approach used by the Irish government in successive 
AER schemes. This approach was first developed in the UK106 and 
uses a competitive bidding procedure to select beneficiaries for 
support (investment or production – such as price-adders or feed-
 
105 The minimum price is specified by law but the maximum price is equal to the 
penalty for not fulfilling the consumer quota. 
106 The British tender system based on the so-called Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation 
(NFFO) dates from the early 1990s.  
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in-tariffs), or for other limited rights – such as sites for wind energy. 
The criteria for the evaluation of the bids are set before the bidding 
round. The government decides on the desired level of electricity 
from each of the renewable sources, their growth rate over time, 
and the level of long-term price security offered to producers over 
time. In Ireland the cost of the scheme continues to be funded 
through a Public Service Obligation (PSO). In the UK, the bidding 
was accompanied by an obligation on the part of electricity 
providers to purchase a certain amount of electricity from 
renewable sources at a premium price (power purchase agreement). 
The difference between the premium and the UK market price is 
reimbursed to the electricity provider, and is financed through a 
non-discriminatory levy on all domestic electricity consumption. In 
each bidding round the most cost-effective offers will be selected to 
receive the subsidy. The mechanism therefore leads to the lowest 
cost options for consumers. The UK has since abandoned its tender 
system and replaced it by a certificates trading model.  
Investment Subsidies 
Investment subsidies can help to overcome the barrier of a high 
initial investment. Section 486B of the Finance Act 1998 offers tax 
relief for Irish corporate investors in renewable energy projects. 
This type of subsidy is commonly used to stimulate investments in 
less economical renewable energy technologies. Investment 
subsidies are usually 20-50 per cent of eligible investment costs, but 
in some cases subsidy is given over the total eligible investment 
sum, however within the limitations of the Community guidelines 
on State Aid for environmental protection. We also consider loans 
with a low interest rate to be investment subsidies.  
Fiscal Measures 
Some EU countries support renewable electricity by means of the 
fiscal system. These schemes may take different forms. They range 
from rebates on general energy taxes, rebates from special emission 
taxes, proposals for lower VAT rates, tax exemption for equity 
funds, to attractive depreciation terms but within the EU they must 
be in line with the Community Guidelines on State Aid. The USA 
stimulated significant levels of new renewable (primarily wind) 
energy electricity using such an instrument. Owners’ federal tax 
liability credits per unit of production exported to the transmission 
system were given for the first 10 years of production at a fixed 
price fully indexed to inflation. The mechanism does not limit the 
total capacity which the grid can accommodate and in the state of 
Texas wind-farms are being asked to constrain export for grid 
reasons. The investor must have a large tax base in order to fully 
benefit from the incentive and only strategic investors have filled 
this role in the USA where a small number own a large portion of 
the new renewable energy capacity. As with all tax schemes their 
cost is uncertain in advance. The Commission on Taxation 
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recommended against such an approach to incentivising investment 
as long ago as the early 1980s.  
Other Secondary Measures 
In the Republic of Ireland, market opening for green suppliers was 
introduced in February 2000 in advance of full market opening 
(February 2005), giving them a beneficial head start. In addition, the 
balancing regime for green sales and green energy was set 
generously but in terms of a higher margin and for a longer period 
to assist new entrants.  There are more favourable arrangements in 
place in the trading rules for green generators than brown.  
Experience in Other Countries 
In promoting the use of electricity from renewable sources the 
greatest penetration has been achieved with the FIT in Denmark, 
Germany and Spain, which relied heavily on this instrument to get 
the initial capacity in place. The European Environment Agency 
(2001) found that 80 percent of new EU wind energy output 
occurred as a direct result of this instrument in these countries. 
Some accession countries, notably Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia 
and Estonia have recently introduced a renewables feed-in tariff.107 
Denmark subsequently moved to a certificate-trading scheme once 
its capacity was in place in anticipation of an EU wide green 
certificate trading system but later reverted back to a FIT with some 
competitive features artificially imposed on the FIT system to share 
the premium tariff between electricity consumers and the 
government budget. Benchmarking was instituted to help take 
technological developments into account. On the other hand, 
benchmarking was criticised because it dilutes the investment 
certainty that is the FIT scheme’s strongest characteristic.  
Overview of Promotional System for Renewable Electricity by EU(15) in 2001 
 AU BE DK* FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL NO PO SP SW UK Total 
FIT X  X  X X X X   X X   7 
Tender        X         1 
Green 
Pricing    X           
  1 
Certs  X X      X  X X   X X 7 
Irish Experience of Incentivising Renewables 
The most recent policy for renewables in Ireland comprised of a 
competitive tendering system – the Alternative Energy Requirement 
(AER) programme. In addition, the Electricity Regulation Act 1999 
introduced full market opening for green electricity generators and 
suppliers.108  
 
107 Latvia guarantees the electricity price for eight years after grid connection and 
has set the tariff at twice the average electricity selling price at close to 5 euro cents.  
108 Green electricity suppliers only have to balance supply and demand on an 
annual basis rather than by the half hour for conventional generators.  
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Alternative Energy Requirement 
The AER mechanism is an example of a bidding system and is the 
only dedicated subsidy system for production of renewable energies 
that operated in Ireland. It combines grant aid from the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF-subsidies) with price support 
above avoided fuel costs. The objective of each AER round was to 
compete for rights to generate electricity and to sell it to the ESB at 
agreed rates over a fifteen-year period. Prospective generators were 
invited to compete based on a price per unit of electricity. The 
advantage was that the guaranteed bankable support for projects 
would provide confidence to investors. The tendering process was 
used as it promised the delivery of renewables-based electricity at 
lowest cost.  
Actual bids of the winning projects in the AER rounds are 
confidential. AER V projects should have been installed by the end 
of 2004 and the target installation for AER VI is December 2005.109 
As a number of fiscal incentives used by renewable energy 
developers to attract investment under their AER V projects were 
no longer available, some applicants were allowed to submit fresh 
bids in AER VI. These differences related to the use of price 
indexation, which was the full consumer price index (CPI) in AER 
VI and the option for generators to apply for an accelerated upfront 
payment in the latest round. Up to 35 per cent of the funding for 
the second half of the contract could be claimed upfront in the first 
seven years as an accelerated capital recovery mechanism. As such, 
revenues and outgoings are matched more closely over the life of 
the contract. The reason for introducing the accelerated payment 
option followed from the finding that developers found debt 
providers were in most cases confident to provide funds at an early 
stage in the project while equity providers were found not to be as 
confident. Developers were therefore finding it very difficult to 
bridge the difference between the full capital costs and debt 
available. The accelerated payment allowed developers to source 
additional sources of finance, which in many cases is relatively 
short-term.  
 
 
 
109 Excluding two offshore wind demonstration projects and the biomass-CHP 
category which must be installed and selling electricity by 31 December, 2006.  
Outcome of the AER Competitions 
 AER I AER II AER III AER IV AER V AER VI 
Date 1996 1996 March 1997 – April 
1998 
Sept 1997 – Aug 1998 May 2001 – Feb 2002 Feb 2003- July 2003 
Technologies 
supported 
Wind, small scale 
hydro, biomass 
(landfill gas), CHP 
waste to energy 
Waste to energy Large Scale Wind (>5 
MW), Small scale wind, 
biomass (landfill gas), 
small scale hydro and 
wage energy 
Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP) 
Large scale wind (>3 
MW), small-scale 
hydro, biomass  
(landfill gas) 
Large scale wind (>5 
MW), small scale  
wind (<5MW).,  
offshore wind, small-
scale hydro, biomass 
(landfill gas), biomass 
CHP, biomass  
(anaerobic digestion) 
       
Total MW targeted 75 MW 1 plant between 10 
and 30 MW 
100 MW 25 MW new + 10 MW 
existing 
255 MW 500 MW 
(Green Paper) 
       
Applications selected 34 1 30 19 (17 new + 2 
 extensions) 
 48 
Total MW supported 22 MW Did not proceed 158.75 52.6 MW 363 MW 365 MW 
       
New Capacity 
installed 
70.62 MW 0 MW 42.11 18.353 MW 109.076 MW  
Breakdown: 
Wind 7 projects (45.8MW) - 6 projects (37.51 MW) - 
354.095 MW 279.42MW onshore + 
50 MW offshore 
Small Scale Hydro 6 projects (2.304 MW) - 4 projects (1.67 MW) - 0.949 MW 1.309 MW 
CHP 4 projects (10.716MW) - - 3 new projects + 2 
extensions 
0 26.83 MW 
Land fill gas 5 projects (11.804MW) - 1 project (2.928 MW) - 8.008MW 7.507 MW 
Wave energy - - 0 - - - 
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The success rates of the various AER rounds were largely 
dependent on projects receiving planning consent and on secondary 
supports available, particularly capital supports. A Renewable 
Energy Development Group was established to accompany this 
process of target setting and policy formulation with the specific 
13.2 per cent target set for renewable electricity for Ireland by 2010 
set in the context of the EC Renewables Directive (2001/77/EC). 
The key design objectives for the continuing policy must be to 
ensure that this target is met at least cost to consumers while 
providing fair returns to attract investors. 
 
